The inescapability of moral luck

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I argue that any account attempting to do away with resultant or circumstantial moral luck is inconsistent with a natural response to the problem of constitutive moral luck. It is plausible to think that we sometimes contribute to the formation of our characters in such a way as to mitigate our constitutive moral luck at later times. But, as I argue here, whether or not we succeed in bringing about changes to our characters is itself a matter of resultant and circumstantial moral luck. I conclude with a dilemma, both horns of which require accepting some form of moral luck.

Author's Profile

Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University


Added to PP

480 (#33,350)

6 months
138 (#22,473)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?