View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

17 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-09-28
    Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle Connection.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - In Arnaud Dewalque, Charlotte Gauvry & Richard Sébastien (eds.), Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School. Basingstoke, Royaume-Uni:
    This chapter argues that Gilbert Ryle’s account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano’s. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. Section 1 suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of analysis. Section 2 spells (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-12-08
    Gilbert Ryle and the Ethical Impetus for Know-How.Matt Dougherty - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (1):01-21.
    This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of “knowing-how”. It is argued that in addition to his motive of discounting a certain theory of mind, his interest in the notion also stemmed (and perhaps stemmed more deeply) from two ethical interests: one concerning his own life as a philosopher and whether the philosopher has any meaningful task, and one concerning the ancient issue of whether virtue is a kind of knowledge. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-10-04
    Skill and the Critique of Descartes in Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.Gabrielle Jackson - 2010 - In Kascha Semonovitch Neal DeRoo (ed.), Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Religion, and Perception. Continuum. pp. 63.
    The mechanistic concept of the body, as inherited from René Descartes, has generated considerable trouble in philosophy—including, at least in part, the mind-body problem itself. Still, the corps mécanique remains perhaps the most prevalent though least examined assumption in recent philosophy of mind. I discuss two notable exceptions. Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected this assumption for surprisingly similar reasons. Writing at about the same time, though in different languages and in very different circles, they each attempted to articulate a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-04-12
    ›Wissen, dass‹ und ›Wissen, wie‹.David Löwenstein - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 116-121.
    This is an introduction to the debate about Know-how.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-03-27
    Is the Royaumont Colloquium the Locus Classicus of the Divide Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy? Reply to Overgaard.Andreas Vrahimis - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):177 - 188.
    (2013). Is the Royaumont Colloquium the Locus Classicus of the Divide Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy? Reply to Overgaard. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 177-188. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.689751.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2018-11-29
    A Practical Guide to Intellectualism.Yuri Cath - 2008 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I demonstrate (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. added 2018-09-29
    Ryle on Motives and Dispositions.Maria Alvarez - 2015 - In D. Dolby (ed.), Ryle on Mind and Language. Palgrave. pp. 74-96.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2018-03-16
    Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.
    Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. added 2018-03-07
    Précis Zu Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):95-99.
    This is a précis of my book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10. added 2018-03-07
    Regresse Und Routinen. Repliken Auf Brandt Und Jung.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):110-113.
    This paper responds to comments and criticisms by Stefan Brandt and Eva-Maria Jung, directed at the book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. added 2017-04-19
    Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
    What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  12. added 2016-01-10
    Review of "Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory" by Leonidas Tsilipakos. [REVIEW]Robert Vinten - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (2):153-156.
    Book review of Tsilipakos, Leonidas: Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory: Taking Concepts Seriously. Farnham : Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2015-04-02
    Knowledge-How, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle's Return.David Löwenstein - 2011 - In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 269-304.
    How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something is the case? In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential aspect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert Ryle – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have tried to establish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This project – Linguistic Intellectualism – will (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. added 2009-08-12
    Ryle’s Dispositional Analysis of Mind and its Relevance.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2010 - Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences (April, 2010):103-112.
    The Concept of Mind is the best known and the most important work of Gilbert Ryle. Ryle is thought to have accomplished two major tasks. First, he was seen to have put the final nail in the coffin of Carteisan dualism. Ryle rejects Descartes’ dualistic theory of the relation between mind and body. This doctrine of separation between mind and body is referred by Ryle as “the dogma of the ghost in the machine.” Second, he himself anticipated and suggested dualism’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2009-08-12
    The Official Doctrine and its Relevance Today.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2009 - PARISHEELAN (No.3):14-21.
    It is the intention of this paper is to introduce some contemporary relevance of Descartes’ dualism with special reference to Gilbert Ryle’s criticism. Ryle’s explicit target in The Concept of Mind is what he calls the “official doctrine”, which results, he tells us, at least in part from Descartes’ appreciation that Galilean methods of scientific discovery were fit to provide mechanical explanations for every occupant of space, together with Descartes’ conviction that the mental could not simply be a more complex (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2009-08-11
    GILBERRT RYLE ON DESCARTES' MYTH.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2007 - K.U. Research Journal of Arts and Humanities (Jan.-Dec.2007):81-86.
    The aim of this paper is to critically examine the Ryle’s conception of “Descartes Myth”. Ryle has two objectives in his book The Concept of Mind: (i) to refute a current philosophical theory about mind. (ii) to substitute at least in blue print, a satisfactory alternative. This paper gives a descriptive analysis of what Ryle calls Descartes-Myth and arguments for it. Conclusion of this paper drawn as he does not succeed in dispelling the myth but only substitutes a peculiar logical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2008-12-31
    Reinterpreting Ryle: A Nonbehaviorist Analysis.Shelley M. Park - 1994 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (2):265-90.
    This paper argues that the behaviorist label yields a caricature of Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind that cannot be adequately fleshed out by reference to the larger corpus of Rylean texts. On the interpretation of Ryle that I offer here, he is best characterized as an "ontological agnostic." Ryle's aim, I believe, is to develop a nondenotational theory of meaning for mental-conduct terms--a theory of meaning which does not presuppose any metaphysical or ontological theory and, hence, does not (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations