Service and Status Competition May Help Explain Perceived Ethical Acceptability

American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (4):258-260 (2020)
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The dominant view on the ethics of cognitive enhancement (CE) is that CE is beholden to the principle of autonomy. However, this principle does not seem to reflect commonly held ethical judgments about enhancement. Is the principle of autonomy at fault, or should common judgments be adjusted? Here I argue for the first, and show how common judgments can be justified as based on a principle of service.

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Hugh Desmond
Leibniz Universit├Ąt Hannover


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