Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):325-340 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary’s epistemic progress when she first experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered.
ISBN(s)
1333-1108
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DEMRIA
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-03-05
Latest version: 1 (2016-03-05)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-03-05

Total views
204 ( #14,254 of 39,699 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #23,327 of 39,699 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.