Epistemological Theories

يلقي سوسا ( -1940) في هذا الكتاب المسائل الكلاسيكية والمعاصرة في نظرية المعرفة، ويعرض مشكلاتها، ويقترح لها الحلول. بداية من الشكية، ومرورا بمشكلة جيتير، والنزاع بين نزعة الأسس ونزعة الاتساق على بنية المعرفة، والخلاف بين النزعة الخارجية والنزعة الداخلية على طبيعة المعرفة، وانتهاء بالدفاع عن إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة التي أسسها واستهل البحث فيها عام 1980، ويناقش العلاقة بين أنصار الثقة وأنصار المسئولية في هذا الفرع المعرفي الجديد. وأنت حين تطالع عرض سوسا لمسائل المعرفة إنما تطالع عقلا ناقدا وفكرا دقيقا في طبيعة (...) المعرفة، ومجالها، وأنواعها ومستوياتها، وقيمتها، والفضيلة أو القدرة المعرفية التي تكون هذه المعرفة. وستجد أيضا أنه يكشف المضمون الحقيقي لفلسفة ديكارت في المعرفة مع مصادرها القديمة، ويقدم تطويرا معاصرا للبناء الديكارتي يقوم على العلم والحس المشترك وليس اللاهوت كما فعل ديكارت. شكلت كتابات سوسا معالم البحث المعرفي المعاصر على مدار أربعة عقود أو يزيد. ومن الخير أن يظهر قراء العربية على هذا الكتاب الخليق بالعناية، وعلى فلسفة مؤلفه الحقيق أن يلقب الآن بعميد الإبستمولوجيا. وقيل عن المؤلف والكتاب:"لا يوجد فيلسوف حي في الوقت الحاضر يفهم الإبستمولوجيا فهما مفصلا وشاملا وواضحا مثلما يفهمها إرنست سوسا. وهذا كتاب تنويري ومرشد كأشد ما يكون التنوير والإرشاد". -/- In this concise book, one of the world’s leading epistemologists provides a sophisticated, revisionist introduction to the problem of knowledge in Western philosophy. Modern and contemporary accounts of epistemology tend to focus on limited questions of knowledge and skepticism, such as how we can know the external world, other minds, the past through memory, the future through induction, or the world’s depth and structure through inference. This book steps back for a better view of the more general issues posed by the ancient Greek Pyrrhonists. Returning to and illuminating this older, broader epistemological tradition, Ernest Sosa develops an original account of the subject, giving it substance not with Cartesian theology but with science and common sense. Descartes is a part of this ancient tradition, but he goes beyond it by considering not just whether knowledge is possible in the first place, but also how we can properly attain it. In Cartesian epistemology, Sosa finds a virtue-theoretic account, one that he extends beyond the Cartesian context. Once epistemology is viewed in this light, many of its problems can be solved or fall away. The result is an important reevaluation of epistemology that will be essential reading for students and teachers. -/- . (shrink)

إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة هي محاول لاستكشاف الفضائل العقلية والبحث فى الطريقة التى يمكن بها أن تشكل معالجتنا لمسائل المعرفة. ظهر مصطلح "إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة" لأول مرة في كتاب سوسا "المعرفة من وجهة نظر"1991. ولكن فكرة الفضيلة العقلية ظهرت لأول مرة في المشهد الإبستمولوجي المعاصر في مقال سوسا "الطوافة والهرم" 1980. وفي ذلك الوقت كانت الإبستمولوجيا تزخر بحلول مقترحة لمشكلة جيتير (Gettier 1963)، واعتراضات حديثة على النزعة الداخلية والنزعة الخارجية معا، واختلافات بين أنصار نظرية الأسس وأنصار نظرية الاتساق. وخلص سوسا في هذا المقال (...) إلى نتيجة مؤداها أن فكرة الفضيلة العقلية intellectual virtue ربما تساعدنا في حل النزاع بين نزعة الأسس ونزعة الاتساق. وبعد أن نشر سوسا مقاله، تحول بعض فلاسفة المعرفة إلى مفاهيم الفضيلة العقلية لمعالجة مجموعة واسعة من مشكلات المعرفة. وتستطيع أن تقول إن إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة جاءت في الأصل لتضع بعض التحسينات على نزعة الثقة، ولتكون طريقة لحل المشكلات التي كانت تزعج نظريات التسويغ القائمة على الاعتقاد. وفي هذه الدراسة تجد تأملا دقيقا في دلالة إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة، ونشأتها، واتجاهاتها، وماتقدمه من حلول لمشكلات المعرفة التقليدية، ومن فائدة للتربية والتكوين الفكري عامة. (shrink)

ISR Phenikaa (05-03-2021) — 文化加算性は２０１８年１２月Palgrave Communications 学術誌に掲載された研究論文に定義された概念である。Palgrave Communications (ISSN 2662-9992) はNatureの唯一の人文社会の科学誌であり、２０２０年７月から名前がHumanities & Social Sciences Communicationsに変更された。.

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K (...) thesis in the context of anti-luck epistemology and the idea that knowledge is factive. Williamson’s views on these matters are worth investigating in some detail because he subscribes to a well-worked out anti-luck view of knowledge that incorporates what is perhaps the most common anti-luck condition. But this paper is also of more general importance because the critique of Williamson’s views on these matters reveals some important things about the nature of evidence and evidence is one of the most fundamental concepts in epistemology. (shrink)

IMAGO TEXT 2020 ABSTRACTS -/- (German abstract below) The text presents a structural analysis and a logical theory of creativity. It argues that creativity emerges from the translation between two forms of precision, thus from the ubiquitous transformation between incompatible forms of thought and articulation. This transformation allows for unexpected surpluses and innovations, in conjunction with fallacies, waste and noise. Common myths and misconceptions – i.e. about creativity as a force in dire supply - are debunked, as are mistaken strategies (...) for creativity-enhancement. Instead, suggestions are offered as to how educational institutions can channel and enable ubiquitous energies – instead of investing much resources and effort into their suppression. -/- Der Text präsentiert eine strukturelle Analyse und eine logische Theorie der Kreativität. Er argumentiert, dass Kreativität aus der Übersetzung zwischen zwei Formen der Präzision hervorgeht, aus der allgegenwärtigen Transformation zwischen unvereinbaren Formen des Denkens und der Artikulation, was zu Überschuß und produktiven Abweichungen wie auch Abfall und Fehlschlüssen führt. Verbreitete Mythen und Missverständnisse – etwa zu Kreativität als Mangelware – werden diskutiert sowie Strategien zur Kreativitätsförderung. Es geht um Vorschläge, wie pädagogische Institutionen die stets vorhandenen kreativen Energien kanalisieren und ermöglichen können, anstatt sie mit viel Aufwand zu unterdrücken. (shrink)

A *qualation* does not contain merely references to qualia, but contains actual qualia. There are many differences to equations. Qualations are irreducibly 1st-person and are required for the statement of a hard problem.

In the course of this article we discussed the method of applying philosophy to adolescents, we count on the added experience during the year we worked in a technical college. We have chosen to apply a method that goes beyond the traditional, in order to make the philosophical act more natural and close to the students. We discuss the effectiveness of the traditional while showing the results achieved in this period. We worked with young people from fifteen to nineteen years, (...) these had their focus to learn the agricultural technical part, our challenge was to take philosophy to a group of students who had no real interest in the material, even thought it was useless. Thinking about the difficulties that it was to bring philosophical thought to these young people, together with the problems that are already part of the school, the different social contexts of the students, we developed classes and contents in order to work all these factors. We want to make these young people not simply knowledgeable of the concepts, but rather to broaden their worldview and logical thinking. (shrink)

This is a primer on Steven James Bartlett's book CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND MEANING. ●●●●● -/- Some books are long and complex. The Critique of Impure Reason is such a book. It is long enough and complex enough so that it may be a service to some readers to offer a primer to introduce and partially summarize the book’s objectives and method. Here, the author of Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning provides such (...) a guide, a vade mecum to accompany a reader should he or she embark on a study of the long and complex work. ●●●●● -/- The book is available in a printed edition, ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6, from online booksellers such as Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and through independent bookstores. The book is also available as an eBook, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5458352, through Zenodo, PhilSci, PhilPapers, HAL, and other online archives. (shrink)

Se o sentido e a finalidade da razão como instrumento de conhecimento converge para a possibilidade de discernimento envolvendo o verdadeiro e o falso, o que se impõe ao seu exercício não é senão um método que consiste na aplicação de determinados preceitos destinados tanto ao entendimento como à vontade, cuja contradição caracteriza o fundamento metafísico do erro, segundo Descartes que, conforme assinala o referido artigo, recorre a uma dúvida que, na investigação dos fundamentos absolutos, encerra uma radicalidade que tende (...) a se deter nas fronteiras do próprio ato de duvidar, que implica na experiência do Cogito e traz a prova ontológica da existência de Deus como única condição capaz de assegurar a realidade do mundo. (shrink)

Correlating it to contemporary society, the article in question beckons with the reading of the idols of the cave [Bacon], holding specifically that the question involves the nature of the individual, whose trend can prevail only to adapt the framework of your perspective content resulting from the endoculturação, converging, in short, to the borders of dogma, as highlighted by the emergence of materialistic scientism, in the name of progress, establishing the techno-scientific belief in the assumptions, proposing the credibility of the (...) referential framework of science and technical division of conditionalities as determinants of social change, characterized because, as a false notion, as evidenced by the consequences. (shrink)

Article in question holds in epistemological implications of the revolution copernicana of Immanuel Kant, whose perspective, emerging of borders that inter-related rationalism of Leibniz, empiricism Hume and science positive physical-mathematics Newton, introduces the horizon of idealism transcendental, establish the correlation fundamental involving the subject and object of knowledge.

O artigo em questão se detém no método baconiano, que emerge através do Novum Organum (ou Verdadeiras Indicações acerca da Interpretação da Natureza) e acena com a pretensão de possibilitar o verdadeiro progresso da ciência, que demanda, em suma, a erradicação das predisposições para o erro, dos preconceitos e das noções falsas que impedem o acesso à verdade, dos “ídolos”, enfim, segundo a leitura de Bacon, que propõe o controle científico sobre a natureza como fator determinante da harmonia e do (...) bem-estar dos homens, conforme o ideal exposto no trabalho intitulado Nova Atlântida, que converge para caracterizar o saber como uma construção coletiva, desenhando um horizonte que se impõe ao processo formativo-educacional, à medida que estabelece uma relação envolvendo conhecimento e poder que guarda raízes nas fronteiras da experiência, em cuja perspectiva a investigação em referência dialoga com a metodologia freinetiana, que sublinha a articulação entre teoria e prática e assinala o papel que cumpre o trabalho em uma aprendizagem que traz como fundamento a ação. (shrink)

Se a leitura da epistemologia clássica e a perspectiva dos adeptos do “empirismo lógico” assinalam que a ciência demanda a exclusão de tudo aquilo que não se impõe ao horizonte que envolve a dedutibilidade analítica e a verificabilidade, Karl Popper defende que mais do que saber quando e em que condição uma teoria dialoga com a verdade a relevância não acena senão para a demarcação entre ciência e não ciência, particularmente no tocante às fronteiras que abrangem a ciência que carrega (...) autenticidade [que emerge através da construção de Newton, submetida ao aperfeiçoamento e à correção de Einstein] e as ideologias [marxismo e psicanálise], tornando-se imprescindível a busca de uma resposta para a questão referente ao critério capaz de estabelecer o estatuto científico de um universo teórico ou de um enunciado. (shrink)

Perfazendo a primeira filosofia existencial trágica, a doutrina de Schopenhauer atribui a origem do caráter simultaneamente trágico, absurdo e doloroso da existência ao querer viver, implicando um pessimismo que impõe à felicidade uma condição negativa, à medida que o sofrimento emerge como o fundamento de toda a vida, constituindo-se o prazer estético uma possibilidade quanto à superação da dor e do tédio, conforme assinala o artigo cujo trabalho mostra a correlação envolvendo a perspectiva da metafí­sica da vontade e o pensamento (...) de Nietzsche que, detendo-se no niilismo como um acontecimento que expressa a negação da vida e converge para a sua própria superação, sobrepõe ao dualismo metafí­sico o princí­pio da unidade-múltipla através da construção da sua metafisica de artista, que supõe um movimento da consciência ética para o pathos artí­stico. (shrink)

Perfazendo a primeira filosofia existencial trágica, a doutrina de Schopenhauer atribui a origem do caráter simultaneamente trágico, absurdo e doloroso da existência ao querer viver, implicando um pessimismo que impõe à felicidade uma condição negativa, à medida que o sofrimento emerge como o fundamento de toda a vida, constituindo-se o prazer estético uma possibilidade quanto à superação da dor e do tédio, conforme assinala o artigo cujo trabalho mostra a correlação envolvendo a perspectiva da metafísica da vontade e o pensamento (...) de Nietzsche que, detendo-se no niilismo como um acontecimento que expressa a negação da vida e converge para a sua própria superação, sobrepõe ao dualismo metafísico o princípio da unidade-múltipla através da construção da sua metafisica de artista, que supõe um movimento da consciência ética para o pathos artístico. (shrink)

Correlacionando-a à sociedade contemporânea, o artigo em questão acena com a leitura dos ídolos da caverna [Bacon], detendo-se especificamente na questão que envolve a natureza do indivíduo, cuja tendência não se impõe senão para adaptar ao arcabouço de sua perspectiva o conteúdo resultante do processo de endoculturação, convergindo, em suma, para as fronteiras da dogmatização, conforme assinala a emergência do cientificismo materialista que, em nome do progresso, institui a crença nos pressupostos tecnocientíficos, propondo a credibilização das referencialidades do arcabouço da (...) ciência e da circunscrição da técnica como condicionalidades determinantes da emancipação social, caracterizando-se, pois, como uma falsa noção, tal como atestam as suas consequências. (shrink)

It seems like experience plays a positive—even essential—role in generating some knowledge. The problem is, it’s not clear what that role is. To see this, suppose that when your visual system takes in information about the world around you it skips the experience step and just automatically and immediately generates beliefs in you about your surroundings. A lot of philosophers think that, in such a case, you would (or at least could) still know, via perception, about the world around you. (...) But then that raises the question: What epistemic role was the experience playing? How did it contribute to your knowledge of your surroundings? Philosophers have given many different answers to these questions. But, for various reasons, none of them has really stuck. In this paper I offer and defend a different answer to these questions—a solution to the problem—which avoids the pitfalls of other answers. I argue that experience is, all by itself, a kind of knowledge—it’s what Bertrand Russell (1912) calls “knowledge of things”. So I argue that experience helps generate knowledge simply by being knowledge. (shrink)

Fenomenologia della percezione (1ª ed. 1941, 2ª ed. 1961) è, a mio parere, un libro fondamentale, che ci può orientare in modo decisivo davanti alla dialettica idealismo - realismo (60). Infatti, il principio di immanenza, da Cartesio a Gadamer, si basa su una sbagliata e gratuita descrizione del punto di partenza della conoscenza. In questa concezione, la conoscenza partirebbe da una materia informe, o un polverone di elementi che deve essere organizzato in qualche modo dal soggetto. L’esperienza ci dà la (...) molteplicità, e l’unità non può venire che dal soggetto. Ora, qual’è l’esperienza sulla quale si basa questa asseverazione? Nessuna, ovviamente, ed p. Fabro si incarica di provarlo fino alla stanchezza nelle 400 pagine che compongono la sua colossale opera. Il punto di partenza dell’idealismo non è per niente fuori discussione, e per convincersi basta prendere tra le mani questo libro. (shrink)

Defendendo a união entre a razão e a experiência como a possibilidade de instauração do desenvolvimento científico, Bacon se contrapõe à indução aristotélica enquanto procedimento que implica a enumeração de casos particulares tendo em vista o objetivo de encontrar o geral existente em todos e em cada um deles em um processo que se detém na soma de fatos, limitando-se à comunicação, na medida em que não tem capacidade de empreender a descoberta do conhecimento. Dessa forma, sobrepondo-se ao acúmulo de (...) fatos sem método, Bacon institui a indução por subtração enquanto processo baseado na eliminação sistemática de experiências inconclusivas, que converge para atribuir valor às experiências negativas e impede as generalizações prematuras, instaurando o experimento enquanto experiência guiada e disciplinada pelo intelecto na fundação do empirismo moderno. (shrink)

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Struktur und Funktion forschender Laborpraxis vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischer Positionen. Das Labor kann in seiner Relevanz unterschätzt werden – mit Blick auf die darin verrichteten praktischen Tätigkeiten, auf dabei erforderliche Urteilsbildungen und nicht zuletzt auf unverzichtbare Impulse für die Wissenschaft. Die abstrakte Gegenüberstellung von Theorie und Praxis ist aufzugeben. Zugleich sollte Wissenschaft weder allein über das Labor noch über die Theoriebildung bestimmt werden. Abschließend plädiert der Beitrag dafür, die skizzierten Fragestellungen in die Labordidaktik (...) sowie in die Planung und Durchführung von Lernlaboren einzubeziehen. (shrink)

Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox. As a consequence, the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of the temporal change of unique absolute (...) temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, - that is my claim - the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which the potentiality of lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences. (shrink)

Tracking theories see knowledge as a relation between a subject’s belief and the truth, where the former is responsive to the latter. This relationship involves causation in virtue of a sensitivity condition, which is constrained by an adherence condition. The result is what I call a stable causal relationship between a fact and a subject’s belief in that fact. I argue that when we apprehend the precise role of causation in the theory, previously obscured problems pour out. This paper presents (...) thirteen distinct and original counterexamples to Nozick’s tracking theory—many of which also constitute problems for more recent tracking theories. I begin by discussing how tracking relates to causation: Nozick invokes causation through conditions similar to those of Lewisian causal dependence. As a result, when causal dependence is not necessary for causation, Nozick fails to identify knowledge. I then address the inability of causation to capture epistemically important concepts, such as justification and truth. I conclude by discussing the underlying asymmetries between causation and knowledge that undermine any attempt to reduce knowledge to a purely metaphysical relation. (shrink)

This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy, considers knowledge as an outcome of intellectual virtues without which there would be no knowledge. The role these two philosophers ascribe to (...) moral and intellectual virtues and vices in forming the identity makes it possible to compare their interpretation of epistemic virtues. As a virtue responsibilist, Zagzebski sees epistemic virtue as a character trait and explains its nature by its different components. Sadra as well, sees epistemic virtue as a character trait. Evidence shows that Sadra’s definition of intellectual virtues is similar to that given by Zagzebski in many respects. Examining Zagzebski’s viewpoint on epistemic virtue, this paper will discuss Sadra’s viewpoint on epistemic virtue as well as its contribution to knowledge. In conclusion the similarities of the two viewpoints will be delineated. (shrink)

This article compares and contrasts the reception of Comte’s positivism in the works of William Whewell, John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano. It is argued that Whewell’s rejection of positivism derives from his endorsement of a constructivist account of the inductive sciences, while Mill and Brentano’s sympathies for positivism are connected to their endorsement of an empiricist account. The mandate of the article is to spell out the chief differences between these two rival accounts. In the last, conclusive section, Whewell’s (...) anti-positivist argument is briefly assessed, and rebutted. (shrink)

According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a (...) proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework. (shrink)

This work has as its main goal to discuss two different epistemic proposals, both under the reliabilist handle. The first one, developed by Alvin Goldman, has as its central goal to offer an adequate characterization of the justificational element present in the standard account of knowledge. Goldman's proposal has the initial challenge of properly explaining Gettier's demand presented some years earlier, but also to correct some more central problems that affect his own causal theory of knowledge. However, the externalist proposal (...) within Goldman's reliabilism faced some serious attacks directed to its notion of justification. Three of these attacks became well known in the recent literature: the generality problem, the meta-incoherence problem and the new evil genius problem. Each one in its own way has established challenges to the his reliabilist account. The second reliabilist theory we will discuss consists in a reformulation of Goldman's account, defended mainly by Ernest Sosa in a series of very important works in contemporary epistemology. In these works, Sosa was able to insert the notion of intellectual virtues in the epistemological debate, bringing to the center of the externalist debate an idea of a responsible belief formation, and at the same time trying to give a proper answer to the more central challenges faced by original reliabilism. In the first part of the paper I present the first of these theories, and after that I offer a treatment of Sosa's reformulation of reliabilism and a defense of this proposal as a more adequate theory to deal with some basic demands of a proper theory of justification. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

Despite playing an important role in epistemology, philosophy of science, and more recently in moral philosophy and aesthetics, the nature of understanding is still much contested. One attractive framework attempts to reduce understanding to other familiar epistemic states. This paper explores and develops a methodology for testing such reductionist theories before offering a counterexample to a recently defended variant on which understanding reduces to what an agent knows.

Sobrepondo uma concepção crítica envolvendo os fundamentos do saber às ontologias dogmáticas que se impõem ao trabalho que implica a apreensão das questões filosóficas, o projeto kantiano propõe o fim da filosofia como construção metafísica e a necessidade de se lhe atribuir uma tarefa teórica de caráter essencialmente genealógico e crítico, no sentido que encerra a legitimação do conhecimento racional através da análise das faculdades que se lhe estão atreladas, conforme assinala o artigo, que se detém nos direitos da razão (...) cuja legitimidade a lógica da verdade reconhece e cuja ilegitimidade a lógica da aparência denuncia, convergindo para as fronteiras que encerram a possibilidade da construção do conhecimento científico, à medida que, tornando o entendimento o legislador universal da natureza e circunscrevendo a utilização das categorias aos limites da experiência possível, propõe as condições necessárias para fundá-lo sobre os juízos sintéticos a priori. (shrink)

O artigo em questão se detém nas implicações epistemológicas da revolução copernicana de Immanuel Kant, cuja perspectiva, emergindo das fronteiras que inter-relacionam o racionalismo de Leibniz, o empirismo de Hume e a ciência positiva físico-matemática de Newton, instaura o horizonte do idealismo transcendental, estabelecendo a correlação fundamental envolvendo o sujeito e o objeto do conhecimento.

This work aims to present and discuss recent developments in epistemology that seek for satisfactory formulations and responses to the problem of radical skepticism. Its main goal is to understand how the skeptical problem can be properly characterized, how it can be viewed as inserted in the traditional dispute in epistemology between externalism and internalism, and to which extent antiskeptical theories are situated within this dispute. After identifying their place in the dispute, another antiskeptical proposal is discussed, one that suggests (...) a conciliatory take on the internalist/externalist debate. The way Duncan Pritchard presents this conciliatory view, known as epistemological disjunctivism, intends to show that we can know the things that radical skepticism wants to preclude us to know. In order to do that, we just have to consider our structure of reasons as one that allows us to have factive reasons, reasons of externalist and internalist nature, that could put us in a privileged position to know the things we ordinarily believe. After the presentation and discussion of Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivism, and his general rejection of skepticism, it is suggested that its antiskeptical tools are also available to more traditional epistemic theories - but to access them, some epistemological assumptions need to be adjusted. In order to do that, an alternative take on the internalism/externalism dispute is offered, so it can allow for a different way of conceiving the conciliatory antiskeptical strategy, one that has epistemic reliabilism as its framework. The final propposal consists in an attempt to democratize the disjunctivist tool against radical skepticism. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving a genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge. The first one is through the epistemic state of nature hypothesis developed by Edward Craig, according to which knowledge is understood as a concept evolved from the concept of a good informant. After considering Craig’s project, I draw a parallel between this approach and Miranda Fricker’s value-laden account of the same concept. Then, I present and discuss Fricker’s social take on Craig’s genealogy, in (...) which she suggests that the notions of a good informant and of knowledge are necessarily dependent on the establishment of a credibility norm, and that this norm should be viewed as inherently political. Lastly, I defend an illustration, through Kristie Dotson’s work, of how both genealogical approaches could explain and offer solutions to failings in the normativity of our epistemic systems. (shrink)

In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or preferences. I consider a moral statement, “Killing innocent civilians is wrong,” and argue that such a statement is a truthful moral norm. I show that what is fundamental to agreement in the realm of both facts and morals is a commonly shared attitude that determines human relatedness to the world. Scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of (...) mind that constitutes scientific attitude. However, knowledge in morals does not presuppose indifference, but love. Once we accept that our thoughts and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world. (shrink)

An invited High Table Address given before the students and faculty of Raymond College, University of the Pacific, Stockton, California, December 10, 1969. An impressionistic and idealistic paper from the author’s youth suggesting how his _de-projective approach to phenomenology_ could lead to an actual, lived, worldview.

Differenti sono i modi di conoscere che sono emersi nel corso della storia umana. Ian Hacking ha proposto una nozione, quella di "stile di pensiero" ("style of reasoning"), che fornisce un modello per caratterizzarli ed esaminare la loro genesi e il loro sviluppo. L'articolo mette in luce alcune implicazioni di questa nozione concernenti l'evoluzione del nostro sapere.

According to proper functionalist theories of warrant, a belief is warranted only if it is formed by cognitive faculties that are properly functioning according to a good, truth-aimed design plan, one that is often thought to be specified either by intentional design or by natural selection. A formidable challenge to proper functionalist theories is the Swampman objection, according to which there are scenarios involving creatures who have warranted beliefs but whose cognitive faculties are not properly functioning, or are poorly designed, (...) or are not aimed at truth. In this paper, we draw lessons from cognitive science in order to develop a novel argument for the conclusion that the Swampman objection fails against proper functionalist theories of warrant. Our argument not only shows that the underlying, central intuition motivating Swampman-like scenarios is false but also motivates proper function as a necessary condition for warrant, thereby lending support to the claim that any theory of knowledge that lacks a proper function requirement is false. (shrink)

Sektion Erkenntnistheorie, 29.09.2014, XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie 2014 in Münster. -/- The problem of synthetic judgments touches upon the question whether philosophy is in fact capable of making independent truth statements. According to Kant, synthetic judgments formulate the conditions for the possibility of objectively valid knowledge a priori. As far as empirical attempts at reinterpretation of the aprioristic fall short of this ambition, Kant’s a priori goes deeper. This is because modern science strives towards objective knowledge, although (...) its statements are fundamentally fallible. The topic of synthetic a priori thus continues to be relevant. -/- This paper will show that, in order to be viable at all, a modernized version of transcendental philosophy must ‘depart from’ the concepts of “independence from empirics” and/or the “purity” of the aprioristic. Kant’s reflections on non-pure synthetic a priori knowledge already contain attempts at this. Furthermore, the aprioristic validity of knowledge does not exclude the possibility, that it can be discovered empirically. Fries and, subsequently, Nelson proceeded with this separation (initially ascribed to Reichenbach) between the contexts of validity and discovery of knowledge, pointing out that the a priori can indeed be discovered empirically, yet never be proven. -/- Currently, there are still a number of valid reasons for arguing that concepts from transcendental philosophy continue to be of fundamental importance for the modern sciences. However, it must not be neglected that, even within a modernized framework of transcendental philosophy various unsolved problems remain and/or are created (such as the unfeasibility of the aprioristic claim to general validity and necessity, the problem of drawing a clear boundary between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds). Moreover, the “beautiful structure” of the Kantian system, which constitutes much of its persuasive strength, is lost. (shrink)

Arguments pro and contra convergent realism - underdetermination of theory by observational evidence and pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity- are considered. It is argued that, to meet the counter-arguments challenge, convergent realism should be considerably changed with a help of modification of the propositions from this meta-programme’s “hard core” and “protecting belt”. Maybe one of the ways out is to turn to the coherent theory of truth. Some of the works of Hegel (as interpreted by Merab Mamardashvili and Alexandre Kojev), (...) Husserl and Heidegger can help to dig still deeper into the background of this theory. Key words: Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel, convergent realism, internal realism, coherent theory of truth. -/- . (shrink)

Aquinas’s process of abstraction of the particular thing into a universal concept is of pivotal importance for grounding his philosophy and theology in a natural framework. Much has been said and written regarding Aquinas’s doctrine of abstraction, yet recent studies still consider it to be ‘nothing more than a kind of magic.’ This problematic claim is not without foundation, for in trying to understand exactly how this process works, we are constantly faced with an unbridgeable abyss and the repeated vague (...) explanations made by Aquinas. The plain truth is that Aquinas explains what abstraction ought to do and yet, most of the time, he does not explain how it is to be done. This paper intends to show that although Aquinas does not present us with a mechanism for the theory of abstraction, we are nevertheless able to construct a viable mechanism which accords with Aquinas’s guidelines. The aim of constructing a working mechanism that corresponds to what Aquinas demands of the process of abstraction is twofold: First, it attempts to extricate Aquinas’s doctrine of abstraction from the claims of being a quasi-natural doctrine. Second, a viable process of abstraction which is derived from Aquinian-Aristotelian sources can approach contemporary cognitive problems from a fresh point of view. (shrink)

This dissertation engages in a critical analysis of the work of Adolf Reinach in the theory of knowledge and legal philosophy. Reinach had trained as a lawyer and brought that perspective and experience to bear in his phenomenological work on problems in evidence and legal philosophy. His contributions to phenomenology in the early 20th century provide a window into the earliest phases of the development of the phenomenological movement, prior to World War I. This dissertation locates this work in the (...) European intellectual context of the era and finds analogies with key philosophical dilemmas and developments in England during the same period, arguably ones with shared intellectual roots. Valued for his talent as an inspiring university lecturer, Reinach was a central figure in the circle of young scholars who practiced phenomenology in the spirit of the "early" "pre-Ideen" phase of phenomenology. The dissertation Appendices include translations of selected excerpts from the Nachlass. My translation of the obituary Edmund Husserl wrote and published following Adolf Reinach's death in WWI is published separately. Professor Raymond Klibansky was my supervisor and mentor throughout. (shrink)

In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response (...) to epistemic relativism. In this paper, I outline this particularist response to relativism, and provide further commentary on the relationship between naturalism and particularism. In addition, I set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to relativism and G. E. Moore’s defense of an external world. (shrink)

Quine, criticism of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology.

During the seventeenth century the major cognitive faculties--sense, imagination, memory, and understanding or intellect--became the central focus of argument in metaphysics and epistemology to an extent not seen before. The theory of the intellect, long an important auxiliary to metaphysics, became the focus of metaphysical dispute, especially over the scope and powers of the intellect and the existence of a `pure' intellect. Rationalist metaphysicians such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche claimed that intellectual knowledge, gained independently of the senses, provides the (...) framework for constructing a new theory of nature. Other writers, including Hobbes and the early Gassendi, denied the existence of a distinct intellectual faculty, and so challenged the metaphysicians' abilities directly to perceive the essences of substances. The theory of the senses, which had long been a part of philosophical discussion, took on a new urgency, for adherents of the new corpuscularian philosophy needed to replace the dominant Aristotelian theory of real sensory qualities and sensible species. The revival of skepticism and a renewed interest in method also brought the faculties into prominence, for skeptical challenges typically were directed toward the faculties of sense and understanding, and the theory of method was conceived as providing instructions for the proper use of one's cognitive equipment. The theory of the faculties, then, is an important key to theories of knowledge in the seventeenth century. Indeed, rather than speaking of seventeenth century epistemology, it would be less anachronistic and more informative to speak of theories of cognition. The familiar (and over-stated) point that epistemology became fundamental to metaphysics during that century can then be restated as the point that the theory of faculties became central in metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

The resolution of the celebrated θ-τ enigma of elementary particle physics through the introduction of the parity violation law by T.D. Lee and C.N. Yang in 1956, may be epistemologically considered as a possible historical instance mostly explainable by means of that particular aspect of Kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions invoking the Gestalt switches as possible psychological patterns whose paradigm’s change is puts into analogy with those inherent the natural sciences (paradigm switches). From what said, then, it will be possible (...) to outline further elementary epistemological considerations. (shrink)