Metainferential Duality

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Abstract
The aim of this article is to discuss the extent to which certain substructural logics are related through the phenomenon of duality. Roughly speaking, metainferences are inferences between collections of inferences, and thus substructural logics can be regarded as those logics which have fewer valid metainferences that Classical Logic. In order to investigate duality in substructural logics, we will focus on the case study of the logics ST and TS, the former lacking Cut, the latter Reflexivity. The sense in which these logics, and these metainferences, are dual has yet to be explained in the context of a thorough and detailed exposition of duality for frameworks of this sort. Thus, our intent here is to try to elucidate whether or not this way of talking holds some ground---specially generalizing one notion of duality available in the specialized literature, the so-called notion of negation duality. In doing so, we hope to hint at broader points that might need to be addressed when studying duality in relation to substructural logics.
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Archival date: 2020-09-11
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2020-09-11

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