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  1. added 2019-02-22
    Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?Nils Kürbis - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46.
    This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of (...)
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  2. added 2017-04-18
    Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Russell Gillian - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W.V.O. Quine. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 181-202.
    A critical survey of Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  3. added 2014-04-06
    On the Copernican Turn in Semantics.Cesare Cozzo - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...)
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  4. added 2014-03-31
    Opacity, Belief and Analyticity.Consuelo Preti - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306.
    Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in (...)
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  5. added 2014-03-27
    Analytic Truths and Kripke’s Semantic Turn.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):327-341.
    In his influential Naming and Necessity lectures, Saul Kripke made new sense of modal statements: “Kant might have been a bachelor”, “Königsberg is necessarily identical with Kaliningrad”. Many took the notions he introduced-metaphysical necessity and rigid designation -- to herald new metaphysical issues and have important consequences. In fact, the Kripkean insight is at bottom semantic, rather than metaphysical: it is part of how proper names work that they purport to refer to individuals to whom modal properties can be ascribed. (...)
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  6. added 2014-03-21
    Analyticity Without Synonymy in Simple Comparative Logic.Theodore J. Everett - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):303 - 315.
    In this paper I provide some formal schemas for the analysis of vague predicates in terms of a set of semantic relations other than classical synonymy, including weak synonymy (as between "large" and "huge"), antonymy (as between "large" and "small"), relativity (as between "large" and "large for a dog"), and a kind of supervenience (as between "large" and "wide" or "long"). All of these relations are representable in the simple comparative logic CL, in accordance with the basic formula: the more (...)
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  7. added 2014-01-20
    Hume On Is and Ought: Logic, Promises and the Duke of Wellington.Charles Pigden - forthcoming - In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook on David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the (...)
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  8. added 2013-07-06
    The Objects and the Formal Truth of Kantian Analytic Judgments.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (2):177-93.
    I defend the thesis that Kantian analytic judgments are about objects (as opposed to concepts) against two challenges raised by recent scholars. First, can it accommodate cases like “A two-sided polygon is two-sided”, where no object really falls under the subject-concept as Kant sees it? Second, is it compatible with Kant’s view that analytic judgments make no claims about objects in the world and that we can know them to be true without going beyond the given concepts? I address these (...)
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  9. added 2013-04-01
    Analyticity and Ontology.Louis deRosset - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9.
    /Analyticity theorists/, as I will call them, endorse the /doctrine of analyticity in ontology/: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The (...)
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  10. added 2013-03-06
    From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences.Olaf L. Müller - 2002 - In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both (...)
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  11. added 2009-09-20
    Doing Philosophy with Words.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):429 - 437.
    This paper discusses the coverage of ordinary language philosophy in Scott Soames' Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. After praising the book's virtues, I raise three points where I dissent from Soames' take on the history. First, I suggest that there is more to ordinary language philosophy than the rather implausible version of it that Soames sees to have been destroyed by Grice. Second, I argue that confusions between analyticity, necessity and priority are less important to the ordinary language period (...)
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  12. added 2008-12-31
    Synonymy Without Analyticity.Roger Wertheimer - 1994 - International Philosophical Preprint Exchange.
    Analyticity is a bogus explanatory concept, and is so even granting genuine synonomy. Definitions can't explain the truth of a statement, let alone its necessity and/or our a priori knowledge of it. The illusion of an explanation is revealed by exposing diverse confusions: e.g., between nominal, conceptual and real definitions, and correspondingly between notational, conceptual, and objectual readings of alleged analytic truths, and between speaking a language and operating a calculus. The putative explananda of analyticity are (alleged) truths about essential (...)
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