Political Theory

Drawing on empirical evidence from history and anthropology, we aim to demonstrate that there is room for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. The test case is some libertarians’ use of folk notions of private property rights in defence of the legitimacy of capitalist states. Our genealogy of the notion of private property shows that asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling the question of its legitimacy, because the notion of private property (...) presupposed by that question is a product of the entity it is supposed to help legitimise: the state. We anchor our genealogical critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of language, and in current debates on the methodology of political theory. But, unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or even belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of ideology critique. (shrink)

"Transparency" is the constant refrain of democratic politics, a promised aid to accountability and integrity in public life. Secrecy is stigmatized as a work of corruption, tolerable by a compromise of democratic principles. My dissertation challenges both ideas. It argues that secrecy and transparency are best understood as complementary, not contradictory, practices. And it develops a normative account of liberal democratic politics in which duties of transparency coexist with permissions to act behind closed doors. The project begins with some history. (...) I show that the language of transparency gained currency only in the last quarter century, and explain how its proximate sources promote three dubious assumptions—that disclosure should in principle be maximized, that it prevents misrule more or less automatically, and that its value is either instrumental, or rooted in a reductive notion of democracy as the rule of popular opinion. Against these assumptions, I sketch an alternative account of liberal democracy centered on the logics of representation, liberty, and equality. These three "logics of self-government" give rise to duties of transparency binding on public and private actors alike. Such obligations have bite, I argue, but they are not all-encompassing. Indeed, the same ideals of representation, liberty, and equality license concealment in a range of important contexts, including deliberation and dissent. Having made this case, I go on to explain how secrecy and transparency can form a "democratic dyad," deepening rather than undermining the project of self-rule. Lastly, I address the limits of conventional transparency practices. Taken alone, disclosure is subject to a range of pitfalls, often failing to produce the results promised in transparency’s name. While my non-instrumental case for openness is not destabilized by this analysis, it does suggest that mandating disclosure is rarely enough. I therefore propose a series of adversarial practices to facilitate the checking of unjustifiable secrecy, and highlight the critical role of interpretation in efforts to make power intelligible. In the end, my dissertation offers a novel defense of secrecy and transparency that highlights rather than minimizes the hard work of political engagement. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el modo en que se presenta la virtud política en los principales textos de Montesquieu y su resonancia en la obra de Rousseau. La hipótesis general que se propone es que, a pesar de sus enormes divergencias, los dos elaboraron una lectura eminentemente moderna que los separa de la filosofía política clásica. Ambos habrían compartido la idea de que la virtud es una pasión ―o que es intercambiable por una pasión―, apartándose de (...) las jerarquías del pensamiento antiguo. Se sostiene en este artículo que Montesquieu declarará, ante la muerte de la virtud clásica, su sucedáneo en el placer de la seguridad que es capaz de garantizar la libertad por medio del gobierno mixto. Por su lado, Rousseau hará una reivindicación de la virtud antigua, pero identificándola con la compasión, dislocando el status de la virtud civil. Estas lecturas darán lugar a dos maneras muy distintas de comprender la relación existente entre derecho natural y derecho positivo. // Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the way in which political virtue appears in the main texts of Montesquieu and and its repercussions in Rousseau’s work. The hypothesis proposed is that, despite their enormous divergences, both of them developed an eminently modern reading that separates them from Classical Political Philosophy. Both authors would have shared the idea that virtue is a passion ―or that it is interchangeable with a passion―, moving away from the hierarchies of ancient thought. This paper argues that Montesquieu will declare after the death of classical virtue the pleasure of security as a substitute capable of guaranteeing modern liberty by means of States organized as mixed constitutions. For his part, Rousseau will make a vindication of ancient virtue, but identifying it with compassion, dislocating the status of civil virtue. These readings will give rise to two very different ways of understanding the relationship between natural law and positive law. -/- Palabras clave: virtud – pasión – modernidad – seguridad – compasión. Key-words: virtue – passion – modernity – security – compassion. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo busca presentar sumariamente las principales críticas elaboradas por Karl Löwith y Leo Strauss en su recepción del clásico trabajo de Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [El concepto de lo político]. Se intentará explorar, en un primer apartado, la acusación löwithiana de “ocasionalismo ateológico”, formulada, aunque bajo pseudónimo, en un texto crítico de 1935 cuyo título original fue luego reemplazado por aquel con el que se lo conoce actualmente: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [El decisionismo (...) ocasional de Carl Schmitt]. En la segunda sección, siguiendo principalmente la lectura propuesta de Heinrich Meier, se buscará dar cuenta de la interpretación que aparece en los Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comentarios sobre El concepto de lo político de Carl Schmitt], las notas de Leo Strauss, publicadas en 1932, que sugieren entender la afirmación de lo político en la obra de Schmitt como constitutiva de la posterior crítica schmittiana de la filosofía política de Thomas Hobbes. Palabras clave: político, ocasionalismo, decisión, teología política, liberalismo. Abstract: This article seeks to briefly present the main criticisms elaborated by Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss in their reception of the classic work of Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [The Concept of the Political]. It will be explored, in a f irst section, the Löwithian accusation of “atheological occasionalism”, offered, although under a pseudonym, in a text of 1935 whose original title was later replaced by that with which it is currently known: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt]. In the second section, following mainly the reading of Heinrich Meier, I will seek to give an account of the interpretation present in the Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comments on Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political], the critical notes by Leo Strauss, published in 1932, which suggest understanding the assertion of politics in Schmitt’s work as constitutive for the later Schmittian critique of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. Keywords: political, occasionalism, decision, politcal theoology, liberalism. (shrink)

The condition of precariousness not only provides insights into a segment of the world of work or of a particular subject group, but is also a privileged standpoint for an overview of the condition of the social on a global scale. Because precariousness is multidimensional and polysemantic, it traverses contemporary society and multiple contexts, from industrial to class, gender, family relations as well as political participation, citizenship and migration. This book maps the differences and similarities in the ways precariousness and (...) insecurity in employment unfold and are subjectively experienced in regions and sectors that are confronted with different labour histories, legislations and economic priorities. Establishing a constructive dialogue amongst different global regions and across disciplines, the chapters explore the shift from precariousness to precariat and collective subjects as it is being articulated in the current global crisis. This edited collection aims to continue a process of mapping experiences by means of ethnographies, fieldwork, interviews, content analysis, where the precarious define their condition and explain how they try to withdraw from, cope with or embrace it. (shrink)

Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This (...) article helps fill that gap by offering a formal theory of three different modes of democratic deliberation: myopic discussion, constructive discussion, and debate. We show that myopic discussion suffers from indeterminacy of long run outcomes, while constructive discussion and debate are conclusive. Finally, unlike the other two modes of deliberation, debate is path independent and converges to a unique compromise position, irrespective of the initial status quo. (shrink)

Citizens are politically autonomous insofar as they are subject to laws that are (a) justified by reasons acceptable to them and (b) authorized by them via their political institutions. An obstacle to the equal realization of political autonomy is the plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical views endorsed by citizens. Decisions regarding certain fundamental political issues (e.g., abortion) can involve citizens imposing political positions justified in terms of their respective worldviews upon others. Despite citizens’ disagreements over which worldview is correct, (...) ‘political liberalism’ claims that there is a form of political autonomy that is realizable within pluralist societies. (Political liberalism differs from ‘comprehensive liberalism’ by, inter alia, being ‘freestanding’ vis-à-vis citizens’ different worldviews.) Citizens can be politically autonomous if they enjoy equal political power and justify its exercise with ‘public reasons.’ A political liberal education would aim at ensuring that all students can become politically autonomous citizens by teaching them how to exercise their democratic rights effectively and how to engage in public reasoning. Some political and educational theorists, however, argue that teaching students how to be politically autonomous amounts to teaching them how to be ‘comprehensively’ autonomous. If this is so, then the distinction between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism collapses, at least with respect to education. This chapter outlines the main elements of political liberalism, summarizes the main requirements of a political liberal citizenship education, and surveys three arguments in support of and against the thesis that a political liberal education amounts to an education for comprehensive autonomy. (shrink)

The issue of political violence is mostly absent from current debates about power. Many conceptions of power treat violence as wholly distinct from or even antithetical to power, or see it as a mere instrument whose effects are obvious and not in need of political analysis. In this paper, I explore what kind of ontology of power is necessary to properly take account of the various roles that violence can play in creating and maintaining power structures. I pursue this question (...) by contrasting the views of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. For Arendt, power is generated and maintained by communicative practices. She argues that power and violence are ‘opposites’ because violence can only destroy but not create these practices. In contrast, Foucault’s conception explicitly allows violence to play a constitutive role in generating power. I argue that while Arendt is right to insist that power and violence are not identical, it does not follow that violence cannot play any role in constituting power. Guided by Foucault’s approach, I formulate a non-dualist account of the relationship between power and violence that takes seriously the role that bodies, material things, and built infrastructures play in making social relations ‘more durable’ and constituting power. (shrink)

This book offers a detailed study of the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, focussing on their concept of power as potentia, concrete power, rather than power as potestas, authorised power. The focus on power as potentia generates a new conception of popular power. Radical democrats–whether drawing on Hobbes's 'sleeping sovereign' or on Spinoza's 'multitude'–understand popular power as something that transcends ordinary institutional politics, as for instance popular plebsites or mass movements. However, the book argues that these (...) understandings reflect a residual scholasticism which Hobbes and Spinoza ultimately repudiate. Instead, on the book's revisionist conception, a political phenomenon should be said to express popular power when it is both popular (it eliminates oligarchy and encompasses the whole polity), and also powerful (it robustly determines political and social outcomes). Two possible institutional forms that this popular power might take are distinguished: Hobbesian repressive egalitarianism, or Spinozist civic strengthening. But despite divergent institutional proposals, the book argues that both Hobbes and Spinoza share the conviction that there is nothing spontaneously egalitarian or good about human collective existence. From this point of view, the book accuses radical democrats of pernicious romanticism; the slow, meticulous work of organizational design and maintenance is the true centre of popular power. (shrink)

This book is a new scholarly edition of Lincoln Steffens' classic, "muck-raking" account of Gilded Age corruption in America. It provides the broader political background, and theoretical and historical context needed to better understand the social and political roots of corruption in general terms: the social and moral nature of corruption and reform.

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis-à-vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorganised groups of people are often (...) in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense. (shrink)

The term 'fascism' continues to be very much in currency in Philippines society. To the Filipino people, its meaning is often drawn from pained memory of wholesale deprivation of democratic rights and large-scale human rights abuses. Yet, to many, the fear of fascism has still to give way to a deeper understanding of this menace. This may hold true even among those belonging to the progressive movement. One Marxist philosopher and theoretician who gave extended treatment of the issues surrounding the (...) character and conditions giving rise to fascism was Nicos Poulantzas, whose theory is employed here to interrogate the debates about fascism in the post-Marcos Philippines context. (shrink)

Some theorists argue that religion relates to politics in one of two ways: either it asserts its authority over the public sphere or it withdraws from the world in preference for spiritual concerns. In response, this special issue offers an expanded vision of what political theology can contribute to public reflection. Against those who appropriate divine authority in support of a given regime, Jewish and Christian negative theology argues that God is radically elusive. Where resistance movements sometimes struggle to transition (...) from opposition to governance, negative theology models a critique that allows for robust affirmation. Although the tradition does not directly address democratic politics, it demonstrates that a commitment to radical transformation does not rule out the compromise required to enact concrete policies. In this way, negative theology offers resources for addressing the crises that currently threaten democratic politics in the West. (shrink)

My main point is that the creation of a free public time implies the creation of a democratic collective inspired by the project of social ecology. The first and second parts of this article focus on the modern social phenomena correlated to the general crisis and the emergence of the Internet Age (Castells, 2012). The third and fourth parts focus on new significations that seem to inspire modern social movements and the challenges that modern democratic ecological collectivities face. I use (...) the term “social ecology” as defined by Murray Bookchin: “Social ecology is based on the conviction that nearly all of our present ecological problems originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2006, p. 19). And I use the term “democracy” exclusively in the original, true meaning, of direct democracy where society is self-governed by the equal participation of every individual to political decisions and functions, as opposed to a modern representative democracy or republic, where political decisions rest in the hands of an oligarchy. In this sense, a truly democratic political collectivity is a truly ecological collectivity and vice versa. (shrink)

Dini çoğulculuk, dini dışlayıcılık ve kapsayıcılıktan farklı olarak, her dinsel inanış taraftarlarının kendi dinleri içinde kalarak ilahi selamete erişeceğini söyler. Temelde, teolojik ve felsefi boyutları olan dini çoğulculuk tartışmasının siyasete bakan bir yönü de vardır. İslam tarihinde Meşşâî felsefenin kurucusu ve mutluluk filozofu olarak bilinen Farabi, bir taraftan hakikate nasıl ulaşılacağı diğer taraftan ise “âlem” adını verdiği kozmopolitanizm nasıl inşa edileceği ile ilgilenmektedir. Siyasal toplumun amacının, insanların uygun ölçekte, en yüce iyi için yardımlaşmalarını sağlamak olduğunu savunan Farabi’ye göre, erdemli bir (...) yaşam kurulmasına imkan sağlayan üç örgütlenme biçimi vardır: Şehir, millet ve âlem. Platon ve Aristoteles gibi Antik düşünürlerden farklı olarak erdemli bir yaşamın sadece sitede kurulacağı düşüncesine karşı çıkan Farabi, sitenin yetkin bir yaşamın ilk basamağı olduğunu savunur. Ancak, erdemli yaşamı site ile sınırlamaz. Farabi’nin teorisinde, Antik düşünceyi aşan bir kozmopolitanizm söz konusudur. Bundan dolayı Farabi, farklı dinlerin varlığını, kendi siyasal düşüncesine uygun olarak meşru kabul eder. Eğer mutluluk için yardımlaşacaklarsa, insanların dinlerinin farklı olmasında bir beis görmez. Bu dini çoğulculuğun siyasal temelidir. Diğer taraftan Farabi, dinleri hakikatle eşitleyen anlayışa karşı çıkarak, farklı dinlerin hakikatin çeşitli imajlar, örnekler ve taklitler yolu ile halka benimsetilmesi olarak görülmesi gerektiğini savunur. Diğer bir ifade ile dinler, hakikatin kendisi değil, farklı tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamlarda oluşmuş sembolik ifadesidir. Bu bakımdan bütün dinler ile hakikat arasında bir mesafe bulunmaktadır ve hiçbir din hakikatin kendisi değildir. Buradan Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dinsel çoğulculuğunun sınırı olmadığı çıkmamalıdır. Farabi’ye göre din, felsefe yolu ile bulunan hakikatin ikna etme veya hayal ettirme yoluyla ya da her ikisiyle birden halka kabul ettirilmesidir. Ancak Farabi, hakiki felsefe ile sahte felsefe arasında bir ayrım yapar ve ancak hakiki felsefeyi takip eden dinlerin bir hakikat değeri olduğunu savunur. Hakiki felsefe ise evrenin bir ilk nedeni olduğunu ve ilk nedenin de nedensiz olduğunu söyler. Bu, evrenin tek bir yaratıcısı olduğu anlamına gelir ve çok tanrıcılığı dışlar. Bu bakımdan Farabi, sadece tek tanrılı dinleri çoğulculuk kapsamına alır. Bunun nedeni, tek tanrılı dinlerin hakikatle özdeş olmaları değil, hakiki felsefeyi takip etmeleridir. Çünkü felsefe dinden öncedir. Bu, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde çoğulculuğun sınırlarına işaret etmektedir. Farabi, dinleri hakikatle özdeş görmeyerek ve aynı hakikatin sembolik ifadeleri olduğunu söyleyerek çoğulculuğun yolunu açar. Buna karşın sahte felsefeyi takip eden dinler olduğu gerekçesiyle çok tanrılı dinleri dışarıda bırakarak sınırlarını çizer. Bu çalışma, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dini çoğulculuğun siyasal ve epistemolojik temellerini ve çoğulculuğun sınırlarını konu almaktadır. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the discipline of political economy, international political economy and their respective historical developments. The paper will then focus on globalization and evaluate the strength and weaknesses of the policy to globalize. Further analysis will be conducted to show the importance of the topic of globalization as it relates to public finance. Rosen & Gayer (2014), Sackery, Schneider & Knoedler (2016), Marlin-Bennett (2017), Ravenhill (2008) and Weingast & Witman (2006) will (...) provide insights into the development of the discipline and its modus operendi. The historical development of the discipline will be provided for by Ingram (1915) and the aforementioned authors will also provide insights into the weakness and strengths of the policy to globalize. Garett & Mitchell (2001) and Kumar (2006) will provide additional insights into the importance of globalization as it pertains to public finance. (shrink)

A tanulmány a republikánus szabadságideálról szól, és annak összefüggéséről a politikai részvétellel. Két fölfogást különít el: az "erőst", mely önértéket, és a "gyöngét" , mely eszközértéket tulajdonít a részvételnek.

Esta tesis estudia el pensamiento del conservador español Juan Donoso Cortés (1809- 1853). Más precisamente, se ocupa de responder cómo resuelve el problema de la decadencia de la autoridad monárquica en Europa a partir de las revoluciones de 1848. Para abordar este objetivo general elaboramos dos objetivos específicos. El primero busca señalar las continuidades y discontinuidades de la obra donosiana, escindida generalmente en dos períodos: el juvenil, con un Donoso Cortés liberal, y el maduro, que luego de una “conversión religiosa” (...) se vuelca hacia el catolicismo reaccionario. El segundo objetivo hace foco en el concepto de dictadura, bajo la sospecha de que en esta noción reside la clave de su proyecto conservador. Con esto en mente construimos dos hipótesis. La primera afirma que nuestro autor es consciente de la imposibilidad de restituir el proyecto monárquico. La segunda, sugiere la presencia de una fórmula parcialmente decisionista como alternativa a dicho proyecto. Luego de un trabajo de lectura de primera mano de los textos donosianos, las conclusiones confirman las hipótesis y observan que existe una continuidad estructural en las ideas del español, pero también que hay discontinuidades, de las cuales la más importante es su particular noción de dictadura, que denominamos dictadura catolizante. (shrink)

This essay frames systemic patterns of mental abuse against women of color and Indigenous women on Turtle Island (North America) in terms of larger design-of-distribution strategies in settler colonial societies, as these societies use various forms of social power to distribute, reproduce, and automate social inequalities (including public health precarities and mortality disadvantages) that skew socio-economic gain continuously toward white settler populations and their descendants. It departs from traditional studies in gender-based violence research that frame mental abuses such as gaslighting--commonly (...) understood as mental manipulation through lying or deceit--stochastically, as chance-driven interpersonal phenomena. Building on structural analyses of knowledge in political epistemology (Dotson 2012, Berenstain 2016), political theory (Davis and Ernst 2017), and Indigenous social theory (Tuck and Yang 2012), I develop the notion of cultural gaslighting to refer to the social and historical infrastructural support mechanisms that disproportionately produce abusive mental ambients in settler colonial cultures in order to further the ends of cultural genocide and dispossession. I conclude by proposing a social epidemiological account of gaslighting that a) highlights the public health harms of abusive ambients for minority populations, b) illuminates the hidden rules of social structure in settler colonial societies, and c) amplifies the corresponding need for structural reparations. (shrink)

While many argue investment-based criteria for immigration are wrong or at least problematic, skill-based criteria remain relatively uncontroversial. This is normatively inconsistent. This article assesses three prominent normative objections to investment-based selection criteria for immigrants: (i) that they wrongfully discriminate between prospective immigrants (ii) that they are unfair, and (iii) that they undermine political equality among citizens. It argues that either skill-based criteria are equally susceptible to these objections, or that investment-based criteria are equally shielded from them. Indeed, in some (...) ways investment-based criteria are less normatively problematic than skill-based criteria. Given this analysis, the resistance to investment-based migration criteria, but not to skill-based criteria, is inconsistent. (shrink)

Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice has its major attempts to defend the institution of private property and to criticize the redistributive measures on the part of government. Nozick frowns at Rawls’ approach and the approach of welfare economics, which focused on evaluating only current time-slices of a distribution with no concern about the procedural aspects of justice. His notion of distributive justice has its anchorage on the account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of (...) what he has acquired and earned. While Rawls, whose position seems incompatible with that of Nozick holds a notion of justice on the account of the equality of the claims of each person in respect of basic needs and of the means to meet such needs. Nozick’s theory is a reaction against Rawls’ notion of distributive justice which he terms patterned, and of which he feels if upheld would consistently interfere with individual’s rights. This paper therefore argues that contrary to what Robert Nozick seems to suggest we do not see his theory as all satisfying nor any alternative, rather we are convinced that the inherent merits of his theory would suitably complement other patterned theories of distributive justice. This paper employed the expository method as well as critical analysis and prescriptive methods. (shrink)

“Todo o poder emana do povo...” “ Todos são iguais perante a lei...” (BRASIL, 1988) Estes pequenos trechos, respectivamente do Parágrafo Único do Artigo 1º e do Artigo 5º da constituição brasileira de 1988 não foram redigidos por acaso, ou porque os legisladores assim quiseram, pois acharam que soaria bem; e nem porque de fato acreditavam nisso, mesmo enquanto representantes escolhidos pelo povo, quando de sua promulgação. O Brasil como membro fundador da Organização das Nações Unidas, incorporou em sua constituição (...) diversos pontos da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos (ORGANIZAÇÃO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS (UN), 1948). Em 1992, o Brasil se torna signatário da Convenção Americana Sobre Direitos Humanos (ORGANIZAÇÃO DOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS (OAS), 1969), (também conhecido como Pacto de San José da Costa Rica) que existia desde 1969, e que provavelmente não fora ratificado antes devido ao, vamos chamar assim, Estado de Exceção (1964 a 1985). A teoria é que estes tratados permitam uma maior igualdade entre as pessoas, se agreguem à política e às agendas de seus países signatários, e de alguma forma, tenham valor de lei ou ao menos de referência em questões legais. Em última instância, se alguma lei local não tiver como decidir por algo, recorre-se aos tratados internacionais. A ideia por trás deste artigo é analisar o viés individualista destas cartas, remetendo sua origem a Hobbes e Rousseau, mostrando a manutenção da desigualdade entre os homens. Vale ressaltar, no entanto, que seus artigos – são 30 no da ONU, e 82 no da OEA - transpassam, perpassam e unem diversas obras, de forma que fica impossível tratar de apenas um autor ou obra específica nos trechos analisados. (shrink)

Gegen die verbreitete Vorstellung, dass Negativität im Interesse von mehr Selbstverwirklichung, Produktivität und Positivität überwunden oder be-grenzt werden muss, eröffnet dieser Band eine andere Perspektive. Er geht den verschiedenen Formen des Negativen in Kunst, Recht und Politik nach, um zu zeigen, dass es nicht allein eine Negativität gibt, die dem Gelingen im Weg steht oder zu dessen sicher beherrschtem Mittel wird. Die Beiträge des Bandes erweisen Negativität vielmehr als eine Kraft der Befreiung, die ein Gelingen anderer Art ermöglicht.

New technologies of surveillance such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are increasingly used as convenient substitutes for conventional means of observation. Recent court decisions hold that the government may, without a warrant, use a GPS to track a vehicle’s movements in public places without violating the 4th Amendment, as the vehicle is in plain view and no reasonable expectation of privacy is violated. This emerging consensus of opinions fails to distinguish the unreasonable expectation that we not be seen in public, (...) from the reasonable expectation that we not be followed. Drawing on a critical discussion of the plain view doctrine, analysis of privacy interests in public places, and distinguishing privacy from property interests, the article contends that government use of GPS to track our movements should require a warrant. (shrink)

Se trata de un artículo que busca una relectura de los textos y problemas en la obra del filósofo francés Louis Althusser. Hay dos líneas argumentativa que sigue la relectura: 1) su materialismo aleatorio, y 2) su teoría del lenguaje.

Socialist republicans advocate public ownership and control of the means of production in order to achieve the republican goal of a society without endemic domination. While civic republicanism is often attacked for its conservatism, the relatively neglected radical history of the tradition shows how a republican form of socialism provides powerful conceptual resources to critique capitalism for leaving workers and citizens dominated. This analysis supports a programme of public ownership and economic democracy intended to reduce domination in the workplace and (...) wider society. I defend this socialist republicanism from both the Marxist objection that it overlooks the impersonal nature of domination under capitalism and the left-liberal objection that property-owning democracy is sufficient to suppress dominating relationships. The resulting position identifies the need for more ambitious institutional grounds for republican liberty than is often supposed, while offering us a distinctive emancipatory justification for socialism. (shrink)

The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s (b. 1962) challenge to the Western liberal order. Even though Dugin’s project is in many ways a theoretical epitome of Russia’s contemporary attempt to profile itself as a regional great power with a political and cultural identity distinct from the liberal West, Dugin can also be read in a wider context as one of the currently most prominent representatives of the culturally and intellectually oriented international New Right. The chapter introduces Dugin’s role (...) on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent “fourth political theory” as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to liberalism as well as the two other main twentieth-century ideologies, communism and fascism. Dugin’s fourth ideology, essentially meant as an alternative to a unipolar post–Cold War global hegemony of victorious liberalism, draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt’s pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin’s eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism. (shrink)

According to Philip Pettit, we should understand republican liberty, freedom as ‘non-domination,’ as a ‘supreme political value.’ It is its commitment to freedom as non-domination, Pettit claims, that distinguishes republicanism from various forms of liberal egalitarianism, including the political liberalism of John Rawls. I explain that Rawlsian political liberalism is committed to a form of non-domination, namely, a ‘political’ conception, which is: (a) limited in its scope to the ‘basic structure of society,’ and (b) ‘freestanding’ in nature (that is, compatible (...) with the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’). I show that the political conception of non-domination is an integral part of political liberalism through an exploration of the kind of citizenship education that political liberalism mandates for all students. Such an education would impart to future citizen the skills and knowledge necessary for them to realize republican freedom vis-à-vis their political institutions, their workplaces, and, by means of an enforceable ‘right of exit,’ the various associations to which they might belong. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds in two ways. First, I argue that Fanon’s structural witnessing of racism yields important insights about the nature of violence that challenges the settler colonial concept of violence as the extra-legal use of force. Second, I argue that his analysis of violence is insufficient for combating colonial racism and violence because, using the terms of his own analysis, it leaves intact logics and mechanisms that allow racism to structurally renew itself in perpetuity: violence against women. Without a (...) critical feminism that tracks the alterities of structural violence against women, and women of color in particular, Fanonianism is just another lifeline of colonialism. I thus caution against uncritical uses of Fanon’s structural account of violence for any emancipatory social theory that fails to acknowledge the attendant alterities, asymmetries, and axes of coordinated subordination involved in racialized violence against women. (shrink)

This essay develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge. From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy experts and non-experts, and the horizontal integration of knowledge among diverse non-experts. The primary analytical payoff of this model (...) is that it provides a clear rationale for variation in the norms and institutionalization of representative behavior. Sometimes a delegate-like approach is the right one, and sometimes a trustee-like approach is better. The key determinant is the effect of these models on the epistemic quality of outcomes under different circumstances. Towards the end of the essay, I apply the model to the present revival of populism and consider its implications in that context. (shrink)

组文章试图让我们了解我们是如何从理论上没有错觉的。在接下来的三组中,我评论了阻碍可持续世界的三个主要错觉——技术、宗教和政治合作团体。人们相信社会可以由他们拯救,所以我在书的其余部分里提出一些建议,说 明为什么通过短文和著名作家最近出版的书的评论,这是不可能的。 -/- 美国和世界正处于人口过度增长的崩溃过程中,大部分在上个世纪,现在全部归功于第三世界人民。消耗资源,增加40亿人口,将使工业文明崩溃,使饥饿、疾病、暴力和战争达到惊人的规模。数十亿将死去,核战争几乎可以 肯定。在美国,由于大规模移民和移民再生产,再加上由示威的诡计造成的虐待,这大大加速了。堕落的人性无情地把民主和多样性的梦想变成了犯罪和贫穷的恶梦。崩溃的根本原因是我们与生俱来的心理无法适应现代世界,这 导致人们把不和伦比的人当作他们有着共同的利益。再加上对基础生物学和心理学的无知,导致部分受过教育的控制民主社会的人产生社会工程错觉。很少有人明白,如果你帮助一个人,你伤害了别人——没有免费的午餐,任何 人消耗的每一件东西都会破坏无法修复的地球。因此,各地的社会政策是不可持续的,一个个、没有严格控制自私的社会将崩溃为无政府状态或独裁。如果不进行戏剧性和立即的变化,就不可能阻止美国或任何遵循民主制度的国 家的崩溃。因此,我的文章"民主的自杀"。现在很清楚,统治中国的七大社会路径正在赢得第三次世界大战,所以我的总结文章。唯一更大的威胁是人工智能,我在最后一段简要地评论了它 .

미국과 세계는 지난 세기 동안 과도 한 인구 증가에서 붕괴의 과정에, 그리고 지금 그것의 모든, 3 세계 사람들 로 인해. 자원 의 소비와 30 억 더 ca. 2100의 추가는 산업 문명을 붕괴하고 엄청난 규모의 기아, 질병, 폭력과 전쟁을 초래할 것입니다. 지구는 매년 표토의 적어도 1 %를 잃고, 그래서 그것은 2100 에 가까워지면, 그것의 음식 성장 능력의 대부분은 사라질 것입니다. 수십억 달러가 죽을 것이고 핵전쟁은 확실합니다. 미국에서, 이것은 거 대 한 이민 및 이민자 재생산에 의해 크게 가속화 되 고, 민주주의에 의해 (...) 가능 하 게 학대와 함께. 타락한 인간의 본성은 민주주의와 다양성의 꿈을 범죄와 빈곤의 악몽으로 바꾸어 놓습니다. 중국은 이기심을 제한하는 독재를 유지하는 한 미국과 세계를 계속 압도할 것입니다. 붕괴의 근본 원인은 우리의 타고난 심리학이 현대 세계에 적응할 수 없다는 것입니다. 인권의 개념은 제3세계 모성에 의한 무자비한 파괴로부터 주의를 끌기 위해 좌파들이 추진하는 사악한 환상이다. 이것은 기본적인 생물학과 심리학에 대한 무지와 더불어 민주사회를 통제하는 부분적으로 교육받은 사람들의 사회 공학적 망상으로 이어집니다. 당신이 한 사람을 도와주면 다른 사람에게 해를 끼칠 수 있다는 것을 이해하는 사람은 거의 없습니다- 무료 점심식사가 없고, 사람이 소비하는 모든 물건은 수리를 넘어 지구를 파괴합니다. 따라서 모든 곳의 사회 정책은 지속 가능하지 않으며 이기심에 대한 엄격한 통제없이 모든 사회가 무정부 상태 또는 독재로 붕괴될 것입니다. 거의 언급되지 않은 가장 기본적인 사실은 미국이나 세계에 빈곤층의 상당 부분을 들어 올리고 거기에 보관할 자원이 충분하지 않다는 것입니다. 이 것을 시도하는 것은 미국을 파산시키고 세계를 파괴하는 것입니다. 우리의 유전적 품질과 마찬가지로 지구의 식량 생산 능력은 매일 감소합니다. 그리고 지금, 언제나처럼, 지금까지 가난한 자의 가장 큰 적은 다른 가난한 부자가 아닙니다. 극적이고 즉각적인 변화가 없다면 미국이나 민주주의 체제를 따르는 어떤 나라도 막을 희망이 없다. (shrink)

अमेरिका और दुनिया अत्यधिक जनसंख्या वृद्धि से पतन की प्रक्रिया में हैं, पिछली सदी के लिए यह सबसे अधिक है, और अब यह सब, 3 दुनिया के लोगों के कारण. संसाधनों की खपत और 3 अरब से अधिक ca. 2100 के अलावा औद्योगिक सभ्यता पतन और भुखमरी, रोग, हिंसा और एक चौंका देने वाले पैमाने पर युद्ध के बारे में लाना होगा. पृथ्वी हर साल अपने topsoil के कम से कम 1% खो देता है, तो के रूप में यह 2100 (...) के पास, अपने भोजन की बढ़ती क्षमता के सबसे चला जाएगा. अरबों मर जाएगा और परमाणु युद्ध सब कुछ है, लेकिन कुछ है। अमेरिका में, यह बेहद बड़े पैमाने पर आव्रजन और आप्रवासी प्रजनन द्वारा त्वरित किया जा रहा है, लोकतंत्र द्वारा संभव बनाया दुर्व्यवहार के साथ संयुक्त. भ्रष्ट मानव प्रकृति inexorably अपराध और गरीबी का एक दुःस्वप्न में लोकतंत्र और विविधता के सपने बदल जाता है. चीन अमेरिका और दुनिया को पराजित करना जारी रखेगा, जब तक कि वह स्वार्थ को सीमित करने वाली तानाशाही को बनाए रखता है। पतन का मूल कारण हमारे सहज मनोविज्ञान की अक्षमता को आधुनिक दुनिया के अनुकूल है, जो लोगों को असंबंधित व्यक्तियों के इलाज के लिए की ओर जाता है जैसे कि वे आम हितों था. मानव अधिकारों का विचार एक बुरी कल्पना वामपंथियों द्वारा प्रोत्साहित करने के लिए अनियंत्रित 3 दुनिया मातृत्व द्वारा पृथ्वी की बेरहम विनाश से दूर ध्यान आकर्षित है. यह, बुनियादी जीव विज्ञान और मनोविज्ञान की अज्ञानता के अलावा, आंशिक रूप से शिक्षित जो लोकतांत्रिक समाज को नियंत्रित करने के सामाजिक इंजीनियरिंग भ्रम की ओर जाता है. बहुत कम लोग समझते हैं कि अगर आप किसी और को नुकसान पहुँचाने में आपकी मदद करते हैं, तो मुफ्त दोपहर का भोजन नहीं होता और हर एक वस्तु का उपभोग करने से धरती की मरम्मत से परे नष्ट हो जाती है। नतीजतन, हर जगह सामाजिक नीतियां unsustainable हैं और स्वार्थ पर कड़े नियंत्रण के बिना एक के बाद एक सभी समाज अराजकता या तानाशाही में गिर जाएगी. सबसे बुनियादी तथ्यों, लगभग कभी नहीं उल्लेख किया है, कि अमेरिका या दुनिया में पर्याप्त संसाधनों के लिए गरीबी से बाहर गरीबों का एक महत्वपूर्ण प्रतिशत उठा और उन्हें वहाँ रखने के लिए नहीं कर रहे हैं. ऐसा करने का प्रयास अमेरिका को दिवालिया कर रहा है और दुनिया को नष्ट कर रहा है। भोजन का उत्पादन करने के लिए पृथ्वी की क्षमता दैनिक कम हो जाती है, के रूप में हमारी आनुवंशिक गुणवत्ता करता है. और अब, हमेशा की तरह, अब तक गरीबों का सबसे बड़ा दुश्मन अन्य गरीब है और अमीर नहीं है. नाटकीय और तत्काल परिवर्तन के बिना, वहाँ अमेरिका, या किसी भी देश है कि एक लोकतांत्रिक प्रणाली के बाद के पतन को रोकने के लिए कोई उम्मीद नहीं है. (shrink)

In recent history of sociopolitical organization we have observed first the transition to nation states followed by the creation of supranational political organizations. One determining characteristic of these contemporary sociopolitical structures is their sovereignty over increasingly large populations. In this paper we are presenting a theoretical framework through which we can generalize the organization of large numbers of individuals within a system. We are reinterpreting Foucault as to outline a political anatomy of computer architecture, thus establishing the notion of politics (...) in a purely technical system. Through this political framing of a technological artifact we are able to describe organization as a technology with applications to technical and social systems alike. Based on the recognition of shared organizing principles across different systems we adopt Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell as to challenge the immutability of contemporary organization. We concretize Heidegger’s primal truth through Derrida’s notion of a democracy to come and reformulate it within our framework as organizations to come. Integrating the outlined concepts, we are proposing the framework of Large-Scale Systems Composed of Homogeneous Individuals (LSSCHI) allowing for new perspectives on the relationship between individuals, structure, activity and power within large-scale systems. (shrink)

This thesis investigates Habermas's attempt to establish a credible form of universalism in moral and political philosophy by means of the theoretical approach which he terms "discourse ethics." The central question motivating this study is whether Habermas succeeds in this ambition. Discourse ethics specifies a procedure which purports to enable all agents involved in a conflict of interest in which issues of justice are at stake to come to a rational and cooperative resolution. It proposes a position unique among contemporary (...) approaches to justice in the strength and character of its anti-relativist stance: the plurality of human cultures and the situated character of human understanding do not, according to this theory, bar the way to arriving at a minimal form of moral universalism. Although the procedure specified in communicative ethics elucidates only a narrow range of concerns--those pertaining to justice in the strict sense--it aims to do so in a way valid across all human cultures. ;Habermas's strategy for the defence of a species-wide moral universalism is, I argue, both the key feature of his position, and the least well understood. Discussion of discourse ethics to date has focussed almost exclusively on the question of its appropriateness to the context of modern, Western pluralism. An important reason for this focus has been the intricacy of Habermas's argumentative strategy, which links the recent work on discourse ethics to his longstanding project of developing a theory of communicative action. ;The principle aim of this thesis is to clarify Habermas's position by explicating his programme of justification. In so doing, I draw attention to several problems in his approach as a mechanism for cross-cultural conflict adjudication, and endeavour to provide a more perspicuous account of the relation of Habermas's theory to its main philosophical competitors, especially Rawlsian deontology, and contextualism. (shrink)

Both Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin borrow from Freudian theory in their analyses of fetishism’s relation to the contemporary reception of cultural prod- ucts. I will argue that both authors have con- fused the Marxian and Freudian theories of fetishism, resulting in mistaken conclusions about artistic reception. By disentangling the Marxian and Freudian elements in both authors’ positions, I want to show that 1) Adorno’s characterization of regressive lis- tening implies, contrary to his intentions, that the current reception of artwork (...) is in fact antagonistic to fetishism, and that 2) his crit- icism of Benjamin’s optimism toward “re- ception in distraction” is nevertheless justi- fied. If I am correct, it may be necessary to reassess Adorno’s demand for asceticism in advanced art. The current danger may not be “fetishism” at all, but rather the troublesome consequences of fetishism’s decline. (shrink)