AI, Concepts, and the Paradox of Mental Representation, with a brief discussion of psychological essentialism

J. Of Exper. And Theor. AI 13 (1):1-7 (2001)
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Abstract

Mostly philosophers cause trouble. I know because on alternate Thursdays I am one -- and I live in a philosophy department where I watch all of them cause trouble. Everyone in artificial intelligence knows how much trouble philosophers can cause (and in particular, we know how much trouble one philosopher -- John Searle -- has caused). And, we know where they tend to cause it: in knowledge representation and the semantics of data structures. This essay is about a recent case of this sort of thing. One of the take-home messages will be that AI ought to redouble its efforts t o understand concepts.

Author's Profile

Eric Dietrich
State University of New York at Binghamton

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