A Liberal Paradox for Judgment Aggregation

Social Choice and Welfare 31 (1):59-78 (2008)
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Abstract

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected proposi- tions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert know- ledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen's 'liberal paradox'. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions.

Author Profiles

Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universit√§t, M√ľnchen

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