View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

113 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 113
  1. WikiSilo: A Self-Organizing, Crowd Sourcing System for Interdisciplinary Science [Supporting Paper].David Pierre Leibovitz, Robert L. West & Mike Belanger - manuscript
    WikiSilo is a tool for theorizing across interdisciplinary fields such as Cognitive Science, and provides a vocabulary for talking about the problems of doing so. It can be used to demonstrate that a particular cognitive theory is complete and coherent at multiple levels of discourse, and commensurable with and relevant to a wider domain of cognition. WikiSilo is also a minimalist theory and methodology for effectively doing science. WikiSilo is simultaneously similar to and distinct, as well as integrated and separated (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Why Think for Yourself?Jonathan Matheson - manuscript
    Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Epistemic Vice Predicts Acceptance of Covid-19 Misinformation.Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano & Boudewijn De Bruin - manuscript
    Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Epistemologia serviciilor de informaţii.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Despre analogia existentă între aspectele epistemologice şi metodologice ale activităţii serviciilor de informaţii şi unele discipline ştiinţifice, pledând pentru o abordare mai ştiinţifică a procesului de culegere şi analiză de informaţii din cadrul ciclului de informaţii. Afirm că în prezent aspectele teoretice, ontologice şi epistemologice, în activitatea multor servicii de informaţii, sunt subestimate, determinând înţelegere incompletă a fenomenelor actuale şi creând confuzie în colaborarea inter-instituţională. După o scurtă Introducere, care include o istorie a evoluţiei conceptului de serviciu de informaţii după (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. Dynamically Rational Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2021
    Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as “coherence” of judgments at a given time, understood as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. By contrast, this paper discusses whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization.Kenneth Boyd - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, particularly with regards to political issues and scientific issues that have become markers of social identity, such as anthropogenic climate change and vaccine hesitancy. Online and social media environments in particular have received a lot of attention in these discussions, both because of people’s increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information, and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Group Understanding.Kenneth Boyd - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    While social epistemologists have recently begun addressing questions about whether groups can possess beliefs or knowledge, little has yet been said about whether groups can properly be said to possess understanding. Here I want to make some progress on this question by considering two possible accounts of group understanding, modeled on accounts of group belief and knowledge: a deflationary account, according to which a group understands just in case most or all of its members understand, and an inflationary account, according (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Collective Understanding — A Conceptual Defense for When Groups Should Be Regarded as Epistemic Agents with Understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Incentivizing Replication is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust.Hugh Desmond - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Philosophers of science and meta-scientists alike now typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this paper I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not only focus on incentive reform.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - forthcoming - Ergo.
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Diversity, Trust and Conformity: A Simulation Study.Sina Fazelpour & Daniel Steel - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Previous simulation models have found positive effects of cognitive diversity on group performance, but have not explored effects of diversity in demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). In this paper, we present an agent-based model that captures two empirically supported hypotheses about how demographic diversity can improve group performance. The results of our simulations suggest that, even when social identities are not associated with distinctive task-related cognitive resources, demographic diversity can, in certain circumstances, benefit collective performance by counteracting two types of conformity (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Group Inquiry.Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Group agents can act, they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two challenges: making sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be a kind of group action, and understanding the division of labour involved in group inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing accounts of group action face problems dealing with large-scale group (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge.
    The aim of this paper is to (i) examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and (ii) explore the consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. I begin by critically examining several definitions of epistemic paternalism that have been proposed, and suggesting ways they might be improved. I then contrast epistemic and general paternalism and argue that it’s difficult to see what makes epistemic paternalism an epistemic phenomenon at all. Next, I turn to the various normative questions one might (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255.
    Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Epistemic Corruption and Political Institutions.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Political Epistemology. pp. 357-358.
    Institutions play an indispensable role in our political and epistemic lives. This Chapter explores sympathetically the claim that political institutions can be bearers of epistemic vices. I start by describing one form of collectivism - the claim that the vices of institutions do not reduce to the vices of their members. I then describe the phenomenon of epistemic corruption and the various processes that can corrupt the epistemic ethoi of political institutions. The discussion focuses on some recent work by Miranda (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Hayek and the “Use of Knowledge in Society”.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
    Encyclopedia entry: http://www.sagepub.com/books/Book234813#tabview=title.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Episteme:1-14.
    It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. When is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?Boaz Miller - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Normatively inappropriate scientific dissent prevents warranted closure of scientific controversies, and confuses the public about the state of policy-relevant science, such as anthropogenic climate change. Against recent criticism by de Melo-Martín and Intemann of the viability of any conception of normatively inappropriate dissent, I identify three conditions for normatively inappropriate dissent : its generation process is politically illegitimate; it imposes an unjust distribution of inductive risks; it adopts evidential thresholds outside an accepted range. I supplement these conditions with an inference-to-the-best-explanation (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Hermeneutic Injustices: Practical and Epistemic.Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Andreas Mauz & Christiane Tietz (eds.), Interpretation und Geltung. Paderborn, Germany: Brill.
    Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - forthcoming - Political Studies:online first.
    Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. In Defense of Partisanship.Neil Sinhababu - forthcoming - In David Killoren, Emily Crookston & Jonathan Trerise (eds.), Ethics in Politics: New Papers on the Rights and Obligations of Political Agents. Routledge.
    This essay explains why partisanship is justified in contemporary America and environments with similar voting systems and coalition structures. It explains how political parties operate, how helping a party succeed can be a goal of genuine ethical significance, and how trusting one party while mistrusting another can be a reliable route to true belief about important political issues.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Can Real Social Epistemic Networks Deliver the Wisdom of Crowds?Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we explain and showcase the promising methodology of testimonial network analysis and visualization for experimental epistemology, arguing that it can be used to gain insights and answer philosophical questions in social epistemology. Our use case is the epistemic community that discusses vaccine safety primarily in English on Twitter. In two studies, we show, using both statistical analysis and exploratory data visualization, that there is almost no neutral or ambivalent discussion of vaccine safety on Twitter. Roughly half the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. The Epistemology of Collective Testimony.Leo Townsend - forthcoming - Journal of Social Ontology.
    In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony. According to the first view, collective testimony inherits its epistemic credentials from the beliefs the testimony expresses— where this can be seen either as the beliefs of all or some of the group’s members, or as the beliefs of group itself. The second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Shared Know-How in Linguistic Bodies.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1):94-101.
    The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2021 - New York; London: Routledge.
    Together we can often achieve things that are impossible to do on our own. We can prevent something bad from happening or we can produce something good, even if none of us could do it by herself. But when are we morally required to do something of moral importance together with others? This book develops an original theory of collective moral obligations. These are obligations that individual moral agents hold jointly, but not as unified collective agents. To think of some (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (1):1-16.
    It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations visà- vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorganised groups of people are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge.
    Our aim in this chapter is to draw attention to what we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationist views of disagreement. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group's epistemic priorities: that is, the group's favoured trade-off between the "Jamesian goals" of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. We show how this problem can arise within a simple belief aggregation framework, and draw some general lessons about when the problem is most (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Can a Wise Society Be Free? Gilbert, Group Knowledge and Democratic Theory.Joshua Anderson - 2020 - Ethics, Politics and Society 3:28-48.
    Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement: An Introduction.Fernandfo Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge. pp. 1-8.
    This is an introduction to the volume The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, forthcoming), (eds.) F. Broncano-Berrocal and J.A. Carter.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Deliberation and Group Disagreement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge. pp. 9-45.
    Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen de Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Motivated Numeracy and Active Reasoning in a Western European Sample.Paul Connor, Emily Sullivan, Mark Alfano & Nava Tintarev - 2020 - Behavioral Public Policy 1.
    Recent work by Kahan et al. (2017) on the psychology of motivated numeracy in the context of intracultural disagreement suggests that people are less likely to employ their capabilities when the evidence runs contrary to their political ideology. This research has so far been carried out primarily in the USA regarding the liberal–conservative divide over gun control regulation. In this paper, we present the results of a modified replication that included an active reasoning intervention with Western European participants regarding both (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Jury Theorems.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2020 - In M. Fricker (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York and Abingdon:
    We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Collective Inaction and Collective Epistemic Agency.Michael D. Doan - 2020 - In Deborah Tollefsen & Saba Bazargan Forward (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. New York, NY, USA: pp. 202-215.
    In this chapter I offer a critique of the received way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction and propose an alternative approach that takes as its point of departure the epistemic agency exhibited by people navigating impossible situations together. One such situation is becoming increasingly common in the context of climate change: so-called “natural” disasters wreaking havoc on communities—flooding homes, collapsing infrastructures, and straining the capacities of existing organizations to safeguard lives and livelihoods. What happens when philosophical reflection begins (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (3):283-304.
    Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Institutional Knowledge and its Normative Implications.Säde Hormio - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: pp. 63-78.
    We attribute knowledge to institutions on a daily basis, saying things like "the government knew about the threat" or "the university did not act upon the knowledge it had about the harassment". Institutions can also attribute knowledge to themselves, like when Maybank Global Banking claims that it offers its customers "deep expertise and vast knowledge" of the Southeast Asia region, or when the United States Geological Survey states that it understands complex natural science phenomena like the probability of earthquakes occurring (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 201-215.
    Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor‎.Boaz Miller & Ori Freiman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. ‎341-353‎.
    This chapter explores properties that bind individuals, knowledge, and communities, together. Section ‎‎1 introduces Hardwig’s argument from trust in others’ testimonies as entailing that trust is the glue ‎that binds individuals into communities. Section 2 asks “what grounds trust?” by exploring assessment ‎of collaborators’ explanatory responsiveness, formal indicators such as affiliation and credibility, ‎appreciation of peers’ tacit knowledge, game-theoretical considerations, and the role moral character ‎of peers, social biases, and social values play in grounding trust. Section 3 deals with establishing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Supergrading: How Diverse Standards Can Improve Collective Performance in Ranking Tasks.Michael Morreau - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (4):541-565.
    The method of supergrading is introduced for deriving a ranking of items from scores or grades awarded by several people. Individual inputs may come in different languages of grades. Diversity in grading standards is an advantage, enabling rankings derived by this method to separate more items from one another. A framework is introduced for studying grading on the basis of observations. Measures of accuracy, reliability and discrimination are developed within this framework. Ability in grading is characterized for individuals and groups (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to Do.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology (1):91-100.
    In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. The Possibility of Collective Moral Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - In The Routledge Handbook on Collective Responsibility. New York: pp. 258-273.
    Our moral obligations can sometimes be collective in nature: They can jointly attach to two or more agents in that neither agent has that obligation on their own, but they – in some sense – share it or have it in common. In order for two or more agents to jointly hold an obligation to address some joint necessity problem they must have joint ability to address that problem. Joint ability is highly context-dependent and particularly sensitive to shared (or even (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Why Moral Reasoning Is Insufficient for Moral Progress.Agnes Tam - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (1):73-96.
    A lively debate in the literature on moral progress concerns the role of practical reasoning: Does it enable or subvert moral progress? Rationalists believe that moral reasoning enables moral progress, because it helps enhance objectivity in thinking, overcome unruly sentiments, and open our minds to new possibilities. By contrast, skeptics argue that moral reasoning subverts moral progress. Citing growing empirical research on bias, they show that objectivity is an illusion and that moral reasoning merely rationalizes pre-existing biased moral norms. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Trust and Commitment in Collective Testimony.Leo Townsend - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices. Cham: pp. 39-58.
    In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Fricker’s ‘trust-based’ view of collective testimony—that is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Fricker’s account is the idea that testimony involves an ‘interpersonal deal of trust’, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to ‘second-personal epistemic trustworthiness’. Appropriating Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can ‘enter into the second-personal relations of trust that characterise (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Introduction to Special Issue on 'Group Speech Acts'.Leo Townsend & Michael Schmitz - 2020 - Language & Communication 72:53-55.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Developing a Model of Groupstrapping: A Response to Baumgaertner and Nguyen.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8):32-39.
    In their responses to my article “Epistemically Pernicious Groups and the Groupstrapping Problem” (Boyd, 2018), Bert Baumgaertner (“Groupstrapping, Boostrapping, and Oops-strapping: A Reply to Boyd”) and C. Thi Nguyen (“Group-strapping, Bubble, or Echo Chamber?”) have raised interesting questions and opened lines of inquiry regarding my discussion of what I hope to be a way to help make sense of how members of groups can continue to hold beliefs that are greatly outweighed by countervailing evidence (e.g. antivaxxers, climate-change deniers, etc.). Here (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology (2):1-11.
    This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents. After introducing a service conception of epistemic authority based on Alvin Goldman’s account of a cognitive expert, I argue that this service conception is well suited to account for the epistemic authority of collective bodies on a non-summativist perspective, and I show in detail how the defining (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Review Socially Extended Epistemology: J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard : Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 336pp, £55.00 HB. [REVIEW]Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Metascience 1 (3):441-447.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Group Knowledge, Questions, and the Division of Epistemic Labour.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6 (33 2019-20).
    Discussions of group knowledge typically focus on whether a group’s knowledge that p reduces to group members’ knowledge that p. Drawing on the cumulative reading of collective knowledge ascriptions and considerations about the importance of the division of epistemic labour, I argue what I call the Fragmented Knowledge account, which allows for more complex relations between individual and collective knowledge. According to this account, a group can know an answer to a question in virtue of members of the group knowing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.
    Thanks to the advent of social media, large numbers of Americans believe outlandish falsehoods that have been widely debunked. Many of us have a tendency to fault the individuals who hold such beliefs. We naturally assume that the individuals who form and maintain such beliefs do so in virtue of having violated some epistemic obligation: perhaps they failed to scrutinize their sources, or failed to seek out the available competing evidence. I maintain that very many ordinary individuals who acquire outlandish (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 113