Service and Status Competition May Help Explain Perceived Ethical Acceptability

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The dominant view on the ethics of cognitive enhancement (CE) is that CE is beholden to the principle of autonomy. However, this principle does not seem to reflect commonly held ethical judgments about enhancement. Is the principle of autonomy at fault, or should common judgments be adjusted? Here I argue for the first, and show how common judgments can be justified as based on a principle of service.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DESSAS-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-04-15
View other versions
Added to PP
2020-11-17

Downloads
41 (#67,469)

6 months
11 (#57,721)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?