View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

42 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-06-27
    Comentarios a «Explicación Teórica y Compromisos Ontológicos: Un Modelo Estructuralista», de C. Ulises Moulines.Pablo Lorenzano - 2005 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37:55-59.
    In this comment on the work by Ulises Moulines I shall not refer to the interesting analysis of the ontological commitments that depends the treatment of the so-called «data models», nor shall I debate the general metaphysical principles proposed in his approach, adopting an experimentalist, instrumentalist, anti-realistic, positivist or empirical stance. I shall focus on the last part of his article in which he elaborates on the links between Wesley Salmon's causalist approach and the structuralist analysis of explanation viewed as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-12-03
    Judgements of Metaphysical Explanations Are Context Sensitive.Andrew James Latham & Kristie Miller - manuscript
    Empirical investigation of the conditions under which people prefer, or disprefer, causal explanation, has suggested to many that our judgements about what causally explains what are context sensitive in a number of ways. This has led many to suppose that whether or not a causal explanation obtains depends on various contextual factors, and that said explanations can obtain in one context, and not in another: they are both subjective and agent-relative. Surprisingly, most accounts of metaphysical explanation suppose there to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-10-26
    Representational Unification in Cognitive Science: Is Embodied Cognition a Unifying Perspective?Marcin Miłkowski & Przemysław Nowakowski - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. added 2019-10-09
    Explicaciones Geométrico-Diagramáticas en Física desde una Perspectiva Inferencial.Javier Anta - 2019 - Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia 38 (19).
    El primer objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que explicaciones genuinamente geométricas/matemáticas e intrínsecamente diagramáticas de fenómenos físicos no solo son posibles en la práctica científica, sino que además comportan un potencial epistémico que sus contrapartes simbólico-verbales carecen. Como ejemplo representativo utilizaremos la metodología geométrica de John Wheeler (1963) para calcular cantidades físicas en una reacción nuclear. Como segundo objetivo pretendemos analizar, desde un marco inferencial, la garantía epistémica de este tipo de explicaciones en términos de dependencia sintáctica y semántica (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-10-08
    The Availability Heuristic and Inference to the Best Explanation.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):409-432.
    This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen's infamous "best of a bad lot" objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response is presented and defended.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-07-18
    Non-Naturalistic Moral Explanation.Samuel Baron, Mark Colyvan, Kristie Miller & Michael Rubin - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This paper focuses on a particular kind of non-naturalism: moral non-naturalism. Our primary aim is to argue that the moral non-naturalist places herself in an invidious position if she simply accepts that the non-natural moral facts that she posits are not explanatory. This has, hitherto, been the route that moral non-naturalists have taken. They have attempted to make their position more palatable by pointing out that there is reason to be suspicious of the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment. That is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-06-11
    Mathematical Explanations and the Piecemeal Approach to Thinking About Explanation.Gabriel Târziu - 2018 - Logique Et Analyse 61 (244):457-487.
    A new trend in the philosophical literature on scientific explanation is that of starting from a case that has been somehow identified as an explanation and then proceed to bringing to light its characteristic features and to constructing an account for the type of explanation it exemplifies. A type of this approach to thinking about explanation – the piecemeal approach, as I will call it – is used, among others, by Lange (2013) and Pincock (2015) in the context of their (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2019-03-08
    Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics.Mark Povich & Carl F. Craver - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):422-426.
    Lange’s collection of expanded, mostly previously published essays, packed with numerous, beautiful examples of putatively non-causal explanations from biology, physics, and mathematics, challenges the increasingly ossified causal consensus about scientific explanation, and, in so doing, launches a new field of philosophic investigation. However, those who embraced causal monism about explanation have done so because appeal to causal factors sorts good from bad scientific explanations and because the explanatory force of good explanations seems to derive from revealing the relevant causal (or (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. added 2019-03-05
    Ontic Explanation Is Either Ontic or Explanatory, but Not Both.Cory Wright & Dingmar van Eck - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:997–1029.
    What features will something have if it counts as an explanation? And will something count as an explanation if it has those features? In the second half of the 20th century, philosophers of science set for themselves the task of answering such questions, just as a priori conceptual analysis was generally falling out of favor. And as it did, most philosophers of science just moved on to more manageable questions about the varieties of explanation and discipline-specific scientific explanation. Often, such (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. added 2019-02-22
    The Narrow Ontic Counterfactual Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation.Mark Povich - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz008.
    An account of distinctively mathematical explanation (DME) should satisfy three desiderata: it should account for the modal import of some DMEs; it should distinguish uses of mathematics in explanation that are distinctively mathematical from those that are not (Baron [2016]); and it should also account for the directionality of DMEs (Craver and Povich [2017]). Baron’s (forthcoming) deductive-mathematical account, because it is modelled on the deductive-nomological account, is unlikely to satisfy these desiderata. I provide a counterfactual account of DME, the Narrow (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2018-12-12
    Explanation, Understanding, and Belief Revision.Andrés Páez - 2018 - In Marco Ruffino, Max Freund & Max Fernández de Castro (eds.), Logic and philosophy of logic. Recent trends from Latin America and Spain. London: College Publications. pp. 233-252.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-10-09
    Should Explanations Omit the Details?Darren Bradley - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences can provide better explanations than lower level sciences. But there is little agreement about exactly why this is so. It is often suggested that higher level explanations are better because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. I argue that our preference for informative beliefs entirely accounts for why (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2018-06-12
    Review of Chrysostomos Mantzavinos's Explanatory Pluralism. [REVIEW]Alexander Beard & Cory Wright - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):569–572.
    Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (2016), Explanatory Pluralism. Cambridge University Press, xiv + 223 pp. £64.99 cloth.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2018-05-11
    Explanation and Understanding in a Model-Based Model of Cognition.Karlis Podnieks - manuscript
    This article is an experiment. Consider a minimalist model of cognition (models, means of model-building and history of their evolution). In this model, explanation could be defined as a means allowing to advance: production of models and means of model-building (thus, yielding 1st class understanding), exploration and use of them (2nd class), and/or teaching (3rd class). At minimum, 3rd class understanding is necessary for an explanation to be respected.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-04-25
    Inference, Explanation, and Asymmetry.Kareem Khalifa, Jared Millson & Mark Risjord - 2018 - Synthese.
    Explanation is asymmetric: if A explains B, then B does not explain A. Tradition- ally, the asymmetry of explanation was thought to favor causal accounts of explanation over their rivals, such as those that take explanations to be inferences. In this paper, we develop a new inferential approach to explanation that outperforms causal approaches in accounting for the asymmetry of explanation.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2018-02-08
    Representing and Explaining: The Eikonic Conception of Scientific Explanation.Alisa Bokulich - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (5):793-805.
    The ontic conception of explanation, according to which explanations are "full-bodied things in the world," is fundamentally misguided. I argue instead for what I call the eikonic conception, according to which explanations are the product of an epistemic activity involving representations of the phenomena to be explained. What is explained in the first instance is a particular conceptualization of the explanandum phenomenon, contextualized within a given research program or explanatory project. I conclude that this eikonic conception has a number of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. added 2018-01-17
    Eight Other Questions About Explanation.Angela Potochnik - 2018 - In Alexander Reutlinger & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The tremendous philosophical focus on how to characterize explanatory metaphysical dependence has eclipsed a number of other unresolved issued about scientific explanation. The purpose of this paper is taxonomical. I will outline a number of other questions about the nature of explanation and its role in science—eight, to be precise—and argue that each is independent. All of these topics have received some philosophical attention, but none nearly so much as it deserves. Furthermore, existing views on these topics have been obscured (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18. added 2017-12-31
    Minimal Models and the Generalized Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation.Mark Povich - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):117-137.
    Batterman and Rice ([2014]) argue that minimal models possess explanatory power that cannot be captured by what they call ‘common features’ approaches to explanation. Minimal models are explanatory, according to Batterman and Rice, not in virtue of accurately representing relevant features, but in virtue of answering three questions that provide a ‘story about why large classes of features are irrelevant to the explanandum phenomenon’ ([2014], p. 356). In this article, I argue, first, that a method (the renormalization group) they propose (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  19. added 2017-12-31
    The Directionality of Distinctively Mathematical Explanations.Carl F. Craver & Mark Povich - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:31-38.
    In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20. added 2017-11-25
    Ciegos por el camino recto. Una explicación de la explicación.Miguel Angel Quintana Paz - 1995 - Cuadernos INICE 67:143-149.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. added 2017-03-29
    Introduction: Scientific Explanation Beyond Causation.Alexander Reutlinger & Juha Saatsi - 2017 - In Alexander Reutlinger & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This is an introduction to the volume "Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations", edited by A. Reutlinger and J. Saatsi (OUP, forthcoming in 2017). -/- Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2017-02-20
    Introduction: Points of Contact Between Biology and History.Marie I. Kaiser & Daniel Plenge - 2014 - In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the special science: The case of biology and history. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 1-23.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. added 2016-12-08
    Explanatory Games.C. Mantzavinos - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (11):606-632.
    A philosophical theory of explanation should provide solutions to a series of problems, both descriptive and normative. The aim of this essay is to establish the claim that this can be best done if one theorizes in terms of explanatory games rather than focusing on the explication of the concept of explanation. The position that is adopted is that of an explanatory pluralism and it is elaborated in terms of the rules that incorporate the normative standards that guide the processes (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. added 2016-09-05
    Explanatory Abstractions.Lina Jansson & Juha Saatsi - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):817–844.
    A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically dif- ferent from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  25. added 2016-07-21
    Henk W. De Regt, Sabina Leonelli and Kai Eigner , Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Pp. Ix+352. ISBN 978-0-8229-4378-6. $65.00. [REVIEW]Jacob Stegenga - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Science 44 (4):578-580.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2016-05-08
    There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):377-384.
    There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. added 2016-03-11
    Mathematical Modelling and Contrastive Explanation.Adam Morton - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (Supplement):251-270.
    Mathematical models provide explanations of limited power of specific aspects of phenomena. One way of articulating their limits here, without denying their essential powers, is in terms of contrastive explanation.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. added 2016-03-07
    Explaining Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben - 1990 - Routledge.
    This book introduces readers to the topic of explanation. The insights of Plato, Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Carl Hempel are examined, and are used to argue against the view that explanation is merely a problem for the philosophy of science. Having established its importance for understanding knowledge in general, the book concludes with a bold and original explanation of explanation.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  29. added 2015-12-30
    Explicaciones Científicas y No Científicas: El Problema de la Demarcación.Andrés Páez - 2008 - In Juan José Botero, Álvaro Corral, Carlos Cardona & Douglas Niño (eds.), Memorias del Primer Congreso Colombiano de Filosofía. Volumen II. Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. pp. 269-282.
    ¿Existe alguna diferencia filosóficamente significativa entre una explicación científica y las explicaciones que se ofrecen en el curso de la vida diaria? Dado que la mayor parte de las discusiones en la filosofía de la ciencia se refieren al primer tipo de explicaciones, debemos considerar si existe un concepto específico que corresponda al término “explicación científica”, y que sea discontinuo de su contraparte cotidiana. El ensayo tiene cuatro secciones. En cada una de ellas considero diferentes criterios que podrían ser utilizados (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2015-12-30
    Esbozo de una teoría pragmatista de la explicación científica.Andrés Páez - 2006 - In José Ahumada, Marzio Pantalone & Víctor Rodríguez (eds.), Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia. Selección de Trabajos de las XVI Jornadas. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. pp. 451-457.
    El ensayo presenta el esbozo de una teoría de la explicación basada en el modelo duda-creencia de investigación propuesto por Peirce y desarrollado por Isaac Levi. Inicialmente se caracteriza una noción de explicación que hace referencia a las creencias y fines epistémicos de los miembros de una comunidad científica. Posteriormente se demuestra que la inclusión de los aspectos pragmáticos de la explicación en la teoría no sólo no conduce al relativismo, sino que es necesaria para poder dar cuenta de la (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2015-12-30
    Explicación, Comprensión e Interpretación.Andrés Páez - 2004 - In Carlos B. Gutiérrez (ed.), No hay hechos, sólo interpre­taciones. Ediciones Uniandes. pp. pp. 347-372.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2015-09-14
    Explanation and Subsumption.Robert C. Cummins - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:163 - 175.
    The thesis that subsumption is sufficient for explanation is dying out, but the thesis that it is necessary is alive and well. It is difficult to attack this thesis: non-subsumptive counter-examples are declared incomplete, or mere promissory notes. No theory, it is thought, can be explanatory unless it resorts to subsumption at some point. In this paper I attack this thesis by describing a theory that (1) would explain every event it could describe, (2) does not explain by subsumption, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2015-09-04
    The Meta-Explanatory Question.L. R. Franklin-Hall - manuscript
    Philosophical theories of explanation characterize the difference between correct and incorrect explanations. While remaining neutral as to which of these ‘first-order’ theories is right, this paper asks the ‘meta-explanatory’ question: is the difference between correct and incorrect explanation real, i.e., objective or mind-independent? After offering a framework for distinguishing realist from anti-realist views, I sketch three distinct paths to explanatory anti-realism.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2015-05-29
    On Explanations From 'Geometry of Motion'.Juha Saatsi - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):253–273.
    This paper examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from "geometry of motion" with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  35. added 2014-10-08
    Because.Achille C. Varzi - 2014 - In Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Volume 1. Springer Verlag. pp. 253–256.
    There is a natural philosophical impulse (and, correspondingly, a great deal of pressure) to always ask for explanations, for example, explanations of why we act as we do. Kevin Mulligan has gone a very long way in disentangling the many different because’s, and the many senses of ‘because’, that tend to clutter our efforts to manage that impulse. This short dialogue is meant as a humble tribute to his work in this area.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2014-04-02
    How Quantum Theory Helps Us Explain.Richard Healey - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axt031.
    I offer an account of how the quantum theory we have helps us explain so much. The account depends on a pragmatist interpretation of the theory: this takes a quantum state to serve as a source of sound advice to physically situated agents on the content and appropriate degree of belief about matters concerning which they are currently inevitably ignorant. The general account of how to use quantum states and probabilities to explain otherwise puzzling regularities is then illustrated by showing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  37. added 2014-03-28
    A Pessimistic Induction Against Scientific Antirealism.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (1):3-21.
    There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  38. added 2012-10-23
    Objectivity Sans Intelligibility. Hermann Weyl's Symbolic Constructivism.Iulian D. Toader - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39. added 2012-08-11
    Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. Why You Can't Cut the Route Toward Further Reduction.Daniel Cohnitz - 2002 - In A. Beckermann & C. Nimtz (eds.), Argument und Analyse: Proceedings of GAP4. Mentis.
    Take a look at these four situations: Figure 1 All of these situations have certain features in common: in all of them an explanation is asked for, in all of them an explanation is given, and all these explanations are literally false (although in different ways).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. added 2012-03-02
    New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2016 - In Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett (eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. Palgrave. pp. 41-74.
    This paper critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to the kinds of examples that it was originally designed to treat, it does not distinguish correct explanations from those that blunder. First, I offer a systematization of the explanatory account, one according to which explanations are mechanistic models that satisfy three desiderata: they must 1) represent causal relations, 2) describe the proper parts, and 3) depict the system at the right ‘level.’ Second, I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  41. added 2012-02-16
    Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception.Cory D. Wright - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
    The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  42. added 2011-11-16
    The Biological Principle of Natural Sciences and the Logos of Life of Natural Philosophy: A Comparison and the Perspectives of Unifying the Science and Philosophy of Life.Attila Grandpierre - 2011 - Analecta Husserliana 110 (Part II):711-727.
    Acknowledging that Nature is one unified whole, we expect that physics and biology are intimately related. Keeping in mind that physics became an exact science with which we are already familiar with, while, apparently, we do not have at present a similar knowledge about biology, we consider how can we make useful the clarity of physics to shed light to biology. The next question will be what are the most basic categories of physics and biology. If we do not want (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark