Popper e o problema da predição prática

Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146 (2011)
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Abstract
The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one pretends that its application be suitable for the preference of hypothesis. I argue that the nature of this vindication is such that it may be applied also to induction. Thus, to be a popperian is a good reason also to be an inductivist.
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Rational Prediction.Salmon, Wesley C.
On Inductive Logic.Carnap, Rudolf

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