Will Life Be Worth Living in a World Without Work? Technological Unemployment and the Meaning of Life

Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (1):41-64 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus on the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; the antiwork critique—which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life—which I argue gives reasons for concern.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DANWLB
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-03-01
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Extended Mind.Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-03-01

Total views
12,383 ( #54 of 41,490 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2,191 ( #81 of 41,490 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.