Robotics

The word semantics, in robotics and AI, has no canonical definition. It usually serves to denote additional data provided to autonomous agents to aid HRI. Most researchers seem, implicitly, to understand that such data cannot simply be extracted from environmental data. I try to make explicit why this is so and argue that so-called semantics are best understood as data comprised of conventions of human behaviour. This includes labels, most obviously, but also places, ontologies, and affordances. Object affordances are especially (...) problematic because they require not only semantics that are not in the environmental data (conventions of object use) but also an understanding of physics and object combinations that would, if achieved, constitute artificial superintelligence. (shrink)

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers focus on the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g. in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: Robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment with 399 participants which explores the following three (...) questions: (i) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe intentions to deceive to artificial agents? (ii) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (iii) Do they blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than it presently attracts. (shrink)

Information and meaning exist around us and within ourselves, and the same information can correspond to different meanings. This is true for humans and animals, and is becoming true for robots. We propose here an overview of this subject by using a systemic tool related to meaning generation that has already been published (C. Menant, Entropy 2003). The Meaning Generator System (MGS) is a system submitted to a constraint that generates a meaningful information when it receives an incident information that (...) has a relation with the constraint. The content of the meaningful information is explicited, and its function is to trigger an action that will be used to satisfy the constraint of the system. The MGS has been introduced in the case of basic life submitted to a "stay alive" constraint. We propose here to see how the usage of the MGS can be extended to more complex living systems, to humans and to robots by introducing new types of constraints, and integrating the MGS into higher level systems. The application of the MGS to humans is partly based on a scenario relative to the evolution of body self-awareness toward self-consciousness that has already been presented (C. Menant, Biosemiotics 2003, and TSC 2004). The application of the MGS to robots is based on the definition of the MGS applied to robots functionality, taking into account the origins of the constraints. We conclude with a summary of this overview and with themes that can be linked to this systemic approach on meaning generation. (shrink)

Friendship is an important part of the good life. While many roboticists are eager to create friend-like robots, many philosophers and ethicists are concerned. They argue that robots cannot really be our friends. Robots can only fake the emotional and behavioural cues we associate with friendship. Consequently, we should resist the drive to create robot friends. In this article, I argue that the philosophical critics are wrong. Using the classic virtue-ideal of friendship, I argue that robots can plausibly be considered (...) our virtue friends - that to do so is philosophically reasonable. Furthermore, I argue that even if you do not think that robots can be our virtue friends, they can fulfil other important friendship roles, and can complement and enhance the virtue friendships between human beings. (shrink)

Abstract: One approach to alignment with human values in AI and robotics is to engineer artiTicial systems isomorphic with human beings. The idea is that robots so designed may autonomously align with human values through similar developmental processes, to realize project ideal conditions through iterative interaction with social and object environments just as humans do, such as are expressed in narratives and life stories. One persistent problem with human value orientation is that different human beings champion different values as ideal, (...) meaning that the values to which an AI should be aligned are ambiguous. Prior work considered human development of purpose and source of meaning in life in terms of project ideal conditions, in effect establishing lifelong value orientations according to which intermediate situations are evaluated. The present work compares views on motivating values from St. Augustine and from popular cognitive science. These accounts are described as divergent error theories which present to their proponents as mutually exclusive yet accurate accounts of personal experience due to differential development of variable innate potentials. SpeciTically, the hypothesis proposed is that differential development of spindle neural projections establishes enduring connections between prior established relatively immediate routine processes entrained during childhood and prioritized in popular cognitive science, and later developing higher-level social and self-processes entrained during adolescence and emphasized in Augustine's account, with these projections hard-wiring lifelong motivating value orientations more or less inaccessible to modiTication through material interaction. Robot experiments informed by this study may evaluate variable value orientation by design, with for example autonomous robots developing motivating associations with temporally distal project ideal conditions through love for humanity, as described by Augustine, and others pursuing adaptive Tit to passing norms consistent with popular contemporary accounts. (shrink)

Emergency response times play a critical role in saving lives, especially in urban settings where traffic congestion and unpredictable events can delay ambulance arrivals. This paper explores a novel framework for smart route optimization for emergency vehicles, leveraging artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, and dynamic traffic analytics. We propose a real-time adaptive routing system that integrates machine learning (ML) for predictive modeling and IoT-enabled communication with traffic infrastructure. The system is evaluated using simulated urban environments, achieving a (...) 35% reduction in response times compared to traditional methods. This work lays the foundation for future advancements in intelligent emergency systems and their integration into smart cities. (shrink)

In Sect. 2, I will introduce what religious robots are and present examples of such robots. Then, in Sect. 3, I will discuss my project with a NAO robot at the Katholikentag. In Sect. 4, I will discuss anthropological and ethical questions related to religious robots. Thus, I will outline the direction in which research on religious robots can go, where the challenges lie, and highlight two key advantages. Finally, in Sect. 5, I conclude with an outlook for future research (...) on religious robots. - Puzio, Anna: A NAO Robot Performing Religious Practices. In: ET-Studies 15/1 (2024), pp. 129-140. DOI: 10.2143/ETS.15.1.3293070. (shrink)

An interesting application for social robots is to act as a presenter, for example as a museum guide. In this paper, we present a fully automated system architecture for building adaptive presentations for embodied agents. The presentation is generated from a knowledge graph, which is also used to track the grounding state of information, based on multimodal feedback from the user. We introduce a novel way to use large-scale language models (GPT-3 in our case) to lexicalise arbitrary knowledge graph triples, (...) greatly simplifying the design of this aspect of the system. We also present an evaluation where 43 participants interacted with the system. The results show that users prefer the adaptive system and consider it more human-like and flexible than a static version of the same system, but only partial results are seen in their learning of the facts presented by the robot. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could (...) willingly make themselves answerable for whatever events ensue, even if those events stem from the robot’s autonomous decision(s). This blank check solution was originally proposed in the context of automated warfare (Champagne & Tonkens, 2015), but we extend it to cover all robots. We argue that, because moral answerability in the blank check is accepted voluntarily and before bad outcomes are known, it proves superior to alternative ways of assigning blame. We end by highlighting how, in addition to being just, this self-initiated and prospective moral answerability for robot harm provides deterrence that the four other stances cannot match. (shrink)

I here consider the reasonableness of punishing future autonomous military robots. I argue that it is an engineering desideratum that these devices be responsive to moral considerations as well as human criticism and blame. Additionally, I argue that someday it will be possible to build such machines. I use these claims to respond to the no subject of punishment objection to deploying autonomous military robots, the worry being that an “accountability gap” could result if the robot committed a war crime. (...) (Sparrow 2007). But these robots will be blameworthy and morally responsible for their wrongful conduct. I then show that we have reasons to punish them based both on good effects and the impact on the robot, itself. (shrink)

Ce travail examine les revendications contemporaines de droits pour les robots. Il présente les principales formes argumentatives qui ont été développées en faveur d’une considération éthique ou de droits positifs pour ces machines. Il met en relation ces argumentations avec un travail de recherche-action afin de produire un retour critique sur l’idée de droit des robots. Il montre enfin le rapport complexe entre les récits de la modernité et la revendication de droits pour les robots. This article presents contemporary vindications (...) of robot rights. The first part exposes main argumentations in favor of moral consideration or legal personhood for robots. The second part builds on cooperative action research with several French roboticists and experts in order to evaluate these arguments. These dialogues eventually show the complex relationships between the narratives of modernity and the vindication of robot rights. (shrink)

The status and functioning of shame is contested in moral psychology. In much of anglophone philosophy and psychology, it is presumed to be largely destructive, while in Confucian philosophy and many East Asian communities, it is positively associated with moral development. Recent work in human-robot interaction offers a unique opportunity to investigate how shame functions while controlling for confounding variables of interpersonal interaction. One research program suggests a Confucian strategy for using robots to rebuke participants, but results from experiments with (...) educational technologies imply a different and potentially opposing account of shame’s role in personal development. By digging deeper into the details of Confucian theorizing about shame, I identify a unifying explanation for these apparently conflicting results. I conclude by offering suggestions for future empirical research in human-robot interactions to further investigate shame’s role in moral development. (shrink)

Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

As robots increasingly find their way into the various spheres of human life, the question of religious robots becomes relevant. This article examines from a Catholic-Christian theological perspective whether robots can be used for religious purposes, and it asks how this may be done and what issues are important to consider. In addition, the study contributes to research on the theological engagement with robotics. It is argued that the use of religious robotics dif- fers significantly depending on the specific religion. (...) From a Christian perspective, the use of religious robotics is fundamentally plausible, especially since a wide variety of entities are used as religious media or representations of the divine. However, the use of religious robotics will ultimately be decided by different concepts (e.g. human, life), religious doctrines and culturally transmitted and subjective attitudes. This article places particular focus on the design of reli- gious robotics. It becomes clear that the reasons for accepting religious technology do not lie in the technology itself but in phenomenological preferences and various time- and culture-de- pendent ideas and concepts. It is likely that as robotics rapidly advances and our relationship with it develops, the use of religious robots also will change. Puzio, Anna: Robot Theology: On Theological Engagement with Robotics and Religious Robots. In: Puzio, Anna/Kunkel, Nicole/Klinge, Hendrik (Hg.): Alexa, wie hältst du es mit der Religion? Theologische Zugänge zu Technik und Künstlicher Intelligenz (Theologie und KI 1). Darmstadt: wbg 2023, S. 95–113. DOI: 10.53186/1030373. (shrink)

The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility (...) by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is. (shrink)

In this paper we examine how the use of robots in caring for elders can impact the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We present a framework for understanding ‘meaningfulness in life’, and then apply that framework in discussing ways in which the use of robots to assist in activities of daily living can preserve, enhance or undermine the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We conclude with a discussion of if and how having false beliefs about companion robots can affect meaningfulness in the (...) life of the person having those false beliefs. (shrink)

A crucial philosophical problem of social robots is how much they perform a kind of sociality in interacting with humans. Scholarship diverges between those who sustain that humans and social robots cannot by default have social interactions and those who argue for the possibility of an asymmetric sociality. Against this dichotomy, we argue in this paper for a holistic approach called “Δ phenomenology” of HSRI. In the first part of the paper, we will analyse the semantics of an HSRI. This (...) is what leads a human being to assign or receive a meaning of sociality by interacting with a social robot. Hence, we will question the ontological structure underlying HSRIs, suggesting that HSRIs may lead to a peculiar kind of user alienation. By combining all these variables, we will formulate some final recommendations for an ethics of social robots. (shrink)

This selective review explores biologically inspired learning as a model for intelligent robot control and sensing technology on the basis of specific examples. Hebbian synaptic learning is discussed as a functionally relevant model for machine learning and intelligence, as explained on the basis of examples from the highly plastic biological neural networks of invertebrates and vertebrates. Its potential for adaptive learning and control without supervision, the generation of functional complexity, and control architectures based on self-organization is brought forward. Learning without (...) prior knowledge based on excitatory and inhibitory neural mechanisms accounts for the process through which survival-relevant or task-relevant representations are either reinforced or suppressed. The basic mechanisms of unsupervised biological learning drive synaptic plasticity and adaptation for behavioral success in living brains with different levels of complexity. The insights collected here point toward the Hebbian model as a choice solution for “intelligent” robotics and sensor systems. Keywords: Hebbian learning; synaptic plasticity; neural networks; self-organization; brain; reinforcement; sensory processing; robot control . (shrink)

This paper discusses the possibility of the phenomenon of empathy between humans and robots, starting from what happens during their eye contact. First, it is shown, through the most relevant results of HRI studies on this matter, what are the most important effects of the robot gaze on human emotions and behaviour. Secondly, these effects are compared to what happens during the phenomenon of empathy between humans, taking inspiration from the studies of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Finally, similarities and (...) differences between human-human and human-robot empathy are conceptualized through Merleau-Ponty’s idea of flesh, which is the extended bodily element of the world. If there is a common concept of body, including both machine-bodies and living bodies, then a transcorporeal analogy takes place, thus explaining why the phenomenon of empathy occurs both in human-human and human-robot interactions. (shrink)

The claim I want to explore in this paper is simple. In social ontology, Margaret Gilbert, Abe Roth, Michael Bratman, Antonie Meijers, Facundo Alonso and others talk about rights or entitlements against other participants in joint action. I employ several intuition pumps to argue that we have reason to assume that such entitlements or rights can be ascribed even to non-sentient robots that we collaborate with. Importantly, such entitlements are primarily identified in terms of our normative discourse. Justified criticism, for (...) example, presupposes that another person acted wrongly, i.e., was not entitled to this action. Praise is supposed to encourage another person and acknowledge that one did more than one was obligated to. I show that such normative talk serves the same function when cooperating with robots. This, I argue, suggests that they have the same kind of entitlements and duties at least in the context of a joint action. (shrink)

This paper discuss the phenomenon of empathy in social robotics and is divided into three main parts. Initially, I analyse whether it is correct to use this concept to study and describe people’s reactions to robots. I present arguments in favour of the position that people actually do empathise with robots. I also consider what circumstances shape human empathy with these entities. I propose that two basic classes of such factors be distinguished: biological and socio-cognitive. In my opinion, one of (...) the most important among them is a sense of group membership with robots, as it modulates the empathic responses to representatives of our- and other- groups. The sense of group membership with robots may be co-shaped by socio-cognitive factors such as one’s experience, familiarity with the robot and its history, motivation, accepted ontology, stereotypes or language. Finally, I argue in favour of the formulation of a pragmatic and normative framework for manipulations in the level of empathy in human–robot interactions. (shrink)

In this paper we present a theoretical framework to understand the underlying psychological mechanism involved in human-Companion Robot interactions. At first, we take the case of Sexual Robotics, where the psychological dynamics are more evident, to thereafter extend the discussion to Companion Robotics in general. First, we discuss the differences between a sex-toy and a Sexual Robots, concluding that the latter may establish a collusive and confirmative dynamics with the user. We claim that the collusiveness leads to two main consequences, (...) such as the fixation on a specific and atypical type of sexual interaction, called paraphilic, and to the infantilization of the user, which we explain through the theoretical framework of “object-relation theory”. We argue that these dynamics may degrade to an infantile stage the relational abilities of users, extending this argument to Companion Robots in general. Then, we enquire if and how the relational dynamics enacted in HRI may shift to human relations: we discuss the analogy with virtual reality concluding that, under certain condition, a symbolic shift might happen. In the last part of this work, we propose an experimental setup to verify if a collusive and confirmative interaction with a Companion Robot can, over time, impact on the user’s ability to manage relational frustration. (shrink)

This book explores how robotics and artificial intelligence can enhance human lives but also have unsettling “dark sides.” It examines expanding forms of negativity and anxiety about robots, AI, and autonomous vehicles as our human environments are reengineered for intelligent military and security systems and for optimal workplace and domestic operations. It focuses on the impacts of initiatives to make robot interactions more humanlike and less creepy. It analyzes the emerging resistances against these entities in the wake of omnipresent AI (...) applications. It unpacks efforts by developers to have ethical and social influences on robotics and AI, and confronts the AI hype that is designed to shield the entities from criticism. The book draws from science fiction, dramaturgical, ethical, and legal literatures as well as current research agendas of corporations. Engineers, implementers, and researchers have often encountered users' fears and aggressive actions against intelligent entities, especially in the wake of deaths of humans by robots and autonomous vehicles. The book is an invaluable resource for developers and researchers in the field, as well as curious readers who want to play proactive roles in shaping future technologies. (shrink)

Social robots are marketed as human tools promising us a better life. This marketing strategy commodifies not only the labor of care but the caregiver as well, conjuring a fantasy of technoliberal futurism that echoes a colonial past. Against techno-utopian fantasies of a good life as one involving engineered domestic help, I draw here on the techno-dystopian television show Humans (stylized HUMⱯNS) to suggest that we should find our desires for such help unsettling. At the core of my argument is (...) a return of the “uncanny valley” problem, from its reformulation as an engineering/design problem to its origins as a psychosocial symptom of an unresolved, traumatic past. I conclude that our sense of the uncanny may be best understood as a moral capacity that should be honed rather than evaded. (shrink)

Whether it was John Searle’s Chinese Room argument (Searle, 1980) or Roger Penrose’s argument of the non-computable nature of a mathematician’s insight – an argument that was based on Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem (Penrose, 1989), we have always had skeptics that questioned the possibility of realizing strong Artificial Intelligence (AI), or what has become known by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). But this new book by Landgrebe and Smith (henceforth, L&S) is perhaps the strongest argument ever made against strong AI. It is (...) a very extensive review of what building a mind essentially amounts to drawing on insights and results from biology, physics, linguistics, computability, philosophy, and mathematics. (shrink)

One of the primary, if not most critical, difficulties in the design and implementation of autonomous systems is the black-boxed nature of the decision-making structures and logical pathways. How human values are embodied and actualised in situ may ultimately prove to be harmful if not outright recalcitrant. For this reason, the values of stakeholders become of particular significance given the risks posed by opaque structures of intelligent agents (IAs). This paper explores how decision matrix algorithms, via the belief-desire-intention model for (...) autonomous vehicles, can be designed to minimize the risks of opaque architectures. Primarily through an explicit orientation towards designing for the values of explainability and verifiability. In doing so, this research adopts the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) approach as a principled framework for the incorporation of such values within design. VSD is recognized as a potential starting point that offers a systematic way for engineering teams to formally incorporate existing technical solutions within ethical design, while simultaneously remaining pliable to emerging issues and needs. It is concluded that the VSD methodology offers at least a strong enough foundation from which designers can begin to anticipate design needs and formulate salient design flows that can be adapted to the changing ethical landscapes required for utilisation in autonomous vehicles. (shrink)

In this paper, we theoretically address the relevance of unintentional and inconsistent interactional elements in human–robot interactions. We argue that elements failing, or poorly succeeding, to reproduce a humanlike interaction create significant consequences in human–robot relational patterns and may affect human–human relations. When considering social interactions as systems, the absence of a precise interactional element produces a general reshaping of the interactional pattern, eventually generating new types of interactional settings. As an instance of this dynamic, we study the absence of (...) metacommunicative abilities in social artifacts. Then, we analyze the pragmatic consequences of the aforementioned absence through the lens of Paul Watzlawick’s interactionist theory. We suggest that a fixed complementary interactional setting may be produced because of the asymmetric understanding, between robots and humans, of metacommunication. We highlight the psychological implications of this interactional asymmetry within Jessica Benjamin’s concept of “mutual recognition”. Finally, we point out the possible shift of dysfunctional interactional patterns from human–robot interactions to human–human ones. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to understand if and how interactions with Sexual Robots will modify users’ relational abilities in human-human relations. We first underline that, in today’s scholar discussion on the ‘symbolic argument’, there is no theoretical framework explaining the process of symbolic shift between human-robot interactions (HRI) and human-human interactions (HHI). To clarify the symbolic shift mechanism, we propose the concept of objectual mediation. Moreover, under the lens of Winnicott’s object-relation theory, we argue that HRI can structurally (...) modify users relationality, degrading intersubjective abilities: Sexual Robots may blurry the limit between the ‘internal object’ and the external one. We conclude that, under certain conditions, interactions with Sexual Robots may bring the user back to an infantile object-relation setting, worsening the user ability to manage relational frustration. This will negatively impact on human-human interactions and social values in general. -/- . (shrink)

Social robots are robots that can interact socially with humans. As social robots and the artificial intelligence that powers them becomes more advanced, they will likely take on more social and work roles. This has many important ethical implications. In this paper, we focus on one of the most central of these, the impacts that social robots can have on human autonomy. We argue that, due to their physical presence and social capacities, there is a strong potential for social robots (...) to enhance human autonomy as well as several ways they can inhibit and disrespect it. We argue that social robots could improve human autonomy by helping us to achieve more valuable ends, make more authentic choices, and improve our autonomy competencies. We also argue that social robots have the potential to harm human autonomy by instead leading us to achieve fewer valuable ends ourselves, make less authentic choices, decrease our autonomy competencies, make our autonomy more vulnerable, and disrespect our autonomy. Whether the impacts of social robots on human autonomy are positive or negative overall will depend on the design, regulation, and use we make of social robots in the future. (shrink)

Google Translate (GT) is the most widely used translator application in the world. The function of GT is not merely as tools but has become a means in personal communication, learning and business matters. This paper aims to examine the GT accuracy in translating culinary texts. This paper used a semiotic approach to analyze the equivalence of GT from the source language to the target language. The data source as the object of study is French culinary texts retrieved from the (...) internet. It can be concluded that the accuracy of GT in culinary texts lies in words, phrases and sentences. GT does not yet have good accuracy in translating culture between source and target languages. In the semiotic perspective, the GT translation model is the translation from the source language form to the target language form (signifier) by maintaining the concept (meaning). GT does not yet have a translation feature in a cultural context. The advancement in information technology shows that GT, as a human-robot, can replace human translators. (shrink)

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary (...) people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive. (shrink)

Popular culture continues fuelling public imagination with things, human and non-human, that we might beco-me or confront. Besides robots, other significant tropes in popular fiction that generated images include non-human humans and cyborgs, wired into his-torically varying sociocultural realities. Robots and artificial intelligence are re-defining the natural order and its hierar-chical structure. This is not surprising, as natural order is always in flux, shaped by new scientific discoveries, especially the reading of the genetic code, that reveal and redefine relationships between (...) life forms. However, for the first time, a new, artificial, species is being introduced into the existing diagrams, and, for the first time, it appears to hybridise the anthro-pocentric natural world order. (shrink)

This paper raises three questions regarding the attribution of beliefs, desires, and intentions to robots. The first one is whether humans in fact engage in robot mindreading. If they do, this raises a second question: does robot mindreading foster trust towards robots? Both of these questions are empirical, and I show that the available evidence is insufficient to answer them. Now, if we assume that the answer to both questions is affirmative, a third and more important question arises: should developers (...) and engineers promote robot mindreading in view of their stated goal of enhancing transparency? My worry here is that by attempting to make robots more mind-readable, they are abandoning the project of understanding automatic decision processes. Features that enhance mind-readability are prone to make the factors that determine automatic decisions even more opaque than they already are. And current strategies to eliminate opacity do not enhance mind-readability. The last part of the paper discusses different ways to analyze this apparent trade-off and suggests that a possible solution must adopt tolerable degrees of opacity that depend on pragmatic factors connected to the level of trust required for the intended uses of the robot. (shrink)

This commentary responds to Stephen Cave and Kanta Dihal’s call for further investigations of the whiteness of AI. My response focuses on three overlapping projects needed to more fully understand racial bias in the construction of AI and its representations in pop culture: unpacking the intersections of gender and other variables with whiteness in AI’s construction, marketing, and intended functions; observing the many different ways in which whiteness is scripted, and noting how white racial framing exceeds white casting and thus (...) cannot be undone by more diverse and inclusive hiring. Our techno-utopian fantasies, I conclude, are morally suspect in ways that go beneath and beyond the white plastic covering on robotic bodies. (shrink)

Technological developments involving robotics and artificial intelligence devices are being employed evermore in elderly care and the healthcare sector more generally, raising ethical issues and practical questions warranting closer considerations of what we mean by “care” and, subsequently, how to design such software coherently with the chosen definition. This paper starts by critically examining the existing approaches to the ethical design of care robots provided by Aimee van Wynsberghe, who relies on the work on the ethics of care by Joan (...) Tronto. In doing so, it suggests an alternative to their non-principled approach, an alternative suited to tackling some of the issues raised by Tronto and van Wynsberghe, while allowing for the inclusion of two orientative principles. Our proposal centres on the principles of autonomy and vulnerability, whose joint adoption we deem able to constitute an original revision of a bottom-up approach in care ethics. Conclusively, the ethical framework introduced here integrates more traditional approaches in care ethics in view of enhancing the debate regarding the ethical design of care robots under a new lens. (shrink)

Animistic cognition has adaptive value in domains of social and physical niche prediction. This argument is extended to our contemporary relationship with digital and AI technology.

In this paper we propose the notion of “subjective reference” as a conceptual tool that explains how and why human-robot sexual interactions could reframe users approach to human-human sexual interactions. First, we introduce the current debate about Sexual Robotics, situated in the wider discussion about Social Robots, stating the urgency of a regulative framework. We underline the importance of a social-relational approach, mostly concerned about Social Robots impact in human social structures. Then, we point out the absence of a precise (...) framework conceptualizing why Social Robots, and Sexual Robots in particular, may modify users’ sociality and relationality. Within a psychological framework, we propose to consider Sexual Robots as “subjective references”, namely objects symbolically referring to human subjects: we claim that, for the user experience, every action performed upon a Sexual Robot is symbolically directed toward a human subject, including degrading and violent practices. This shifting mechanism may transfer the user relational setting from human-robot interactions to human-human interactions. (shrink)

Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory – ‘ethical behaviourism’ – which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly performatively equivalent to other entities that have significant moral status. This theory is then defended from seven objections. Second, taking this theoretical position onboard, it is argued that the performative threshold that robots need (...) to cross in order to be afforded significant moral status may not be that high and that they may soon cross it (if they haven’t done so already). Finally, the implications of this for our procreative duties to robots are considered, and it is argued that we may need to take seriously a duty of ‘procreative beneficence’ towards robots. (shrink)

If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; superficial state deception; and hidden state deception) in (...) order to think clearly about its ethics. Second, it argues that the second type of deception – superficial state deception – is not best thought of as a form of deception, even though it is frequently criticised as such. And third, it argues that the third type of deception is best understood as a form of betrayal because doing so captures the unique ethical harm to which it gives rise, and justifies special ethical protections against its use. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to determine the domain of validity of the notions developed in Machine Ethics [ME]. To this aim, I analyse the epistemological and methodological presuppositions that lie at the root of such technological project. On this basis, I then try and develop the theoretical means to identify and deconstruct improper applications of these notions to objects that do not belong to the same epistemic context, focusing in particular on the extent to which ME is supposed (...) to feedback onto moral philosophy. By highlighting the inadequacy of many approaches to the supposed philosophical implications of ME, I wish to redirect attention to its actual scope and to stress its relevance for the social acceptance of autonomous technologies. The essay is structured as follows. After a brief introduction (§ 1), in § 2 I shed light upon the link between the current trend of robotic development toward greater degrees of autonomy and the corresponding need for artificial moral agents that fuels research in ME. I then present the epistemological profile of ME in § 3, focusing on its main component, i.e., the modelling of human moral agency in the language of robotics and computer science. In § 4 I deal with cases in which such model is brought to bear on human ethics and moral philosophy as well, whilst in § 5 I develop a criticism of this extension based on an account of the actual epistemological relations that obtain between philosophical and technological knowledge in the context of the ME project. In § 6 I discuss the role that the ordinary use of language plays in the process of extending machinerelated notions to other domains of knowledge and, finally, I clarify what the appropriate scope of machine ethics is notwithstanding its many utopian or dystopian misinterpretations. (shrink)

The recent rise of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has led to intense discussions on their ability to achieve higher-level mental states or the ethics of their implementation. One question, which so far has been neglected in the literature, is the question of whether AI systems are capable of action. While the philosophical tradition appeals to intentional mental states, others have argued for a widely inclusive theory of agency. In this paper, I will argue for a gradual concept of agency because (...) both traditional concepts of agency fail to differentiate the agential capacities of AI systems. (shrink)

To many, the idea of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) killing human beings is grotesque. Yet critics have had difficulty explaining why it should make a significant moral difference if a human combatant is killed by an AWS as opposed to being killed by a human combatant. The purpose of this paper is to explore the roots of various deontological concerns with AWS and to consider whether these concerns are distinct from any concerns that also apply to long-distance, human-guided weaponry. We (...) suggest that at least one major driver of the intuitive moral aversion to lethal AWS is that their use disrespects their human targets by violating the martial contract between human combatants. On our understanding of this doctrine, service personnel cede a right not to be directly targeted with lethal violence to other human agents alone. Artificial agents, of which AWS are one example, cannot understand the value of human life. A human combatant cannot transfer his privileges of targeting enemy combatants to a robot. Therefore, the human duty-holder who deploys AWS breaches the martial contract between human combatants and disrespects the targeted combatants. We consider whether this novel deontological objection to AWS forms the foundation of several other popular yet imperfect deontological objections to AWS. (shrink)

The fourth of eight chapters from my recently published book "Grace and Gravity: Architectures of the Figure." The argumentation builds on terminology introduced in the first three chapters, the most important being the phased structure of the figure: prefiguration, figuration, and transfiguration. Also, the earlier developed interdependence of movement and standstill, which we find both in beauty and in grace, is here expanded in the relationship between the mineral, animal, and vegetable.

アメリカと世界は、過去1世紀の人口過剰な人口増加から崩壊し、現在は第3世界の人々のために崩壊しています。資源の消費と40億ca.2100の追加は、産業文明を崩壊させ、驚異的な規模で飢餓、病気、暴力と戦 争をもたらすでしょう。地球は毎年表土の少なくとも1%を失うので、2100に近づくにつれて、その食糧栽培能力のほとんどはなくなりました。何十億人もの人が死んで、核戦争は確実です。アメリカでは、これは大規 模な移民と移民の生殖によって、民主主義によって可能になった虐待と相まって、非常に加速されています。堕落した人間性は、民主主義と多様性の夢を犯罪と貧困の悪夢に変えます。中国は、利己主義を制限する独裁政権 を維持する限り、アメリカと世界を圧倒し続けるだろう。崩壊の根本的な原因は、私たちの生来の心理学が現代世界に適応できないことであり、人々は無関係な人を共通の利益を持っているかのように扱う。人権の考え方は 、左翼が第三世界の母性によって地球の無慈悲な破壊から注意を引くために促進する邪悪なファンタジーです。これは、基本的な生物学と心理学の無知に加えて、民主的な社会を支配する部分的に教育を受けた人々のソーシ ャルエンジニアリングの妄想につながります。一人の人を助けた場合、誰かに危害を加える人はいませんが、無料のランチはなく、誰もが消費するアイテムが修復を超えて地球を破壊することを理解している人はほとんどい ません。その結果、至る所の社会政策は持続不可能であり、利己主義に対する厳格な統制なしに、すべての社会が一つ一つ無政府状態または独裁に崩壊する。最も基本的な事実は、ほとんど言及されていないが、貧困層のか なりの割合を貧困から引き上げ、そこに留めるのに十分な資源がアメリカや世界に存在しないことである。これを行う試みは、アメリカを破産させ、世界を破壊することです。私たちの遺伝的品質と同様に、食料を生産する 地球の能力は毎日低下します。そして今、いつものように、貧しい人々の最大の敵は他の貧しい人々であり、金持ちではありません。劇的かつ即時の変化がなければ、アメリカの崩壊や民主主義システムに続く国を防ぐ望み はありません。.

Vor einigen, Jahren habe ich den Punkt erreicht, an dem ich normalerweise aus dem Titel eines Buches oder zumindest aus den Kapiteltiteln erzähle, welche philosophischen Fehler gemacht werden und wie häufig. Bei nominell wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten können diese weitgehend auf bestimmte Kapitel beschränkt sein, die philosophisch werden oder versuchen, allgemeine Schlussfolgerungen über die Bedeutung oder langfristige-Bedeutung des Werkes zuziehen. Normalerweise sind die wissenschaftlichen Fakten jedoch großzügig mit philosophischem Kauderwelsch darüber, was diese Tatsachen bedeuten, verwogen. Die klaren Unterscheidungen, die Wittgenstein vor etwa (...) 80 Jahren zwischen wissenschaftlichen Fragen und deren Beschreibungen durch verschiedene Sprachspiele beschrieb, werden selten berücksichtigt, so dass man abwechselnd von der Wissenschaft begeistert und von ihrer inkohärenten Analyse bestürzt ist. So ist es mit diesem Band. Wenn man einen Geist mehr oder weniger wie unseren erschaffen soll, braucht man eine logische Struktur für Rationalität und ein Verständnis der beiden Denksysteme (Dual-Prozess-Theorie). Wenn man darüber philosophieren will, muss man die Unterscheidung zwischen wissenschaftlichen Faktenfragen und der philosophischen Frage verstehen, wie Sprache im streitigen Kontext funktioniert und wie man die Fallstricke von Reduktionismus und Scientismus vermeiden kann, aber Kurzweil ist, wie die meisten Verhaltensstudenten, weitgehend ahnungslos. Er ist verzaubert von Modellen, Theorien und Konzepten und dem Erklärungsdrang, während Wittgenstein uns gezeigt hat, dass wir nur beschreiben müssen, und dass Theorien, Konzepte usw. nur Wege der Verwendung von Sprache (Sprachspiele) sind, die nur einen Wert haben, da sie einen klaren Test haben (klare Wahrheitsmacher, oder wie John Searle (der berühmteste Kritiker der AI) gerne sagt, klare Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (COS). Ich habe versucht, in meinen jüngsten Schriften damit einen Anfang zu machen. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Alcuni anni fa, ho raggiunto il punto in cui di solito posso dire dal titolo di un libro, o almeno dai titoli dei capitoli, quali tipi di errori filosofici saranno fatti e con quale frequenza. Nel caso di opere nominalmente scientifiche queste possono essere in gran parte limitate a determinati capitoli che sono filosofici o cercanodi trarre conclusioni generali sul significato o sul significato a lungoterminedell'opera. Normalmente però le questioni scientifiche di fatto sono generosamente intrecciate con incomprodellami filosofici su ciò (...) che questi fatti significano. Le chiare distinzioni che Wittgenstein ha descritto circa 80 anni fa tra le questioni scientifiche e le loro descrizioni da parte di vari giochi linguistici sono raramente prese in considerazione, e quindi si è alternativamente stupiti dalla scienza e costerghi per la sua analisi incoerente. Così è con questo volume. Se si vuole creare una mente più o meno come la nostra, è necessario avere una struttura logica per la razionalità e la comprensione dei due sistemi di pensiero (teoria del doppio processo). Se si vuole filosofare su questo, bisogna capire la distinzione tra le questioni scientifiche di fatto e la questione filosofica di come funziona il linguaggio nel contesto in questione, e di come evitare le insidie del riduzionismo e dello scientismo, ma Kurzweil, come la maggior parte degli studenti di comportamento, è in gran parte all'oscuro. Egli è incantato da modelli, teorie e concetti, e dalla voglia di spiegare, mentre Wittgenstein ci ha mostrato che dobbiamo solo descrivere, e che le teorie, i concetti, ecc., sono solo modi di usare il linguaggio (giochi linguistici) che hanno valore solo nella misura in cui hanno un test chiaro (clear truthmakers, o come John Searle (il critico più famoso di AI) ama dire, chiare condizioni di soddisfazione (COS)). Ho cercato di dare un inizio su questo nei miei scritti recenti. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica della filosofia, psicologia, mente e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Alcuni anni fa, ho raggiunto il punto in cui di solito posso dire dal titolo di un libro, o almeno dai titoli dei capitoli, quali tipi di errori filosofici saranno fatti e con quale frequenza. Nel caso di opere nominalmente scientifiche queste possono essere in gran parte limitate a determinati capitoli che sono filosofici o cercanodi trarre conclusioni generali sul significato o sul significato a lungoterminedell'opera. Normalmente però le questioni scientifiche di fatto sono generosamente intrecciate con incomprodellami filosofici su ciò (...) che questi fatti significano. Le chiare distinzioni che Wittgenstein ha descritto circa 80 anni fa tra le questioni scientifiche e le loro descrizioni da parte di vari giochi linguistici sono raramente prese in considerazione, e quindi si è alternativamente stupiti dalla scienza e costerghi per la sua analisi incoerente. Così è con questo volume. Se si vuole creare una mente più o meno come la nostra, è necessario avere una struttura logica per la razionalità e la comprensione dei due sistemi di pensiero (teoria del doppio processo). Se si vuole filosofare su questo, bisogna capire la distinzione tra le questioni scientifiche di fatto e la questione filosofica di come funziona il linguaggio nel contesto in questione, e di come evitare le insidie del riduzionismo e dello scientismo, ma Kurzweil, come la maggior parte degli studenti di comportamento, è in gran parte all'oscuro. Egli è incantato da modelli, teorie e concetti, e dalla voglia di spiegare, mentre Wittgenstein ci ha mostrato che dobbiamo solo descrivere, e che le teorie, i concetti, ecc., sono solo modi di usare il linguaggio (giochi linguistici) che hanno valore solo nella misura in cui hanno un test chiaro (clear truthmakers, o come John Searle (il critico più famoso di AI) ama dire, chiare condizioni di soddisfazione (COS)). Ho cercato di dare un inizio su questo nei miei scritti recenti. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica della filosofia, psicologia, mente e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) . (shrink)

कुछ साल पहले, मैं उस बिंदु पर पहुँच गया जहां मैं आमतौर पर एक किताब के शीर्षक से बता सकते हैं, या कम से कम अध्याय शीर्षक से, दार्शनिक गलतियों के किस प्रकार किया जाएगा और कितनी बार. नाममात्र के वैज्ञानिक कार्यों के मामले में ये काफी हद तक कुछ अध्यायों तक सीमित हो सकते हैं जो दार्शनिक मोमकरते हैं या कार्य के अर्थ या दीर्घकालिक महत्व के बारे में सामान्य निष्कर्ष निकालने का प्रयास करतेहैं। आम तौर पर हालांकि तथ्य (...) के वैज्ञानिक मामलों उदारता से इन तथ्यों का क्या मतलब है के रूप में दार्शनिक अस्पष्ट के साथ interlarded रहे हैं. स्पष्ट भेद जो Wittgenstein वैज्ञानिक मामलों और विभिन्न भाषा के खेल द्वारा उनके विवरण के बीच कुछ 80 साल पहले वर्णित शायद ही कभी ध्यान में रखा जाता है, और इसलिए एक बारी-बारी से विज्ञान द्वारा wowed है और इसके असंबद्ध से निराश विश्लेषण. तो यह इस मात्रा के साथ है. यदि एक हमारे जैसे अधिक या कम एक मन बनाने के लिए है, एक तर्कसंगतता और विचार के दो प्रणालियों की समझ के लिए एक तार्किक संरचना की जरूरत है (दोहरी प्रक्रिया सिद्धांत). यदि एक इस बारे में दर्शन है, एक तथ्य के वैज्ञानिक मुद्दों और कैसे भाषा के मुद्दे पर संदर्भ में काम करता है के दार्शनिक मुद्दे के बीच अंतर को समझने की जरूरत है, और कैसे रिडक्शनिज्म और scientism के नुकसान से बचने के लिए, लेकिन Kurzweil, जैसे सबसे अधिकव्यवहार के छात्रों, काफी हद तक अनजान है. वह मॉडल, सिद्धांतों, और अवधारणाओं से मुग्ध है, और समझाने के लिए आग्रह करता हूं, जबकि Wittgenstein हमें पता चला है कि हम केवल वर्णन करने की जरूरत है, और है कि सिद्धांतों, अवधारणाओं आदि, भाषा का उपयोग करने के सिर्फ तरीके हैं (भाषा का खेल) जो मूल्य केवल insofar के रूप में वे एक स्पष्ट है परीक्षण (स्पष्ट truthmakers, या जॉन Searle (एआई के सबसे प्रसिद्ध आलोचक) के रूप में कहना पसंद करती है, संतोष की स्पष्ट शर्तें (COS)). मैं अपने हाल के लेखन में इस पर एक शुरुआत प्रदान करने का प्रयास किया है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

A new book by Maurizio Balistreri, "Sex robot. L’amore al tempo delle macchine", is reviewed. Sex robots not only exacerbate social, ethical and cultural issues that already exist, but also come with emergent and novel ones. This book is intended to build on the recent research on both robotics and the growing scholarship on sex robots more generally, however with greater attention to the developments of the philosophical issues of how to deal with these new artefacts and steps for living (...) among these types of systems into the future. (shrink)