Analyticity and Ontology
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9 (2015)
Abstract
/Analyticity theorists/, as I will call them, endorse the /doctrine of analyticity in ontology/: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The doctrine implies that the table's existence requires nothing more of the world than that those particles exist and bear the features in question. Analyticity theorists have alleged that this idea may be used to defend controversial existence claims against a battery of objections. I argue that this style of defense fails, because the doctrine faces counter-examples. An existence claim may be analytically entailed by some truth and still report a substantial further fact.
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Archival date: 2013-04-01
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Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.
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2013-04-01
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289 ( #8,824 of 37,125 )
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15 ( #20,847 of 37,125 )
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