The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism

Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the “natural” compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions

Author Profiles

Taylor Davis
Purdue University
Oisín Deery
York University

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-02-24

Downloads
1,635 (#5,128)

6 months
118 (#25,041)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?