A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence

Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503 (2019)
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Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: A is epistemically permitted to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.
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First archival date: 2019-03-19
Latest version: 2 (2019-03-22)
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