Incentivizing Replication Is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):906-917 (2021)
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Abstract
Philosophers of science and metascientists alike typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this article I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not focus solely on incentive reform.
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2021
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DESIRI-3
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Archival date: 2021-04-13
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2020-09-27

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