There May Yet be Non-causal Explanations

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Abstract
There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
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DELTMY-2
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Archival date: 2016-05-08
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2016-05-08

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