Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle Connection

In Arnaud Dewalque, Charlotte Gauvry & Richard Sébastien (eds.), Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School. Basingstoke, Royaume-Uni: (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This chapter argues that Gilbert Ryle’s account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano’s. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. Section 1 suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of analysis. Section 2 spells out the notion of misleading expression by means of the surface-grammar/truth-conditions distinction, which I argue is implicit in their accounts. Section 3 zooms in on a specific class of misleading expressions, namely expressions about ficta. Finally, Section 4 draws the consequences of what precedes for a correct understanding of the notion of meaning.
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Archival date: 2020-09-26
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