The inescapability of moral luck

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310 (2021)
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I argue that any account attempting to do away with resultant or circumstantial moral luck is inconsistent with a natural response to the problem of constitutive moral luck. It is plausible to think that we sometimes contribute to the formation of our characters in such a way as to mitigate our constitutive moral luck at later times. But, as I argue here, whether or not we succeed in bringing about changes to our characters is itself a matter of resultant and circumstantial moral luck. I conclude with a dilemma, both horns of which require accepting some form of moral luck.
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Archival date: 2021-12-03
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