View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

771 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 771
Material to categorize
  1. Evil and Moral Responsibility in The Vocation of Man.Jane Dryden - 2013 - In Daniel Breazeale & Tom Rockmore (eds.), Fichte's Vocation of Man: New Interpretive and Critical Essays. Albany, NY, USA: pp. 185-198.
    When discussing the problem of evil, philosophers often distinguish between physical evil (harm caused within the natural world such as natural disasters, disease, and the like), and moral evil (harm caused by human agency). Mapping this traditional distinction is mapped onto the third section of Fichte’s The Vocation of Man would at first seem fairly straightforward: for Fichte, evil arising from nature occurs through “blind mechanism” and is unfree; in contrast, evil done by human beings arises out of free agency. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The parallelism argument and the problem of moral luck.Anna Nyman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):955-971.
    Robert Hartman’s parallelism argument aims to show that resultant moral luck exists. The gist of the argument is this: because there is circumstantial moral luck in a particular circumstantial luck scenario and that scenario is analogous in important ways to a particular resultant luck scenario, the resultant luck scenario is plausibly an instance of resultant moral luck. I argue that there is a principled way of denying that circumstantial moral luck is present in the circumstantial luck scenario. Doing so is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Making Sense of the Knobe-Effect.István Zárdai - 2022 - Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 13:11-20.
    The paper defends the idea that when we evaluate whether agents deserve praise or blame for their actions, we evaluate both whether their action was intentional, and whether it was voluntary. This idea can explain an asymmetry in blameworthiness and praiseworthiness: Agents can be blamed if they have acted either intentionally or voluntarily. However, to merit praise we expect agents to have acted both intentionally and voluntarily. This asymmetry between demands of praise and blame offers an interpretation of the Knobeeffect: (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..
    Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Haji’s argument requires not only that we embrace an ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, but also that we adopt the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’. I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Distributed Responsibility in Human–Machine Interactions.Anna Strasser - 2021 - AI and Ethics.
    Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and raises (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. A New Ameliorative Approach to Moral Responsibility.Mich Ciurria - 2022 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 1 (2):159-183.
    Sally Haslanger identifies three standard philosophical approaches – conceptual, descriptive, and ameliorative – and defends an ameliorative analysis of race and gender as the most effective at addressing social injustice. In this paper, I assign three influential theories of moral responsibility to these categories, and I defend the ameliorative approach as the most justice-conducive. But I argue that existing ameliorative accounts of responsibility are not ameliorative enough – they do not adequately address social injustice. I propose a new ameliorative model (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Gratitude to God for Our Own Moral Goodness.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    Someone owes gratitude to God for something only if God benefits her and is morally responsible for doing so. These requirements concerning benefit and moral responsibility generate reasons to doubt that human beings owe gratitude to God for their own moral goodness. First, moral character must be generated by its possessor’s own free choices, and so God cannot benefit moral character in human beings. Second, owed gratitude requires being morally responsible for providing a benefit, which rules out owed gratitude to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Obrana determinismu.Filip Tvrdý - 1997 - Proglas 8 (10):37-38.
    Reakce na článek Johna Carrolla "Proti svobodné vůli", Proglas, roč. 8, čís. 5-6 (1997), s. 14-18.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Retributivism, Free Will, and the Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - forthcoming - In Palgrave Handbook of the Philosophy of Punishment. London, UK:
    This chapter outlines six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. It then sketches a novel non-retributive alternative called the public health-quarantine model. The core idea of the model is that the right to harm in self-defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate protection. The model also draws on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Blame for Me and Not for Thee: Status Sensitivity and Moral Responsibility.Henry Argetsinger - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
    In our day-to-day lives, we form responsibility judgements about one another – but we are imperfect beings, and our judgments can be mistaken. This paper suggests that we get things wrong not merely by chance, but predictably and systematically. In particular, these miscues are common when we are dealing with large gaps in social status and power. That is, when we form judgements about those who are much more or less socially powerful than ourselves, it is increasingly likely that “epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Molina Und Das Problem des Theologischen Determinismus.Christoph Jäger - 2018 - In Louis de Molina, Göttlicher Plan und menschliche Freiheit, lat.-deutsch,. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. pp. 13-178.
    Der Download enthält die penultimative Fassung (noch unter dem vorläufigen Titel "Molina über Vorsehung und Freiheit"). Diese ausführliche Einleitung zu dem Band "Luis de Molina: Göttlicher Plan und menschliche Freiheit", hg. und übersetzt von C. Jäger, H. Kraml und G. Leibold, Hamburg: Meiner 2018, rekonstruiert auf 165 S. Molinas berühmte Theorie der Willensfreiheit und die Frage ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit göttlichem Vorherwissen und göttlicher Vorsehung. Sie zeichnet wesentliche Stationen der Debatte um den theologischen Determinismus nach, wie sie sich von Augustinus und (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Sizing Up Free Will: The Scale of Compatibilism.Stuart Doyle - 2021 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 42 (3 & 4):271-289.
    Is human free will compatible with the natural laws of the universe? To “compatibilists” who see free actions as emanating from the wants and reasons of human agents, free will looks perfectly plausible. However, “incompatibilists” claim to see the more ultimate sources of human action. The wants and reasons of agents are said to be caused by physical processes which are themselves mere natural results of the previous state of the world and the natural laws which govern it. This paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Still Guilty.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    According to what may be called PERMANENT, blameworthiness is forever: once you are blameworthy for something, you are always blameworthy for it. Here a prima facie case for this view is set out, and the view is defended from two lines of attack. On one, you are no longer blameworthy for a past offense if, despite being the person who committed it, you no longer have any of the pertinent psychological states you had at the time of the misdeed. On (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice.J. Y. Lee - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):519-536.
    Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able to redress the testimonial injustice. Moreover, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Meaning and Responsibility.Ray Buchanan & Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    In performing an act of assertion we are sometimes responsible for more than the content of the literal meaning of the words we have used, sometimes less. A recently popular research program seeks to explain certain of the commitments we make in speech in terms of responsiveness to the conversational subject matter (Hoek 2018, Stokke 2016, Yablo 2014). We raise some issues for this view with the aim of providing a more general account of linguistic commitment: one that is grounded (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Institutional Responsibility is Prior to Personal Responsibility in a Pandemic.Ben Davies & Julian Savulescu - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-20.
    On 26 January 2021, while announcing that the country had reached the mark of 100,000 deaths within 28 days of COVID-19, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that he took “full responsibility for everything that the Government has done” as part of British efforts to tackle the pandemic. The force of this statement was undermined, however, by what followed: -/- What I can tell you is that we truly did everything we could, and continue to do everything that we can, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. The Inescapability of Moral Luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.
    I argue that any account attempting to do away with resultant or circumstantial moral luck is inconsistent with a natural response to the problem of constitutive moral luck. It is plausible to think that we sometimes contribute to the formation of our characters in such a way as to mitigate our constitutive moral luck at later times. But, as I argue here, whether or not we succeed in bringing about changes to our characters is itself a matter of resultant and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The Identity of the Self Over Time is Normative.David L. Thompson - manuscript
    The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or contiguous relations between independently definable mental events, as proposed by Locke and Parfit. The identity of the self over time is normative: it depends on the institutional context of social rules external to the self that determine the relationship between past commitments and current responsibilities. (2005).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2014 - In David Palmer (ed.), Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates. New York, NY, USA: pp. 107-23.
    We take it for granted that commonly we act freely and we are generally morally responsible for what we do when we so act. Can there be such a thing as freely omitting to act, or freely refraining or forbearing, and can we be similarly responsible for omitting, refraining, and forbearing? This paper advances a view of freely omitting to act. In many cases, freedom in omitting cannot come to the same thing as freedom in acting, since in many cases (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Negligent Action and Unwitting Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - In Alfred Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will. New York, NY, USA: pp. 298-317.
    Negligence and omission are closely related: commonly, in cases of negligent action, the agent has failed to turn her attention to some pertinent fact. But that omission is itself typically unwitting. A sufficient condition for blameworthiness for an unwitting omission is offered, as is an account of blameworthiness for negligent action. It is argued that one can be blameworthy for wrongdoing done from ignorance even if one is not blameworthy for that ignorance.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  21. Ignorance, Revision, and Common Sense.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford, UK: pp. 233-51.
    Sometimes someone does something morally wrong in clear-eyed awareness that what she is doing is wrong. More commonly, a wrongdoer fails to see that her conduct is wrong. Call the latter behavior unwitting wrongful conduct. It is generally agreed that an agent can be blameworthy for such conduct, but there is considerable disagreement about how one’s blameworthiness in such cases is to be explained, or what conditions must be satisfied for the agent to be blameworthy for her conduct. Many theorists (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  22. Responsibility: The Charge of Meaning in Art and Language.Sauer Martina - 2021 - Art Style International 8:153-167.
    This article starts from the assumption that there is a connection between art and language and responsibility. What is it based on? It follows on from the research of the Hamburg Circle in the 1920s by Ernst Cassirer and Aby M. Warburg, and was strengthened in the 2000s by Hartmut Böhme. Their joint starting point is the emotional life of human beings. Thus, they assume that already the perception is shaped by it and can be increased in rituals. Comparably hardly (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness.Andrew C. Khoury - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-21.
    Many theorists have found the notion of forgiveness to be paradoxical, for it is thought that only the blameworthy can be appropriately forgiven but that the blameworthy are appropriately blamed not forgiven. Some have appealed to the notion of repentance to resolve this tension. But others have objected that such a response is explanatorily inadequate in the sense that it merely stipulates and names a solution leaving the transformative power of repentance unexplained. Worse still, others have objected that such a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to the response-dependence view of moral responsibility, a person is morally responsible just in case, and in virtue of the fact that, she is an appropriate target for reactive attitudes. This paper raises a new puzzle regarding response-dependence: there is a mismatch between the granularity of the reactive attitudes and of responsibility facts. Whereas the reactive attitudes are comparatively coarse-grained, responsibility facts can be quite fine-grained. This poses a challenge for response-dependence, which seeks to ground facts about responsibility in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. It’s (Almost) All About Desert: On the Source of Disagreements in Responsibility Studies.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):386-404.
    In this article I discuss David Shoemaker’s recently published piece “Responsibility: The State of the Question. Fault Lines in the Foundations.” While agreeing with Shoemaker on many points, I argue for a more unified diagnosis of the seemingly intractable debates that plague (what I call) “responsibility studies.” I claim that, of the five fault lines Shoemaker identifies, the most basic one is about the role that the notion of deserved harm should play in the theory of moral responsibility. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. What Do Trollies Teach Us About Responsible Innovation?Steven Umbrello - 2021 - In Death And Anti-Death, Volume 19: One Year After Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020). Ann Arbor, MI: Ria University Press. pp. 271-288.
    Since its inception, the trolley problem has sparked a rich debate both within and beyond moral philosophy. Often used as a primer for students to begin thinking about moral intuitions as well as how to distinguish between different forms of moral reasoning, the trolley problem is not without its uses in very practical, applied field like engineering. Often thought of as unrealistic by technically-oriented engineers, trolley cases in fact, help us to think about moral responsibility in a high tech world. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Minding Negligence.Craig K. Agule - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-21.
    The counterfactual mental state of negligent criminal activity invites skepticism from those who see mental states as essential to responsibility. Here, I offer a revision of the mental state of criminal negligence, one where the mental state at issue is actual and not merely counterfactual. This revision dissolves the worry raised by the skeptic and helps to explain negligence’s comparatively reduced culpability.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Actual Causation.Enno Fischer - 2021 - Dissertation, Leibniz Universität Hannover
    In this dissertation I develop a pluralist theory of actual causation. I argue that we need to distinguish between total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. The pluralist theory accounts for a set of example cases that have raised problems for extant unified theories and it is supported by considerations about the various functions of causal concepts. The dissertation also analyses the context-sensitivity of actual causation. I show that principled accounts of causal reasoning in legal inquiry face limitations and I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Excuse Without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance.Paulina Sliwa - 2020 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. pp. 72-95.
    Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been based on a mistaken assumption: namely that excuses are all-or-nothing affairs; to have an excuse is to be blameless. The chapter argues that we should reject this assumption. Excuses are not binary but gradable: they can be weaker or stronger, mitigating blame to greater or lesser extent. This chapter explores the notions of strength of excuses, blame miti- gation and the relationship between excuses and moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.
    Some arguments include imperative clauses. For example: ‘Buy me a drink; you can’t buy me that drink unless you go to the bar; so, go to the bar!’ How should we build a logic that predicts which of these arguments are good? Because imperatives aren’t truth apt and so don’t stand in relations of truth preservation, this technical question gives rise to a foundational one: What would be the subject matter of this logic? I argue that declaratives are used to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Quantum Propensities in the Brain Cortex and Free Will.Danko D. Georgiev - 2021 - Biosystems 208:104474.
    Capacity of conscious agents to perform genuine choices among future alternatives is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Determinism that pervades classical physics, however, forbids free will, undermines the foundations of ethics, and precludes meaningful quantification of personal biases. To resolve that impasse, we utilize the characteristic indeterminism of quantum physics and derive a quantitative measure for the amount of free will manifested by the brain cortical network. The interaction between the central nervous system and the surrounding environment is shown to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Does the Anthropocene Require Us to Be Saints?Bennett Gilbert - manuscript
    The question of the moral demands that humans, posthumans, and nonhumans in the Anthropocene put up on persons now living generally takes the form of supererogatory demands—that is, moral obligations with a perfectionist structure leading to obligations “above and beyond the call of duty” and extreme individual and collective sacrifice. David Roden construes this by deontology; Toby Ord, following Derek Parfit, by consequentualism. Such obligations are akin to the martyrdom of saints: but must our expectations of the Anthropocene necessarily lead (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. How to Theorise About the Criminal Law: Thoughts on Methodology Prompted by Alex Sarch’s Criminally Ignorant.Aness Kim Webster - 2021 - Jurisprudence 12 (2):247-258.
    Alex Sarch’s recent book, Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don’t is a wonderfully rich work.1 Sarch provides and defends an explanatorily powerful theory of criminal culpab...
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Shame and the Scope of Moral Accountability.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):544-564.
    It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments for the view that shame is a reactive attitude. The arguments also support the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Faultless Responsibility: On the Nature and Allocation of Moral Responsibility for Distributed Moral Actions.Luciano Floridi - 2016 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 374:20160112.
    The concept of distributed moral responsibility (DMR) has a long history. When it is understood as being entirely reducible to the sum of (some) human, individual and already morally loaded actions, then the allocation of DMR, and hence of praise and reward or blame and punishment, may be pragmatically difficult, but not conceptually problematic. However, in distributed environments, it is increasingly possible that a network of agents, some human, some artificial (e.g. a program) and some hybrid (e.g. a group of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  36. Impermissible yet Praiseworthy.Theron Pummer - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):697-726.
    It is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, not praiseworthy. I argue that unexcused impermissible acts can not only be pro tanto praiseworthy, but overall praiseworthy—and even more so than permissible alternatives. For example, there are cases in which it is impermissible to at great cost to yourself rescue fewer rather than more strangers, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissibly rescuing no one. I develop a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can so radically come apart (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. A Filosofia Moral Kantiana Como Teoria da Aplicação da Norma.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2011 - [email protected] 1 (1):27-44.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Banez’s Big Problem: The Ground of Freedom.James Dominic Rooney - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):91-112.
    While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even if (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation: Personal Identity, Authenticity, and Autonomy.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2020 - Diametros 18 (69):71-98.
    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an invasive therapeutic method involving the implantation of electrodes and the electrical stimulation of specific areas of the brain to modulate their activity. DBS brings therapeutic benefits, but can also have adverse side effects. Recently, neuroethicists have recognized that DBS poses a threat to the very fabric of human existence, namely, to the selves of patients. This article provides a review of the neuroethical literature examining this issue, and identifies the crucial dimensions related to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Choice, Compulsion, and Capacity in Addiction’ - A Commentary on Charland, L. ‘Consent and Capacity in the Age of the Opioid Epidemic: The Drug Dealer’s Point of View’.Tania Gergel - 2021 - Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry 27 (2).
    Charland's article suggests that we need to think more about whether decision-making capacity is impaired in severe addiction, working from the idea that drug dealers rely on this understanding of addiction to draw in their clients. Charland argues that it is possible to make a choice without being in control (to make decisions without having decision-making capacity). I argue in support of Charland's ideas by examining the reasons supporting a medical model of addiction and its importance. (For Charland's article and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. The Case Against Non-Moral Blame.Benjamin Matheson & Per-Erik Milam - forthcoming - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 11.
    Non-moral blame seems to be widespread and widely accepted in everyday life—tolerated at least, but often embraced. We blame athletes for poor performance, artists for bad or boring art, scientists for faulty research, and voters for flawed reasoning. This paper argues that non-moral blame is never justified—i.e. it’s never a morally permissible response to a non-moral failure. Having explained what blame is and how non-moral blame differs from moral blame, the paper presents the argument in four steps. First, it argues (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Ought Implies Can, Asymmetrical Freedom, and the Practical Irrelevance of Transcendental Freedom.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant's commitment to an asymmetry between the control conditions for praise and blame is explained by his endorsement of the principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). I argue that Kant accepts only a relatively weak version of OIC and that he is hence committed only to a relatively weak requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. This suggests that whether we are transcendentally free is irrelevant to questions about moral permissibility and moral blameworthiness.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Can Morally Ignorant Agents Care Enough?Daniel J. Miller - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):155-173.
    Theorists attending to the epistemic condition on responsibility are divided over whether moral ignorance is ever exculpatory. While those who argue that reasonable expectation is required for blameworthiness often maintain that moral ignorance can excuse, theorists who embrace a quality of will approach to blameworthiness are not sanguine about the prospect of excuses among morally ignorant wrongdoers. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that moral ignorance always reflects insufficient care for what matters morally, and therefore that moral ignorance never excuses. Furthermore, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.
    This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something else, and that they cannot do both. They must act against either of their two judgments. But such action is commonly understood as weakness of will. An agent is weak-willed in doing something if she judges that she ought to and could do something else instead. Thus, it seems (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Circumstance, Answerability, and Luck.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):155-167.
    This paper identifies a distinctive kind of moral luck, deep circumstantial luck and then explores its effects on moral responsibility. A key feature of the phenomenon is that it is recurrent rather than one-off. It also affects agents across a wide range of situations making it difficult to detect. Deeply unlucky agents are subject to unfavourable moral assessments through no fault of their own both in specific cases and when they try to respond to such initial assessments. In this respect, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Psychopaths and Symmetry: A Reply to Nelkin.Matthew Talbert - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (3):1233-1245.
    An agent is morally competent if she can respond to moral considerations. There is a debate about whether agents are open to moral blame only if they are morally competent, and Dana Nelkin’s “Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility” is an important contribution to this debate. Like others involved in this dispute, Nelkin takes the case of the psychopath to be instructive. This is because psychopaths are similar to responsible agents insofar as they act deliberately and on judgments (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Does Criminal Responsibility Rest Upon a False Supposition? No.Luke William Hunt - 2020 - Washington University Jurisprudence Review 13 (1):65-84.
    Our understanding of folk and scientific psychology often informs the law’s conclusions regarding questions about the voluntariness of a defendant’s action. The field of psychology plays a direct role in the law’s conclusions about a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and term of incarceration. However, physical sciences such as neuroscience increasingly deny the intuitions behind psychology. This paper examines contemporary biases against the autonomy of psychology and responds with considerations that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of those biases. The upshot is that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Inverse Enkrasia and the Real Self.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):228-236.
    Non‐reflectivist real self views claim that people are morally responsible for all and only those bits of conduct that express their true values and cares, regardless of whether they have endorsed them or not. A phenomenon that is widely cited in support of these views is inverse akrasia, that is, cases in which a person is praiseworthy for having done the right thing for the right reasons despite her considered judgment that what she did was wrong. In this paper I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Pattern Theory of Self and Situating Moral Aspects: The Need to Include Authenticity, Autonomy and Responsibility in Understanding the Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation.Przemysław Zawadzki - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    The aims of this paper are to: identify the best framework for comprehending multidimensional impact of deep brain stimulation on the self; identify weaknesses of this framework; propose refinements to it; in pursuing, show why and how this framework should be extended with additional moral aspects and demonstrate their interrelations; define how moral aspects relate to the framework; show the potential consequences of including moral aspects on evaluating DBS’s impact on patients’ selves. Regarding, I argue that the pattern theory of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-Flopping.Fischer John Martin - 2016 - In Daniel Speak & Kevin Timpe (eds.), Free Will and Theism. Oxford: pp. 48-61.
    I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and morally (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 771