Robot Betrayal: a guide to the ethics of robotic deception

Ethics and Information Technology 22 (2):117-128 (2020)
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Abstract
If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; superficial state deception; and hidden state deception) in order to think clearly about its ethics. Second, it argues that the second type of deception – superficial state deception – is not best thought of as a form of deception, even though it is frequently criticised as such. And third, it argues that the third type of deception is best understood as a form of betrayal because doing so captures the unique ethical harm to which it gives rise, and justifies special ethical protections against its use.
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Archival date: 2019-10-25
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The Philosophical Case for Robot Friendship.John Danaher - forthcoming - Journal of Posthuman Studies.

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