Fighting Fair: The Ecology of Honor in Humans and Animals

In Jonathan Crane (ed.), Beastly Morality. Columbia University Press. pp. 123-154 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This essay distinguishes between honor-typical and authoritarian behavior in humans and animals. Whereas authoritarianism concerns hierarchies coordinated by control and obedience, honor concerns rankings of prestige determined by fair contests. Honor-typical behavior is identifiable in non-human species, and is to be expected in polygynous species with non-resource-based mating systems. This picture lends further support to an increasingly popular psychological theory that sees morality as constituted by a variety of moral systems. If moral cognition is pluralistic in this way, then the question of moral agency is better considered in terms of particular moral modes, one of which will be “honor-agency.” The universal principles of honorable conduct suggest a handful of criteria for counting as an honorable agent (human or otherwise), and these criteria can be specified without commitment to any particular account of what it takes to be an agent in general.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DEMFFT
Upload history
First archival date: 2013-07-18
Latest version: 7 (2015-11-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-07-18

Total views
691 ( #6,864 of 58,204 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #25,540 of 58,204 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.