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  1. added 2020-11-13
    Institutional Knowledge and its Normative Implications.Säde Hormio - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: pp. 63-78.
    We attribute knowledge to institutions on a daily basis, saying things like "the government knew about the threat" or "the university did not act upon the knowledge it had about the harassment". Institutions can also attribute knowledge to themselves, like when Maybank Global Banking claims that it offers its customers "deep expertise and vast knowledge" of the Southeast Asia region, or when the United States Geological Survey states that it understands complex natural science phenomena like the probability of earthquakes occurring (...)
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  2. added 2020-11-11
    The Possibility of Collective Moral Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - In The Routledge Handbook on Collective Responsibility. New York: pp. 258-273.
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  3. added 2020-10-25
    When is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?Boaz Miller - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Normatively inappropriate scientific dissent prevents warranted closure of scientific controversies, and confuses the public about the state of policy-relevant science, such as anthropogenic climate change. Against recent criticism by de Melo-Martín and Intemann of the viability of any conception of normatively inappropriate dissent, I identify three conditions for normatively inappropriate dissent : its generation process is politically illegitimate; it imposes an unjust distribution of inductive risks; it adopts evidential thresholds outside an accepted range. I supplement these conditions with an inference-to-the-best-explanation (...)
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  4. added 2020-10-10
    Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization.Kenneth Boyd - forthcoming - Episteme.
    There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, particularly with regards to political issues and scientific issues that have become markers of social identity, such as anthropogenic climate change and vaccine hesitancy. Online and social media environments in particular have received a lot of attention in these discussions, both because of people’s increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information, and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those (...)
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  5. added 2020-09-23
    Why Think for Yourself?Jonathan Matheson - manuscript
    Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even (...)
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  6. added 2020-09-22
    Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (3):283-304.
    Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...)
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  7. added 2020-09-18
    Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - forthcoming - Ergo.
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the (...)
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  8. added 2020-09-16
    Epistemic Corruption and Political Institutions.Ian James Kidd - manuscript
    Institutions play an indispensable role in our political and epistemic lives. This Chapter explores sympathetically the claim that political institutions can be bearers of epistemic vices. I start by describing one form of collectivism - the claim that the vices of institutions do not reduce to the vices of their members. I then describe the phenomenon of epistemic corruption and the various processes that can corrupt the epistemic ethoi of political institutions. The discussion focuses on some recent work by Miranda (...)
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  9. added 2020-08-25
    The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to Do.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology (1):91-100.
    In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.
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  10. added 2020-08-19
    Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor‎.Boaz Miller & Ori Freiman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. ‎341-353‎.
    This chapter explores properties that bind individuals, knowledge, and communities, together. Section ‎‎1 introduces Hardwig’s argument from trust in others’ testimonies as entailing that trust is the glue ‎that binds individuals into communities. Section 2 asks “what grounds trust?” by exploring assessment ‎of collaborators’ explanatory responsiveness, formal indicators such as affiliation and credibility, ‎appreciation of peers’ tacit knowledge, game-theoretical considerations, and the role moral character ‎of peers, social biases, and social values play in grounding trust. Section 3 deals with establishing (...)
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  11. added 2020-07-25
    Social Media Disinformation and the Security Threat to Democratic Legitimacy.Regina Rini - 2019 - NATO Association of Canada: Disinformation and Digital Democracies in the 21st Century:10-14.
    This short piece draws on political philosophy to show how social media interference operations can be used by hostile states to weaken the apparent legitimacy of democratic governments. Democratic societies are particularly vulnerable to this form of attack because democratic governments depend for their legitimacy on citizens' trust in one another. But when citizen see one another as complicit in the distribution of deceptive content, they lose confidence in the epistemic preconditions for democracy. The piece concludes with policy recommendations for (...)
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  12. added 2020-07-15
    Can a Wise Society Be Free? Gilbert, Group Knowledge and Democratic Theory.Joshua Anderson - 2020 - Ethics, Politics and Society 3:28-48.
    Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize (...)
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  13. added 2020-07-01
    Epistemic Vice Predicts Acceptance of Covid-19 Misinformation.Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano & Boudewijn De Bruin - manuscript
    Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...)
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  14. added 2020-07-01
    Deliberation and Group Disagreement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge.
    Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...)
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  15. added 2020-07-01
    The Epistemology of Group Disagreement: An Introduction.Fernandfo Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge.
    This is an introduction to the volume The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, forthcoming), (eds.) F. Broncano-Berrocal and J.A. Carter.
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  16. added 2020-07-01
    Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...)
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  17. added 2020-06-16
    Review Socially Extended Epistemology: J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard : Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 336pp, £55.00 HB. [REVIEW]Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Metascience 1 (3):441-447.
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  18. added 2020-06-05
    Collective Inaction and Collective Epistemic Agency.Michael D. Doan - 2020 - In Deborah Tollefsen & Saba Bazargan Forward (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. New York, NY, USA: pp. 202-215.
    In this chapter I offer a critique of the received way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction and propose an alternative approach that takes as its point of departure the epistemic agency exhibited by people navigating impossible situations together. One such situation is becoming increasingly common in the context of climate change: so-called “natural” disasters wreaking havoc on communities—flooding homes, collapsing infrastructures, and straining the capacities of existing organizations to safeguard lives and livelihoods. What happens when philosophical reflection begins (...)
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  19. added 2020-05-18
    The Shared Know-How in Linguistic Bodies.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...)
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  20. added 2020-05-17
    Review of Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers, by Brian McGuinness and Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, by David Bloor. [REVIEW]Julian Friedland - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):164-168.
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  21. added 2020-04-16
    What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Essays in Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge.
    The aim of this paper is to (i) examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and (ii) explore the consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. I begin by critically examining several definitions of epistemic paternalism that have been proposed, and suggesting ways they might be improved. I then contrast epistemic and general paternalism and argue that it’s difficult to see what makes epistemic paternalism an epistemic phenomenon at all. Next, I turn to the various normative questions one might (...)
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  22. added 2020-04-15
    Introduction to Special Issue on 'Group Speech Acts'.Leo Townsend & Michael Schmitz - 2020 - Language & Communication 72:53-55.
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  23. added 2020-03-14
    The Theory of Two Sciences: Bourgeois and Proletarian Science.Agustin Ostachuk - 2015 - Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad 10 (Suppl 1):191-194.
    What is the relation between science and ideology? Are they incompatible, complementary or the same thing? Should science avoid “contamination” from ideology? Is there an only way to do science? Does anyone of them lead to the same results and give us the same worldview? We will focus on the figure of Alexander Bogdanov, Russian physician and philosopher, in order to discuss these and other relevant topics. His theories gave birth to what may be called later “the theory of two (...)
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  24. added 2020-03-14
    Bogdanov and the Theory of Two Sciences.Agustin Ostachuk - 2015 - Sociologia Em Rede 5 (5):114-118.
    What is the relation between science and ideology? Are they incompatible, complementary or the same thing? Should science avoid “contamination” from ideology? Is there an only way to do science? Does anyone of them lead to the same results and give us the same view of the world? We will focus on the figure of Alexander Bogdanov, Russian physician and philosopher, in order to discuss these and other relevant topics. His theories gave birth to what may be called later “the (...)
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  25. added 2020-03-04
    When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge.
    Our aim in this chapter is to draw attention to what we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationist views of disagreement. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group's epistemic priorities: that is, the group's favoured trade-off between the "Jamesian goals" of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. We show how this problem can arise within a simple belief aggregation framework, and draw some general lessons about when the problem is most (...)
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  26. added 2020-03-04
    El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Angeles Eraña & Axel Barceló - 2016 - Tópicos 51 (51):9-35.
    En este ensayo exploramos una perspectiva epistemológica en la que el elemento social y colectivo del conocimiento juega un papel fundamental en la explicación de su producción y transmisión. Primero presentamos y criticamos una posición individualista que ha sido dominante en la epistemología contemporánea y cuyas raíces pueden trazarse, al menos, hasta Descartes. Posteriormente introducimos y defendemos nuestra propia mirada, una en la que el conocimiento es un proceso constituido por un conjunto de actividades y prácticas que tiene un carácter (...)
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  27. added 2020-02-10
    Group Inquiry.Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Group agents can act, they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two challenges: making sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be a kind of group action, and understanding the division of labour involved in group inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing accounts of group action face problems dealing with large-scale group (...)
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  28. added 2020-02-10
    Disentangling the Epistemic Failings of the 2008 Financial Crisis.Lisa Warenski - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 196-210.
    I argue that epistemic failings are a significant and underappreciated moral hazard in the financial services industry. I argue further that an analysis of these epistemic failings and their means of redress is best developed by identifying policies and procedures that are likely to facilitate good judgment. These policies and procedures are “best epistemic practices.” I explain how best epistemic practices support good reasoning, thereby facilitating accurate judgments about risk and reward. Failures to promote and adhere to best epistemic practices (...)
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  29. added 2020-02-03
    Archives Against Genocide Denialism?Melanie Altanian - 2017 - In Swisspeace Working Paper. Bern, Schweiz: pp. 1-38.
    Considering the value of archives for dealing with the past processes, especially for the establishment of collective memory and identity, this paper discusses the role of archives in situations of conflicting memories such as in the case of the official Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide. A crucial problem of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation are the divergent perceptions of what to consider as proper ‘evidence’, i.e. as objective, reliable, impartial or trustworthy sources of knowledge in order to prove the Armenian genocide. The (...)
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  30. added 2020-01-08
    Collective Understanding — A Conceptual Defense for When Groups Should Be Regarded as Epistemic Agents with Understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
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  31. added 2020-01-06
    Supergrading: How Diverse Standards Can Improve Collective Performance in Ranking Tasks.Michael Morreau - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (4):541-565.
    The method of supergrading is introduced for deriving a ranking of items from scores or grades awarded by several people. Individual inputs may come in different languages of grades. Diversity in grading standards is an advantage, enabling rankings derived by this method to separate more items from one another. A framework is introduced for studying grading on the basis of observations. Measures of accuracy, reliability and discrimination are developed within this framework. Ability in grading is characterized for individuals and groups (...)
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  32. added 2019-11-23
    Group Understanding.Kenneth Boyd - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    While social epistemologists have recently begun addressing questions about whether groups can possess beliefs or knowledge, little has yet been said about whether groups can properly be said to possess understanding. Here I want to make some progress on this question by considering two possible accounts of group understanding, modeled on accounts of group belief and knowledge: a deflationary account, according to which a group understands just in case most or all of its members understand, and an inflationary account, according (...)
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  33. added 2019-11-20
    Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:1-16.
    It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations visà- vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorganised groups of people are (...)
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  34. added 2019-11-14
    Why Moral Reasoning Is Insufficient for Moral Progress.Agnes Tam - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (1):73-96.
    A lively debate in the literature on moral progress concerns the role of practical reasoning: Does it enable or subvert moral progress? Rationalists believe that moral reasoning enables moral progress, because it helps enhance objectivity in thinking, overcome unruly sentiments, and open our minds to new possibilities. By contrast, skeptics argue that moral reasoning subverts moral progress. Citing growing empirical research on bias, they show that objectivity is an illusion and that moral reasoning merely rationalizes pre-existing biased moral norms. In (...)
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  35. added 2019-11-09
    Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 201-215.
    Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
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  36. added 2019-11-06
    Group Knowledge, Questions, and the Division of Epistemic Labour.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Discussions of group knowledge typically focus on whether a group’s knowledge that p reduces to group members’ knowledge that p. Drawing on the cumulative reading of collective knowledge ascriptions and considerations about the importance of the division of epistemic labour, I argue what I call the Fragmented Knowledge account, which allows for more complex relations between individual and collective knowledge. According to this account, a group can know an answer to a question in virtue of members of the group knowing (...)
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  37. added 2019-10-21
    The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.
    Thanks to the advent of social media, large numbers of Americans believe outlandish falsehoods that have been widely debunked. Many of us have a tendency to fault the individuals who hold such beliefs. We naturally assume that the individuals who form and maintain such beliefs do so in virtue of having violated some epistemic obligation: perhaps they failed to scrutinize their sources, or failed to seek out the available competing evidence. I maintain that very many ordinary individuals who acquire outlandish (...)
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  38. added 2019-09-09
    The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent.Boaz Miller - 2019 - In David Henderson, Peter Graham, Miranda Fricker & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 228-237.
    This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and (...)
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  39. added 2019-08-28
    Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Episteme:1-14.
    It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue (...)
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  40. added 2019-08-19
    Exploring Searle's Social Ontology.Samal H. R. Manee - 2018 - Philosophical Alternatives Journal 2.
    In this short article, I will explore John Searle’s social ontology project from the perspective of social epistemology. The outcome of my analysis is that language is decisive for the collective acquisition and production of knowledge. I agree with Searle regarding the exposure of language as a central constitutive component of social forms of knowledge, a component that plays a significant role in the development of social epistemology.
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  41. added 2019-08-15
    Developing a Model of Groupstrapping: A Response to Baumgaertner and Nguyen.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8):32-39.
    In their responses to my article “Epistemically Pernicious Groups and the Groupstrapping Problem” (Boyd, 2018), Bert Baumgaertner (“Groupstrapping, Boostrapping, and Oops-strapping: A Reply to Boyd”) and C. Thi Nguyen (“Group-strapping, Bubble, or Echo Chamber?”) have raised interesting questions and opened lines of inquiry regarding my discussion of what I hope to be a way to help make sense of how members of groups can continue to hold beliefs that are greatly outweighed by countervailing evidence (e.g. antivaxxers, climate-change deniers, etc.). Here (...)
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  42. added 2019-07-30
    Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Olivier Roy & Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - Synthese.
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe (...)
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  43. added 2019-06-12
    Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
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  44. added 2019-06-12
    Staying True with the Help of Others: Doxastic Self-Control Through Interpersonal Commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.
    I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...)
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  45. added 2019-06-05
    Knowledge and Cognitive Integration.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1931-1951.
    Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of (...)
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  46. added 2019-04-08
    For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology (2):1-11.
    This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents. After introducing a service conception of epistemic authority based on Alvin Goldman’s account of a cognitive expert, I argue that this service conception is well suited to account for the epistemic authority of collective bodies on a non-summativist perspective, and I show in detail how the defining (...)
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  47. added 2019-02-13
    Epistemologia serviciilor de informaţii.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Despre analogia existentă între aspectele epistemologice şi metodologice ale activităţii serviciilor de informaţii şi unele discipline ştiinţifice, pledând pentru o abordare mai ştiinţifică a procesului de culegere şi analiză de informaţii din cadrul ciclului de informaţii. Afirm că în prezent aspectele teoretice, ontologice şi epistemologice, în activitatea multor servicii de informaţii, sunt subestimate, determinând înţelegere incompletă a fenomenelor actuale şi creând confuzie în colaborarea inter-instituţională. După o scurtă Introducere, care include o istorie a evoluţiei conceptului de serviciu de informaţii după (...)
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  48. added 2019-01-11
    Essays in Collective Epistemology, Edited by Jennifer Lackey: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. Vii + 253, £40. [REVIEW]Boaz Miller - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):402-405.
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  49. added 2019-01-03
    Common Knowledge.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - In Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. pp. 181-195.
    An opinionated introduction to philosophical issues connected to common knowledge.
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  50. added 2018-11-16
    Epistemically Pernicious Groups and the Groupstrapping Problem.Kenneth Boyd - 2018 - Social Epistemology 33 (1):61-73.
    Recently, there has been growing concern that increased partisanship in news sources, as well as new ways in which people acquire information, has led to a proliferation of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers: in the former, one tends to acquire information from a limited range of sources, ones that generally support the kinds of beliefs that one already has, while the latter function in the same way, but possess the additional characteristic that certain beliefs are actively reinforced. Here I argue, (...)
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