Is ontological revisionism uncharitable?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):405-425 (2016)
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Some philosophers deny the existence of composite material objects. Other philosophers hold that whenever there are some things, they compose something. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize an objection to these revisionary views: the objection that nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false. Our main business is to show how nihilism and universalism can be defended against the objection. A secondary point is that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism.
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First archival date: 2013-11-22
Latest version: 2 (2016-05-09)
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