Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism: An Integrated Approach from Participant Stance and Affect

Logos Architekton 3 (1):247-269 (2009)
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Abstract
Following the recent surge in experimental philosophy exploring how unprimed intuitions enable the folk arrive at judgments concerning free will and moral responsibility, a widespread anomaly in folk intuitions has been reported. This has given rise to two different explanatory frameworks- one counting on affect that has been projected as making all the difference between compatibilism and Incompatibilism and the other relying on Strawsonian participant attitude while accounting for compatibilist responses. The aim of this paper is to bring to the fore the asymmetric folk intuitions regarding ascription of moral responsibility, the expository accounts- one put forward by Shaun Nichols and the other by Eddy Nahmias, and show possibility of reconciliation between the two apparently different views, especially when it comes to unravelling the psychological mechanism underlying compatibilist intuition
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First archival date: 2010-11-22
Latest version: 2 (2010-12-10)
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2010-11-22

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