The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism

Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801 (2015)
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Abstract
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the “natural” compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions
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2015
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First archival date: 2014-03-12
Latest version: 2 (2014-03-12)
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References found in this work BETA
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Nahmias, Eddy; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason
Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Greene, Joshua D.; Morelli, Sylvia A.; Lowenberg, Kelly; Nystrom, Leigh E. & Cohen, Jonathan D.

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2014-02-24

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