Students with visual impairments (VI) are among the groups of students needing specialized resources and supports for their school success. Using a scoping review, the institutional support services needed by visually impaired students were examined in this paper. It looked at different strategies for putting these students' institutional support into practice and collated such strategies into levels that can inform inclusive practices in higher institutions of learning. The study followed a PRISMA protocol to present a descriptive analysis of peer-reviewed publications (...) gathered from PubMed, Scopus, Google Scholars, and PsychInfo. Eight peer reviewed papers with a sample of 316 (303 post-secondary school students with VI and 13 teachers) were drawn for the study after eligibility assessment. It was found that post-secondary school students with VI still requires a number of institutional support modalities for their smooth career transition. Institutional support needs were described under the career challenges experienced by students with visual impairments and the needs for institutional support for building on smooth transition from school to career. It was deduced that student with VI still experiences barriers such as inadequately trained teachers, ill-equipped schools to address their needs, financial challenges, public stigma, accessibility, peer-to-peer acceptance and difficulties in learning at the university. The support needed from the institution were found to be those associated with academic support, integration into the social environment, need for institutional structural support services, and career transition intervention support. Practical implications demonstrates that educational institutions play a big part in helping visually impaired students in career transition. These implications can be built into a framework of action for institutional support for students with VI in schools as proposed in this paper. (shrink)

Many people do not know or believe there is a God, and many experience a sense of divine absence. Are these (and other) “divine hiddenness” facts evidence against the existence of God? Using Bayesian tools, we investigate *evidential arguments from divine hiddenness*, and respond to two objections to such arguments. The first objection says that the problem of hiddenness is just a special case of the problem of evil, and so if one has responded to the problem of evil then (...) hiddenness has no additional bite. The second objection says that, while hiddenness may be evidence against generic theism, it is not evidence against more specific conceptions of God, and thus hiddenness poses no epistemic challenge to a theist who holds one of these more specific conceptions. Our investigation leaves open just how strong the evidence from hiddenness really is, but we aim to clear away some important reasons for thinking hiddenness is of no evidential significance at all. (shrink)

Abstract: This review is based on the issues connected with wife beating in Nigeria which are reflections in so many other developing countries in Africa and Asia. Wife beating is one of the many dimensions of gender issues that threatens social freedom of women and increases mental and health burdens among victims, and indirectly affects their children, family members and the society at large. Yet there is a great degree of social acceptance of the issue as a form of chastisement (...) of wives and socio-cultural norm in most of the African countries, especially in the rural areas. (shrink)

Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, education was interrupted. To continue offering high-quality education led to a dramatic transition away from face-to-face instruction and to blended learning. However, modular distance learning, as one of the adaptable learning modes, was chosen by most parents. Hence, this study seeks to determine the role of parents in the effectiveness of modular distance learning during the COVID-19 pandemic era, ascertain whether there is a relationship between the parents’ roles and their backgrounds, determine whether there is (...) a relationship between the parents’ backgrounds and the children’s academic performance and determine whether the child’s educational performance was related to the role of the parents. A survey questionnaire was used to acquire information on the parents’ profiles and the role they played or did not play. Mean, frequency count, and Spearman correlation were used to analyze the data. Results showed a relationship between parents’ profiles and roles in their child’s academic achievement. The children’s academic performance in modular distance learning is boosted, mainly if the parents work and earn a higher income. Modular distance learning is effective when parents act as friendly teachers and motivators for their children and are employed in either public or private agencies. -/- . (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to motivate and defend a recognizable version of N. L. Wilson's "Principle of Charity" Doing so will involve: (1) distinguishing it fromthe significantly different versions of the Principle familiar through the work of Quine and Davidson; (2) showing that it is compatible with, among other things, both semantic externalism and "simulation" accounts of interpretation; and (3) explaining how it follows from plausible constraints relating to the connection between interpretation and self-interpretation. Finally, it will (...) be argued that Charity represents a type of "minimal individualism" that is closely tied to first person authority, and that endorsing Charity in our interpretations of others reflects a commitment to capturing, from the third-person starting point, their first-personal point of view. (shrink)

Our aim is to propose a non-referential semantics for the principle of logical charity: neither logical universalism (one logic, one way of thinking), nor logical relativism (several logics, several ways of thinking) afford an adequate conceptual framework to interpret the meaning of any speech act. But neither of them is totally wrong, either. The point is to know to which extent each of these views is partly right, thus leading to a more consensual but paradoxical-sounding "relative principle of (...) class='Hi'>charity". After recalling the theoretical background of logical charity, we suggest a four-valued logic of acceptance and rejection (hereafter: AR4); then we explain how such a non-referential semantics does justice both to the champions of logical charity and its opponents. While endorsing coherence as a precondition for rationality, we argue that such a criterion does not entail that classical logic is a necessary conceptual scheme to interpret the others' beliefs. A better application of charity should take account of the questions implicitly asked by a statement, and we bring these questions out in replacing Quine's truth-functions by Quine’s verdict functions while emphasizing upon their varying degrees of strength. (shrink)

Interpretive charity is an important principle in devising the content of propositional attitudes and their expression. I want to argue that it does not square well with externalism about content. Although my argument clearly also applies to a principle of maximizing truth (as it requires only the true belief - component of knowledge), I will focus my attention to Timothy Williamson’s more intriguing recent proposal of maximizing knowledge.

I here investigate whether there is any version of the principle of charity both strong enough to conflict with an error-theoretic version of nominalism (EN) about abstract objects, and supported by the considerations adduced in favour of interpretive charity in the literature. I argue that in order to be strong enough, the principle, which I call (Charity), would have to read, “For all expressions e, an acceptable interpretation must make true a sufficiently high ratio of accepted sentences (...) containing e”. I next consider arguments based on Davidson's intuitive cases for interpretive charity, the reliability of perceptual beliefs, and the reliability of “non-abstractive inference modes”, and conclude that none support (Charity). I then propose a diagnosis of the view that there must be some universal principle of charity ruling out (EN). Finally, I present a reason to think (Charity) is false, namely, that it seems to exclude the possibility of such disagreements as that between nominalists and realists. (shrink)

: The purpose of this paper is to address from a normative perspective issues raised by John Mueller in Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element. Mueller criticizes economists, including Austrians, for failing to properly address unilateral transfers—in particular, charity, childcare, and crime—in economic thought. Mueller challenges economist Gary Becker’s position that giving increases the […] The post “Charity, Childcare, and Crime: From Objectivist Ethics to the Austrian School” appeared first on Libertarian Papers.

Whenever fellow humans suffer due to natural catastrophes, we have a duty to help them. This duty is not only acknowledged in moral theory, but also expressed in ordinary people’s reactions to phenomena such as tsunamis, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Despite being widely acknowledged, this duty is also widely disputed: some believe it is a matter of justice, others a matter of charity. Although central to debates in international political theory, the distinction between justice and charity is hardly ever (...) systematically drawn. To fill this gap in the literature, I consider three accounts of this distinction, the ‘Agent-based’, the ‘Recipient-based’, and the ‘Mixed’ View, and argue that they are all unsatisfactory. I then offer a fourth alternative, the ‘Autonomy’ View, which successfully overcomes the difficulties affecting its rivals. I conclude by considering the implications of this view for the moral grounds of disaster relief in earthquake-stricken Haiti, New Zealand, and Japan. (shrink)

Contemporary republicans have adopted a less-than-charitable attitude toward private beneficence, especially when it is directed to the poor, worrying that rich patrons may be in a position to exercise arbitrary power over their impoverished clients. These concerns have led them to support impartial public provision by way of state welfare programs, including an unconditional basic income (UBI). In contrast to this administrative model of public welfare, I will propose a competitive model in which the state regulates and subsidizes a decentralized (...) and nonstatist provision of support for the poor. This model will fix the historically objectionable features of private provision by having the state prevent collusion among private charities, deliver information to recipients about alternative sources of assistance, and give substantial grants to charities as well as tax incentives and vouchers to donors. I will contend that such an approach would do a better job of minimizing domination of the poor than traditional welfare states and may prove more politically feasible than a UBI, at least in the near term in certain national contexts. (shrink)

Many of us give to charities that are close to our hearts rather than those that would use our gifts to do more good, impartially considered. Is such partiality to charities acceptable? I argue that if partiality to particular people is justified, we can go SOME distance toward justifying partiality to particular charities. Even so, partiality to charities is justified in fewer cases than most people seem to believe.

Positions in the debate about the correct semantics of “S knows that p” are sometimes motivated in part by an appeal to interpretive charity. In particular, non-skeptical views hold that many utterances of the sentence “S knows that p” are true and some of them think the fact that their views are able to respect this is a reason why their views are more charitable than skeptical invariantism. However, little attention has been paid to why charity should be (...) understood in this way and little effort has been spent justifying the notion that a charitable semantics is likely to be true. I distinguish two kinds of interpretive charity. One principle of charity is often appealed to in the literature. I introduce a second. I argue that while some positions better respect one principle of charity, the reverse is true of the other principle of charity. I conclude with some remarks about how to break this apparent tie. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of work on human development in evolutionary anthropology from a Thomist perspective. I show that both fields view care for others as fundamental to human nature and interpret cooperative breeding as expression of the virtue of charity. I begin with an analysis of different approaches to the relationship between evolutionary anthropology and moral theory. I argue that ethical naturalism is the approach best suited to interdisciplinary dialogue, since it holds that natural facts are useful (...) for moral theory but do not encompass it. This forms the basis for a Thomist analysis of some key features of human evolution including bipedalism, higher encephalisation and extended childhood. In each case I explain how these parts of our nature contributed to the evolution of modern humans, and how each is reliant upon communal care. Finally, I offer three observations on these facts from a Thomist perspective. Firstly, that a good human life necessarily involves caring for others and being cared for ourselves. Secondly, that this is exemplified in the virtue of charity, which is the ground of all virtue. Finally, that the need for such care shows that human flourishing cannot be attained without divine aid. (shrink)

Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “equivalent” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language’s semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists who speak “equivalent” languages can only argue about (...) syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “the weak self-conception”. As a result, Hirsch’s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it. (shrink)

In this paper [submitted in 2008] I discuss the relation between truth and assertion. But the paper was never published, because the journal did not start (I don't know whether it started with another name and I wish all the best for this enterprise). After a while, I realized that what I had written was unclear and I tried to re-write with more details for "Agora filosofica". In this new paper I discuss in detail Kripke's example presented as a case (...) against Donnellan's distinction, and I claim that one of the two dialogues breaks Grice's Cooperation principle (and,in general, the charity principle). (shrink)

This chapter deals with Thomas Browne’s most famous work, Religio Medici, and especially with his account of Charity. The first paragraph focuses on Browne’s specific account of the relationship between natural and supernatural. This view is inspired by Bacon, Sebunde, and Montaigne, and is crucial to understand the background of Browne’s view about the virtue of Charity. The second paragraph is about Browne’s specific understanding of Charity, which seems to be a middle stage between the traditional, Scholastic (...) doctrine, and the Kantian idea of moral law, independent from the practical law and the desire of the subject. The third paragraph deals with Religio Medici’s reversal of the traditional “order” of Charity, as well as Browne’s accounts of abnegation and friendship as an effective way for a charity to the self which meets many aspects of Foucault’s ἑπιμέλεια έαuτου. The fourth paragraph is about Browne’s analogical understanding of medicine and morality, as well as his use of the meditatio mortis. (shrink)

My discussion in this paper proceeds in four stages. First, Iprovide a brief description of Nozick’s entitlement theory and I raise some general questions about it. Secondly, I argue, contrary to Nozick, that we are justified in distributing some goods on the basis of need. More specifically, I argue that we must distinguish between the claim that goods ought to be distributed on the basis of need and the claim that goods which are essential needs ought to be distributed on (...) the basis of need. In the third section I consider the objection that such distributions will inevitably lead to the violation of individuals’ property rights. I argue that individuals are obliged to be charitable and that this obligation places limits on what they are entitled to. What charity requires of us, I maintain, we have no rights over and we must relinquish. In the fourth and final section I point out the general significance of these arguments. _______________ Replies include : -/- * Antony Flew, Meeting Needs: charity or justice?: Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (2): 225-231. 1988. -/- * Tony Skillen, "Flew on Russell on Nozick: uncharitable interpretations of justice and unjust views of charity"; Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 (1): 87-89. 1990. (shrink)

This study examines the Egyptian House of Zakat and Charities as an example for Al- Azhar's public role after June 30, 2013. It raises questions regarding Al-Azhar's role in state-society relations, as well as the social, political, and economic implications of the institution's work. The study is based on the concept of the "common sphere," a theoretical model that assumes Al- Azhar's ideal position is to contribute to strengthening cooperative relations between society and the state in a way that reflects (...) the interests of both parties and not to reflect the dominance of one over the other and support it in a way that strengthens conflictual relations. The conclusion of the study is that the policies of the Zakat House assist the state in implementing its austerity economic policies and make up for the lack of public expenditure on service sectors by utilizing donor funds. Thus, the Zakat House contributes to enhancing Al-Azhar's standing in its relations with the state and society. It also aids economically impoverished segments of the population. Nevertheless, compared to the state and Al-Azhar, society at large continues to garner less benefit from the Zakat House's activities. -/- تناقش هذه الدراسة مؤسسة بيت الزكاة والصدقات المصري، باعتباره نموذجًا للحضور الأزهري في المجال العام في مرحلة ما بعد 30 حزيران/ يونيو 2013. وتتساءل عن الأبعاد الاجتماعية والسياسية والاقتصادية لنشاط المؤسسة، وآثار هذه الأنشطة في علاقات الدولة والمجتمع وفي موقع مؤسسة الأزهر من هذه العلاقات. وتعتمد الدراسة في تحليلها على مفهوم "المجال المشترك"، وهو نموذج نظري يفترض أن الوضع المثالي للأزهر وممارساته في المجال العام هو أن يُسهم في تعزيز العلاقات التعاونية بين المجتمع والدولة بما يعكس مصالح الطرفين، لا أن تعكس الهيمنة والسيطرة لأحدهما على الآخر وتدعمها بما يعزز العلاقات الصراعية بين الدولة والمجتمع. وتخلص الدراسة إلى أن سياسات بيت الزكاة تدعم الدولة جزئيًا في تمرير سياساتها الاقتصادية التقشفية وتُعوض قلة الإنفاق العام على القطاعات الخدمية، وذلك باستخدام أموال المتبرعين. يُسهم البيت في تعزيز قوة الأزهر في علاقاته بكل من الدولة والمجتمع. وتستفيد فئات فقيرة من المساعدات والإعانات التي يقدمها البيت. لكن يظل المجتمع أقل الأطراف استفادة من نشاط المؤسسة مقارنة بكل من الدولة والأزهر. (shrink)

Aquinas’s thought is often considered an exemplary balance between Christian faith and natural reason. However, it is not always sufficiently clear what such balance consists of. With respect to the relation between philosophical topics and the Christian faith, various scholars have advanced perspectives that, although supported by Aquinas’s texts, contrast one another. Some maintain that Aquinas elaborated his philosophical view without being under the influence of faith. Others believe that the Christian faith constitutes an indispensable component of Aquinas’s view; at (...) least when Aquinas focused on those statements that, though maintainable by mere reason, belong to the Christian revelation. In this essay I intend to show that the aforementioned perspectives can be reconciled on the basis of Aquinas’s concept of faith. If we do not limit ourselves to considering faith as the assent to the revealed truth, but also look at what leads the believer to assent—i.e., charity that unites the believer with God and is gratuitously conceded by God himself—then the relation between faith and reason appears to be twofold. On the one hand, the truths of faith cannot participate in the rational inquiry, because according to Aquinas faith lacks the evidence searched for by natural reason. On the other hand, since Aquinas holds that faith is the assent to the revelation due to the love for God that is granted by God himself, the believer will take faith as more certain than intellect and science, and the truths of faith will constitute the orientation and criterion of her/his rational investigation. The truths shall constitute orientation because the believer aims to confirm by reason what she/he already believes. They will also be criterion, because in case of a contradiction between rational arguments and revealed truths, reason must be considered mistaken and the rational investigation must start anew from the beginning. (shrink)

Revisionary ontologists are making a comeback. Quasi-nihilists, like Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks, insist that the only composite objects that exist are living things. Unrestriced universalists, like W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, Mark Heller, and Hud Hudson, insist that any collection of objects composes something, no matter how scattered over time and space they may be. And there are more besides. The result, says Eli Hirsch, is that many commonsense judgments about the existence or identity of highly visible physical objects (...) are a priori necessarily false. In a “last ditch effort” to bring revisionary ontologists back to their senses, Hirsch marshalls what he calls the Argument from Charity. We can be sure that there are tables and chairs and that there are no fusions of Plato’s nose and the Eiffel Tower, says Hirsch, because these commonsense platitudes are a logical consequence of the well-known principle of interpretive charity applied to natural languages, like English. In what follows, I assess the Argument from Charity. My conclusion is that if this is the best we can do to save revisionary ontologists, they are surely lost forever. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to begin a conversation about how we read and write about Nietzsche and, related to this, other figures in the history of philosophy. The principle of charity can appear to be a way to bridge two dif-ferent interpretative goals: getting the meaning of the text right and offering the best philosophy. I argue that the principle of charity is multiply ambiguous along three different dimensions, which I call “unit,” “mode,” and “strength”: consequently, (...) it is not a single, neutral or independent principle to which we can helpfully appeal and it cannot, in itself, perform this bridging function. Nietzsche, I suggest, is particularly ill suited to some forms of charitable reading. I compare charity to what I call “misreporting” a philosopher’s words, in order to highlight some problematic structural similarities. Finally, I assess what charity might be doing instead, if it is not intended to bridge meaning and best philosophy. (shrink)

The article distinguishes between charity and philanthropy and answers those who argue that monies spent for either are an inefficient deployment of monies for present consumption that could better be deployed by investing in the production of future wealth. It closes by arguing that philanthropists provide a key leadership role in the free-market economy. -/- The author owns the copyright, and there was no agreement, express or implied, not to use the publisher's PDF.

Social advertising often employs persuasive imagery in support of a morally laden cause. These visual arguments can take the form of veridical representations of the given situation or the form of purposeful visual blends. Both visual routes to persuasion have serious ethical issues to confront. In what concerns the purportedly veridical images, controversies about picture retouching and framing have cast many doubts on their success in offering unmediated access to a given reality. Editorial interests have proven far too influential on (...) the destiny of what and how is presented to the audience from the amount of visual material available on a topic. Even when the audience is certain that photos are not doctored, the use of veridical images may be seen as unethical. Their disproportionate affective impact may lead the audience to hold biased opinions, since other concerns may be impossible to capture in a vivid picture. Visual blends may be the answer to this problem, employing the fictional or the figurative to help the viewer grasp the moral anatomy of a given situation. Their generous use of figurative meaning may be seen as their strength and their weakness at the same time. It makes them less likely to face accusations of distorting reality, because they do not claim to be windows on reality per se. At the same time, it makes them vulnerable to interpretations that miss their true point – one might appreciate the artistry of a visual metaphor or a visual pun and fail to consider the statement it makes about a given situation. Contemporary philosophical approaches to the place of visuals in moral persuasion inform my analysis of the use of visual arguments in charity-oriented advertising. (shrink)

This article considers Pablo Gilabert’s attempt to defend against libertarian critics his ambitious argument for basic positive duties of justice to the world’s destitute. The article notes that Gilabert’s argument – and particularly the vocabulary of perfect and imperfect duties that he adopts – has firm roots in the modern natural rights tradition. The article goes on to suggest, however, that Gilabert employs the phrase ‘imperfect duties’ in a manner that is in some tension with the tradition from which it (...) is derived. Indeed, Gilabert’s novel deployment of the phrase contains a number of radical possibilities that are not pursued in his text. The article suggests that Gilabert would do better to break more decisively from a tradition that insists on the essential distinction between justice and charity. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that there are or will be examples where the principle of charity recommends an interpretation which makes a text more true than another interpretation, whereas the rival interpretation improves on making sense of its form.

In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melamed.

Effective Altruism is a popular social movement that encourages individuals to donate to organizations that effectively address humanity’s most severe poverty. However, because Effective Altruists are committed to doing the most good in the most effective ways, they often argue that it is wrong to help those nearest to you. In this paper, I target a major subset of Effective Altruists who consider it a moral obligation to do the most good possible. Call these Obligation-Oriented Effective Altruists (OOEAs), and their (...) movement Obligation-Oriented Effective Altruism (OOEA). I argue that insofar as this variety of OOEA seems to commit us to refrain from helping the people right in front of us, there is something intuitively wrong about it. In response, I introduce an alternative model that embraces partiality: Mutual Aid. Mutual Aid is a network of community members, usually from the same geographical region, who share a commitment to offer, receive, and exchange material goods, wealth, and social support. I recommend Mutual Aid as a liberatory model, which—through empathy, solidarity, and care—mobilizes community building and provides a catalyst for community advocacy. As such, we should resist the claims of OOEAs that partially distributing our funds to people or causes we care about is morally wrong or even less than ideal. We do not have a moral obligation to use our funds “effectively;” rather, we have a broader obligation to address human suffering, and Mutual Aid is one moral alternative for discharging this duty. (shrink)

This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.

By using multilevel mediation involving 322,589 posts made by 384 musicians over 104 weeks, we simultaneously analyze the short-term and long-term effects of charity-related signaling on sales, with social media engagement as the mediator. Specifically, we compare the effects of charity-related signals with those of two other types of signals: mission-related (i.e., promoting music and commercial products) and non-mission-related (i.e., other posts that do not relate to the other two categories). In the short term, the indirect effect of (...) using charity signaling on sales (through engagement) is positive, though smaller than the effects of mission-related and non-mission related signals. However, in the long term, the indirect effect of regularly using charity-related signaling on sales (through long-term engagement) is greater than for the effects involving the other types of signals. We derive from these findings three main implications for the business ethics literature. First, in the long term, the mutual economic benefits of charity signaling should encourage both entities (i.e., musicians and charities) to go beyond short-term, transactional philanthropy. Second, because it is profitable for musicians to partner with charities in the long-term, our research argues that charities have extensive bargaining power in such co-branding decisions. Third, our research highlights the importance of studying the longitudinal aspects of co-branding decisions involving non-profit organizations; the financial outlook of such decisions could greatly vary depending on the timeframe (i.e., short vs. long). (shrink)

Existential reason belief is a tacit premise in reasoning in any instance of substantial decision making where sentential reason alone cannot indicate the rational choice. The outcome of the decisions that implicate such existential reasons are to essentially constitute either utility or knowledge of some sort or both. The binding underwrites some aspect of mental content that is by design charitably interpretable.---Knowledge or utility if reason consist of desire and belief.

This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problematic knowledge variance. It first replies to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne’s new putative problem cases, which purport to show that pragmatic encroachment is committed to problematic variations in knowledge depending on what choices are available to the potential knower. It argues that the new cases do not provide any new reasons to be concerned about the pragmatic encroacher’s commitment to knowledge-variance. The chapter further argues that concerns about knowledge-variance (...) are not limited to the pragmatic encroacher, but come up for traditional purist invariantism as well. (shrink)

Ludwig deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and, especially, the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another’s speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudes—her beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. The chapter is organized around three questions: What is the relation between rationality and thought? What is the relation between rationality and language? What is the relation between thought and language? Ludwig argues that some large degree of rationality is required for thought and (...) consequently that same degree of rationality at least is required for language since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. In answering questions and, Ludwig gives particular attention to Davidson’s arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech we lack the power of thought. (shrink)

Color relationalism holds that the colors are constituted by relations to subjects. The introspective rejoinder against this view claims that it is opposed to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. The rejoinder seems to be correct about how colors appear when looking at how participants respond to an item about the metaphysical nature of color but not when looking at an item about the ascription of colors. The present article expands the properties investigated to sound and taste and inspects the mentioned asymmetry, (...) with a particular focus on the principle of charity. Using a metaphysical item, we find that color and sound are no different from shape, our control for a clearly anti-relational property. Taste, on the other hand, is no different from likability, our control for a clearly relational property. Importantly, we find that the disparity between metaphysical and ascription items is due to participants using a principle of charity to interpret disagreement cases such that both parties can be correct. (shrink)

This article is a reflection on the NSU Winter Symposium of March 2020, entitled ‘Feminism and Hospitality: Religious and Critical Perspectives in dialogue with a Secular Age’. It contends with moral judgments which regard charity as an act of alienation from the other and as a reiteration of hierarchies of power. Instead of this conceptualisation, I propose an ethics of charity in terms of an ethics of the reflective agency of otherness. This ethics of charity entails acts (...) of aid for an other which stem from the recognition of the agency pertaining to both parties. It will be shown how this recognition of agency, and the reciprocity it entails, is critical for the success of the charitable endeavour in two ways: first, for the manifestation of the act itself of aiding and providing for another; second, for the assertion of the other’s own agency through the reciprocal act of charity. (shrink)

Antonio Caso, “La existencia como economía y como caridad” (1916). Translated with Jose G. Rodriguez Jr. as “Existence as Economy and as Charity,” in 20th Century Mexican Philosophy: Essential Readings, eds. Carlos Alberto Sánchez and Robert Eli Sanchez, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

This research aims to investigate managing information and planning for the participation of health charities. With the Covid-19 outbreak, it was important to use information systems to optimize health management. The correct processing of information is the basis for better use of health charities’ participation. Using the snowball technique, and semi-structured interviews, 47 experts and non-experts in Fars province were asked for their opinions. Next, based on the fuzzy network analysis, important factors were prioritized. Four categories and 8 important criteria (...) were identified. To prioritize the effective aspects of the participation of health charities in Fars province, a network analysis technique was used via MATLAB software. Strategy and programs with a normal weight of 0.34 showed the highest priority. Research and education with a normal weight of 0.26 received the second priority. Laws and regulations with a normal weight of 0.24 were placed as the third priority. Based on the obtained results, creating strategy and planning, training and building cultural in this field, ease of rules and regulations as well as planning of financial resources play an important role in managing the participation of health donors. With precise planning of health programs, donors see the transparency of decisions. They check the part that needs financing and equipment completion. Because the quality of plans and programs, effectiveness and efficiency of strategies, and the quality of results depend on the decisions made by donors. (shrink)

Chapter 32 of the Philosophy of Happiness book by Martin Janello. Please see the Table of Contents for its contextual order. An audio version of this and all other sections of the book, an entire on-line review copy, and a host of other pertinent materials are available without charge at the referenced website.

In the article charity as a factor in building a strong organizational culture is considered; examples of the charitable activities of the world’s leading companies, including health, tourism and hospitality, are demonstrated; the survey results of these industries employees understanding of the culture of philanthropy features are presented; the existence of a link between the characteristics and types of a strong organizational culture, on the one hand, and the charitable donations policy, on the other hand, is proved; recommendations for (...) creating a culture of philanthropy in a company are made. (shrink)

Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. The notion of othering spread from feminist theory and post-colonial studies to other areas of the humanities and social sciences, but is originally rooted in Hegel’s dialectic of identification and distantiation in the encounter of the self with some other in his “Master-Slave dialectic”. In this paper, after reviewing the philosophical (...) and psychological background of othering, I distinguish two kinds of othering, “crude” and “sophisticated”, that differ in the logical form of their underlying arguments. The essential difference is that the former is merely self-other distantiating, while the latter – as in Hegel’s dialectic – partially depends on self-other identification. While crude othering is closer to the paradigmatic notion of othering, sophisticated othering is closer to Hegel’s, but so is quasi-othering, which is nearly identical in form to sophisticated othering, but which misses the defining feature of othering – attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness. Because Hegel’s dialectic applies to any encounter of an interpreting self with some other, sophisticated or quasi-othering is at least potentially a very common occurrence in the interpretation of others, especially of those who do not belong to the in-group. However, although othering is usually undesirable, the Hegelian varieties can provide a “mirror”, which can be used as a tool to improve understanding of both the other and the interpreting self, and the malignant aspects of othering can be avoided through charity. (shrink)

Some of the challenges in Sanders et al. (this issue) can be aptly illustrated by means of charity nudges, that is, nudges designed to increase charitable donations. These nudges raise many ethical questions. First, Oxfam’s triptychs with suggested donations are designed to increase giving. If successful, do our actions match ex ante or ex post preferences? Does this make a difference to the autonomy of the donor? Second, the Behavioural Insights Team conducted experiments using social networks to nudge people (...) to give more. Do these appeals steer clear of exploiting power relations? Do they respect boundaries of privacy? Third, in an online campaign by Kiva, donors are asked to contribute directly to personalized initiatives. In many cases, the initiative has already been funded and donor money is funnelled to a new cause. Is such a “pre-disbursal” arrangement truthful and true to purpose as a social business model? (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that intellectual humility is related to argumentation in several distinct but mutually supporting ways. I begin by drawing connections between humility and two topics of long-standing importance to the evaluation of informal arguments: the ad verecundiam fallacy and the principle of charity. I then explore the more explicit role that humility plays in recent work on critical thinking dispositions, deliberative virtues, and virtue theories of argumentation.

Effective altruism has a strategy problem. Overreliance on a strategy of donating to the most effective charities keeps us on the firefighter's treadmill, continually pursuing the next-highest quantifiable marginal gain. But on its own, this is politically shortsighted. Without any long-term framework within which these individual rescues fit together to bring about the greatest overall impact, we are almost certainly leaving a lot of value on the table. Thus, effective altruists' preferred means undercut their professed aims. Alongside the charity (...) framework, the more effective altruist ought to consider a mutual aid framework, which better acknowledges and honors the unavoidably political commitments of effective altruism to reimagine and remake the world. (shrink)

In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can (...) be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of “deviant” implications. (shrink)

Effective altruism (EA) requires that when we donate to charity, we maximize the beneficial impact of our donations. While we are in broad sympathy with EA, we raise a practical problem for EA, which is that there is a crucial empirical presupposition implicit in its charity assessment methods which is false in many contexts. This is the presupposition that the magnitude of the benefits (or harms) generated by some charity vary continuously in the scale of the intervention (...) performed. We characterize a wide class of cases where this assumption fails, and then draw out the normative implications of this fact. (shrink)