Indeterminacy of translation and indeterminacy of belief

Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):229 - 237 (1974)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation is incorrect. the argument exploits the connections between quine's thesis and common sense notions regarding belief. a simple model of belief, taking beliefs to be sets of brain states, is used to give a rigorous restatement of quine's thesis. it is then argued that our need to project the actions of other people from their professions of belief would make the situation quine describes unstable, since persons in that situation would make less accurate predictions of actions than would persons not so situated
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DARIOT
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-12-18
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
221 ( #28,153 of 2,449,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #61,261 of 2,449,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.