What is new about poverty? A question that anyone can answer and mostly can validate it through life experiences. Poverty is a concern for everyone, so it is hoped that everyone will work to interfere. However, with the number of research on poverty in a global context, it is practically difficult to track how each country addresses global poverty on its own. Hence, poverty is broad as its concept is concerned. Poverty is a difficult concept to describe, especially because it (...) is a complicated and contentious social reality. Despite the challenges in obtaining a consensus description of poverty, the understanding for such concept is a significant endeavor, not just theoretically or empirically, but also practically, because this definition may be used in the future to orient public policies aimed at combating poverty or improving the living conditions of the impoverished. In most cases, poverty is associated to lack of income and to address as such is just a matter of wealth distribution. Which happens in the Philippines through a poverty reduction program the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program that aims to end poverty and yet, poverty remains a main concern and continue to persist. Thus, the aim of this paper is to scrutinize the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) implemented by the government as human development measure to end the vicious cycle of poverty. It aims to look at the purpose if the 4Ps is really gird towards human development or it lacks the principle of a fully human development measure in addressing poverty. This critical analysis is brought for the reason that researches are limited only as to the effects of 4Ps to its beneficiaries if the 4Ps is helpful or not. However, the paper wants to dig deeper as the goal of the 4Ps is concerned. Also, to contribute in the strengthening of the human development program of the government in the lenses of philosophical undertaking. In doing so, it applies the capability approach of Amartya Sen in the analysis of the 4Ps. As this paper argued that the capability approach of Sen gives us a holistic perspective of poverty in which Sen envisions a fully human development for the poor. (shrink)

El artículo presenta un análisis de cuatro temas centrales de Sen: su visión sobre el ser humano, la libertad individual, la evaluación moral y los derechos, y la igualdad. Con esto quiero mostrar que estas ideas no sólo son consistentes, sino que explican muchas de las reflexiones sobre temas sociales y económicos que lo han convertido en un referente en estas áreas. En las conclusiones presentaré una síntesis e interpretación de estas ideas fundamentales, mostrando cómo constituyen un núcleo filosófico y (...) qué relaciones mantienen entre ellas. Mi objetivo no es encasillarlo en algunas de las corrientes de filosofía actuales, sino destacar la solidez y pertinencia de su aporte filosófico, algo sumamente útil en un tiempo como el nuestro, deseoso de ideas frescas para los acuciantes problemas de siempre. (shrink)

Over the last 30 years the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya Sen has developed an original normative approach to the evaluation of individual and social well-being. The foundational concern of this ‘capability approach’ is the real freedom of individuals to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value. This freedom is analysed in terms of an individual’s ‘capability’ to achieve combinations of such intrinsically valuable ‘beings and doings’ (‘functionings’) as being sufficiently nourished and freely expressing one’s political views. In (...) this account, ‘development’ is conceived as the expansion of individuals’ capability, and thus as a concept that goes beyond the economic growth of third world countries. My thesis is a philosophical examination of Sen’s capability approach. In the first part (chapters 1-3) I present and defend my interpretation of Sen’s work. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has recently told us how he feels he has not yet made his mark as an economist. I notice that he is strangely not named in the background information to an essay competition. It concerns why some nations are wealthy and others poor, names other economists, and even discusses freedom and capabilities. Here I address the question of why Sen is absent and, more generally, at risk of devaluation.

La aspiración a formar sociedades justas se choca con alarmantes niveles de pobreza y desigualdad, un problema al cual toda reflexión sobre la justa sociedad debe ofrecer una respuesta convincente. Esta ponencia afirma (1ª parte) que la experiencia que tenemos de las injusticias – como la pobreza – puede dar origen a una reflexión sobre la justicia. Luego (2ª parte) presenta el concepto de pobreza según el enfoque de las capacidades de Amartya Sen y lo completa con una interpretación (...) filosófica de la pobreza como privación radical de libertad individual. Finalmente (3ª parte) analiza y critica la forma en que la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls no aborda el problema de la pobreza y propone un principio de justicia previo a los dos de Rawls – el principio “cero” – que recoge el desafío que la pobreza plantea al concepto de sociedad justa. (shrink)

Political violence is a broad term that is often identified with acts of violence perpetuated by individuals or the state with the lone purpose of achieving political goals. Political violence may come in two modes, either as political terrorism or counter terrorism. The former is determined as the aggressive manipulation of an individual’s judgments by threats and intimidations to achieve political change. Such intimidations are often perpetuated by non-governmental agents who act on the basis of a certain political ideology. The (...) latter presupposes the preventive measures the government is doing in fighting against all forms of terrorism, which in the process will inevitably lead to war. War, in this regard, is conceived to be the lone and most feasible alternative, taken by the state, in order to resolve arm conflicts and political violence. With the intention that in so doing, the absolute welfare and well-being of the people is safeguarded and proliferated. It is for this reason that the paper intends to examine whether the well-being of the people is upheld if the state, inflicted with arm conflicts and terrorism, will engage with war against non-government agents. Moreover, the paper intends to examine, following Amartya Sen’s capability approach, how both of these forms of political violence affect the development of the individual. This paper, following Sen, adheres to the idea that any attempt of resolving violence by resorting to war is futile. War in all its form is destructive to the claim of individual development. The government that readily engages into war without having to consider first any democratic dialogues in solving arm conflicts is not fulfilling its task of protecting and prioritizing the development of the people. In war there is no individual development. (shrink)

Una poderosa intuición atravesaba el discurso con el que Jawaharlal Nehru, en la medianoche del 15 de agosto de 1947, se dirigía a la asamblea y, a través de la radio, a millones de indios esperanzados y jubilosos: “Hace muchos años fijamos una cita con el destino; ahora llega el momento de cumplir nuestra promesa. Cuando suene la hora de la medianoche, mientras el mundo duerme, la India despertará a la vida y a la libertad”. La estabilidad del futuro de (...) la India y su democracia solo se alcanzarían rescatando de su olvidada historia y su denostada tradición las raíces democráticas silenciadas durante tanto tiempo por la devastación intelectual producida por el colonialismo y su infame ejercicio, que encerró al país en un anquilosado arquetipo atemporal, en el que la religiosidad, la mística y la espiritualidad se establecieron como señas de identidad y orgullo de un pueblo que acabaría por identificar lo genuinamente indio con aquello que se desmarcaba de lo “presumiblemente” occidental, hasta acabar convirtiéndolo en un elemento de lucha y afirmación contra la metrópoli, desterrando de la dignidad india su pasado más racional y argumentativo. (shrink)

Amartya Sen’s remarkable endeavour to realize the normative capability of welfare economics goes beyond the impecunious resultants of the neoclassical welfare economy. The neoclassical welfare economy decoratively bracketed values to speculate about factual observations. This was due to the influence of logical positivists and their convictions about experimental scientific statements (primarily mathematical) and their vicinity to empirical truths and analytic statements. Sen adequately inquires “whether morality can be expressed in the form of choice between preference patterns rather than between (...) actions” (Sen, 1997a, 78). “A new phase classical theory” in economics from the hands of Sen and some others put forth two pivotal issues in a unified manner: a. Mathematical models of an economy. b. Ethical reflection on the subject of welfare economy–a value-laden enterprise in Sen’s literature. -/- In general, welfarists and utilitarians affirm that moral values are anchored in individual agency and involve mental metric utilities (pleasure, happiness, pain etc.). This focus, first of all, results in a disadvantage, as it undermines freedom in terms of achievement. Secondly, it pays no heed to achievement reasonably giving more importance to those who are incapable of reflecting on any one of those mental metrics. Besides, Sen argues that equality of opportunity does not accord with the equality of freedom, and its reason is rooted in the scope of the incongruity of human beings and the diversified meanings of efficiency. Developing a general methodological approach to revisit the notion of inequality concerned by exploring a particular substantive stand that Sen aims to underscore involves examining how social arrangements work to define freedom, capabilities, and welfare to ensure comparisons and assessments of quality of life. (shrink)

review of two similar collections on well-being.

Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct (...) a normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance. (shrink)

In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen, among other things, discusses certain qualities any adequate theory of justice ought to incorporate. Two important qualities a theory of justice should account for are impartiality/objectivity and sensitivity to consequences. In order to motivate his discussion of sensitivity to consequences, Sen discusses the debate between Krishna and Arjuna from the religio-philosophical Hindu text the Bhagavad Gita. According to Sen, Arjuna represents a sensitivity to consequences while Krishna is an archetypal deontologist. In this (...) paper it will be argued that Sen's interpretation of the Gita is inaccurate. Further, a more adequate interpretation will be presented. What will be of significance is that the more adequate interpretation actually demonstrates the importance of an impartial spectator in moral reasoning. Finally, there will be a discussion of some lessons that can be taken from the Gita regarding justice generally. (shrink)

Capability approach pioneers Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum both recognize empowerment as an important aspect of human development. They seem to disagree, however, about how empowerment should be represented within the capability approach (CA). This essay is concerned with the analysis of the foundational concepts at work within Sen and Nussbaum’s CAs. Part One concerns the key concepts of empowerment at work in Sen’s CA and has three goals. 1) Clarify Sen’s various empowerment concepts. 2) Argue that Sen’s concept (...) of Realize Agency Success is flawed. 3) Make clear that empowerment in Sen’s approach can be helpfully understood in terms of agency and capability set expansion. Part Two considers Nussbaum’s CA and the debate over whether it can account for empowerment. I conclude that not only can Nussbaum’s CA account for empowerment, but that the role of empowerment in both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s CAs can be understood in terms of agency and capability set expansion. In other words, Sen and Nussbaum actually agree about empowerment at the foundational level. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in (...) any given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based “reasoned choices,” Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has recently leveled a series of what he alleges to be quite serious very general objections against Rawls, Rawlsian fellow travelers, and other social contract accounts of justice. In The Idea of Justice, published in 2009, Sen specifically charges his target philosophical views with what calls transcendentalism, procedural parochialism, and with being mistakenly narrowly focused on institutions. He also thinks there is a basic incoherence—arising from a version of Derek Parfit’s Identity Problem—internal to the Rawslian theoretical apparatus. (...) Sen would have political philosophy pursue intersocietal comparisons of relative justice more directly and in the manner of social choice theory. Yet the positive argument he develops in support of this method is quite thin. That aside, Sen’s polemical strategy of inflicting death by a thousand cuts is ineffective against the Rawlsian paradigm. For, as I show herein, none of these criticisms have the force we might be led to expect. (shrink)

The 2004-5 essay competition set by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis asks, “Why are some countries rich and some countries poor?” It has information which strangely does not feature the name Amartya Sen. But I have conceived of a defence against the charge that this is bad practice, which resembles appealing to the descriptivist theory of names.

This paper analyzes areas of convergence in the works of Amartya Sen and Slavoj Žižek in their criticisms of the multiculturalist approach to non-violence. First, Žižek’s characterization of the liberal discourse of guilt and fear is presented. Then, Sen’s key ideas on multiculturalism, tolerance, and rational critique are explicated. Next, a synthesis of Sen and Žižek’s notions of universality, freedom, and rationality, as well as of their critical conceptions of globalization and anti-globalization are discussed. Subsequently, Sen and Žižek’s divergences (...) on overcoming violence are examined. Lastly, from integrating Sen and Žižek’s thoughts, key theses are provided on the paradoxical character of the multiculturalist approach to non-violence and on how despite their divergences, both Sen and Žižek propose radical systematic changes and an alternative approach to non-violence characterized by the universals of rationality and genuine freedom. (shrink)

In his recent bookThe Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests that political philosophy should move beyond the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm – what Sen calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’ – towards a more practically oriented approach to justice: ‘realization-focused comparison’. In this article, I argue that Sen's call for a paradigm shift in thinking about justice is unwarranted. I show that his criticisms of the Rawlsian approach are either based on misunderstandings, or correct but of little consequence, and conclude that the (...) Rawlsian approach already delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice. (shrink)

Consequentialism is seen by Philip Pettit mainly as a theory of the appropriate; in his conception of virtual consequentialism he is much less concerned with the theory of Good. Nevertheless, he pays attention to values such as rights, freedom, loyalty, confidence, dignity and love, although his analyses are isolated, and the connections with other values are not taken into account. He focuses especially on the values of freedom and rights. Contrary to Pettit, Amaryta Sen is much more concerned with the (...) latter, although there is no complex value framework to be find in his evaluator relative theory. He sees these values as the basis of the value system of any morais. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification of ‘perfect’ justice is neither necessary nor sufficient. He replaces ‘perfect’ justice with comparative justice. Comparative justice limits itself to comparing social states with respect to degrees of justice. Sen’s central thesis is that identifying ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states are ‘analytically disjoined’. This essay refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make adequate comparisons we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This (...) is precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s theory): identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. The same integrated criteria that determine ‘perfect’ justice are needed to be able to adequately compare imperfect social states. Sen’s alternative approach, which is based on social choice theory, is incapable of avoiding contrary, indeterminate or incoherent directives where plural principles of justice conflict. (shrink)

Decentralising Bengaluru Urban -The Regional Planning way -/- Author / Authors : Priyadarshini Sen Page no.139 -148 Discipline : Applied Economics/ Management/ Commerce/Geography Script/language : Roman/English Category : Research paper Keywords: Regional Planning, Metropolis, Social wellbeing, Settlement.

Some theorists—including Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Gaus, and Amartya Sen—endorse versions of 'public reason' as the appropriate way to justify political decisions while rejecting 'ideal theory'. This chapter proposes that these ideas are not easily separated. The idea of public reason expresses a form of mutual 'civic' respect for citizens. Public reason justifications for political proposals are addressed to citizens who would find acceptable those justifications, and consequently would comply freely with those proposals should they become law. Hence public reasoning (...) involves 'local ideal theorizing': the justification of political proposals includes their consideration and evaluation under conditions of compliance with them by the citizens to whom those justifications are addressed. Local ideal theorizing, moreover, can lead to 'full ideal theorizing', wherein citizens outline and evaluate an amended version of their society’s 'basic structure'. This argument is illustrated by some recent empirical work on inequality within the United States. (shrink)

Là một nhà nghiên cứu kinh tế có nhiều thành tựu, một trong các nhà khoa học có chỉ số các bài báo khoa học được công bố quốc tế cao nhất cả nước, TS Vương Quân Hoàng (Trường ĐH Phenikaa) đã chia sẻ cùng Nhân Dân hằng tháng những quan điểm cá nhân về một năm kinh tế nhiều dấu ấn của đất nước.

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of (...) Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that categories play significant roles in the appreciation of artworks. This paper argues that the correct categories of artworks are institutionally established through social processes. Section 1 examines the candidates for determining correct categories and proposes that this question should shift the focus from category membership to appreciative behaviour associated with categories. Section 2 draws on Francesco Guala’s theory of institutions to show that categories of artworks are established as rules-in-equilibrium. Section 3 reviews the explanatory benefits (...) of this institutional theory of the correct category. [Winner of the 2022 Debates in Aesthetics Essay Prize]. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the practice of categorizing works of art and its relationship to art criticism. How a work of art is categorized influences how it is appreciated and criticized. Being frightening is a merit for horror, but a demerit for lullabies. The brushstrokes in Monet's "Impression, Sunrise" (1874) look crude when seen as a Neoclassical painting, but graceful when seen as an Impressionist painting. Many of the judgments we make about artworks are category-dependent in this way, but previous research (...) has rarely examined in depth the ontological structure of art categories, how they are generated and maintained, and how they function. This dissertation fills this gap. The proposal of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. Categories (especially genres) should be analyzed as clusters of rules that regulate the responses and behaviors of agents in the artworld. The visual mundaneness is a critical reason to consider Duchamp's "Comb" (1916) provocative, given the existence of the readymade as a set of rules that justifies such reasoning. The critical and appreciative practice of which categorization is a part is a social practice of making, declaring, proposing, reforming, and developing rules of appreciation. How we appreciate artworks, and how criticism guides our appreciation, is sensitive to how we categorize artworks. How we categorize artworks is sensitive to what categories have been set up in our community and which categories are active regarding each artwork. (shrink)

La pobreza y la democracia guardan relaciones complejas y ya bastante estudiadas por los científicos sociales. En este artículo no volveré sobre estos enfoques, ni tampoco insistiré en los problemas de gobernabilidad que nacen de la pobreza, sino que presentaré la crítica filosófico-política al ideal democrático que resulta cuando consideramos a la pobreza como privación de libertad individual. A la pobreza se la puede entender desde múltiples perspectivas filosóficas, pero el interpretarla como privación de libertad individual, como lo hace (...) class='Hi'>Amartya Sen, la pone en relación directa y problemática con un sistema de gobierno que precisamente hace de las libertades, y de la libertad humana en general, su nervio central. Quisiera sostener que la existencia de la pobreza pone en duda que vivamos en sociedades democráticas porque cuestiona la finalidad y la esencia de estas comunidades, a la vez que les desafía a pensar cómo pueden convertirse realmente en sociedades justas. Comenzaré con una interpretación filosófica de la pobreza a partir de algunas ideas de Sen (sección 1). Seguiré con el análisis de la relación que se podría establecer entre la privación de libertad y la comunidad política según tres filósofos de la tradición occidental: Aristóteles, Baruch de Espinosa y John Locke (sección 2), y terminaré presentando tres desafíos que la pobreza presenta a nuestras democracias (sección 3). (shrink)

Abstract— In parallel to developing technology, demand for more energy makes us seek new energy sources. Wind and solar energy are the most popular ones owing to their abundance, ease of availability and convertibility to electric energy. This work covers realization of a hybrid renewable energy system. The scheme involves conversion of solar power and wind power into usable electrical energy using solar panel and by designing a wind turbine with appropriate calculations and specifications. Battery in this system is charged (...) by both solar and wind power, the DC output is then converted to AC using an inverter and fed to the load. The idea of water conservation through rain water collection and storage with the use of solar panel is also implemented. The main aim of the design is to create a system suitable to provide continuous power by utilization of non-conventional energy resources and making use of the additional advantage of the solar panel in the conservation of water. Power resources and load in the system are monitored and controlled in real time. (shrink)

Drèze and Sen are not entirely right in their apparent glorification of the roles of nongovernmental organizations in Bangladesh in An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions because they leave out and/or de-emphasize some important issues, especially those that are related to the problematic trusting relationship between nongovernmental organizations in Bangladesh and rural poor women. Nongovernmental organizations’ use of trust disturbs social solidarity in rural Bangladesh mainly because of their massive supervision mechanism that they undertake to sustain the so-called trusting (...) relationship between them and their debtors. The massive supervision mechanism damages social solidarity also because it creates a tension between local norms and nongovernmental organizations’ neoliberalist values of “discipline, efficiency and competitiveness,” which nongovernmental organizations try to inject into villagers by their numerous social engineering programs, which are state’s responsibility. Nongovernmental organization monitoring has some psychological impacts on their clients that also contribute to shaking social solidarity. The absence of a proper trusting relationship between nongovernmental organizations and rural poor women reduces the capabilities of the latter as a result of which Drèze and Sen’s glorification of Bangladeshi nongovernmental organizations and Sen’s capabilities approach are in tension. However, there are strategies that Bangladeshi nongovernmental organizations should employ to address the issues raised due to their massive supervision mechanism. (shrink)

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected proposi- tions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert know- ledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen's 'liberal paradox'. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the (...) unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions. (shrink)

Amartya Sen’s critique of the concept of need and his case for the superiority of capability as a measure of advantage have been highly influential. However, Sen perpetuates a caricature. Needs are not necessarily mere instrumental resource requirements for the achievement of ends; the valuable ends of people’s lives can themselves constitute needs, as can freedoms. Indeed, these ideas are already present in basic needs theory. Moreover, official disavowals notwithstanding, expansive notions of need are implicitly present in certain important (...) theories of capabilities and other advantages. Objections to need can be undermined in part by showing how this is the case. Aversion to need is unfortunate, because the concept offers powerful theoretical resources that could be better exploited if negative preconceptions were overcome and need were explicitly embraced. However, this proposal is friendly. It is not that need should replace, but that it can augment, other concepts. Drawing on need may assist with: selecting important capabilities or dimensions of advantage; marking a distinction of seriousness between these and relatively trivial advantages (and buttressing claims to the ethical or political priority of the former); explaining the incommensurability/non-substitutability of certain capabilities and dimensions of advantage, and; defining notions of sufficiency. (shrink)

La cobertura universal de salud está en el centro de la acción actual para fortalecer los sistemas de salud y mejorar el nivel y la distribución de la salud y los servicios de salud. Este documento es el informe fi nal del Grupo Consultivo de la OMS sobre la Equidad y Cobertura Universal de Salud. Aquí se abordan los temas clave de la justicia (fairness) y la equidad que surgen en el camino hacia la cobertura universal de salud. Por lo (...) tanto, el informe es pertinente para cada agente que infl uye en ese camino y en particular para los gobiernos, ya que se encargan de supervisar y guiar el progreso hacia la cobertura universal de salud. (shrink)

This report from the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage offers advice on how to make progress fairly towards universal health coverage.

Objective: Lung cancer is the most common cause of morbidity and mortality. Platinum-based chemotherapy, which is the primary line of treatment, offers limited benefit due to drug resistance and side effects. Berberine (BBR), which is characterised by its potent and safe anticancer activity, represents a promising combination option in chemotherapy. To overcome the limitations in lung cancer chemotherapy, we investigated whether BBR and cisplatin (CIS) exert synergistic effects on non-small cell lung cancer cell line (A549) based on cytotoxicity and apoptotic (...) response markers. -/- Methods: The potential cytotoxic effects of the combination treatment were evaluated using the MTT and Chou-Talalay methods. Elisa assays were also performed to measure the levels of the pro-apoptotic protein Bax and the effector protein caspase (Cas)-3. -/- Results: The results showed that BBR alone reduced A549 cell viability in a dose-dependent manner and synergized with CIS (CI =0.34±0.05 at IC50 concentrations). Elisa results showed that the combined treatment (both at IC50 concentrations) modulated apoptotic signalling pathways in A549 cells. Bax and Cas3 protein levels were dramatically enhanced in A549 cells treated with CIS +BBR compared to control (0.5% DMSO) (p < 0.001). -/- Conclusion: Our results suggest that BBR can synergistically enhance the therapeutic effect of CIS in A549 cells. The potential therapeutic efficacy of BBR as part of a combination in current chemotherapy should be supported by in-depth research and clinical studies on the molecular mechanisms associated with cancer. (shrink)

This paper develops and explores a new framework for theorizing about the measurement and aggregation of well-being. It is a qualitative variation on the framework of social welfare functionals developed by Amartya Sen. In Sen’s framework, a social or overall betterness ordering is assigned to each profile of real-valued utility functions. In the qualitative framework developed here, numerical utilities are replaced by the properties they are supposed to represent. This makes it possible to characterize the measurability and interpersonal comparability (...) of well-being directly, without the use of invariance conditions, and to distinguish between real changes in well-being and merely representational changes in the unit of measurement. The qualitative framework is shown to have important implications for a range of issues in axiology and social choice theory, including the characterization of welfarism, axiomatic derivations of utilitarianism, the meaningfulness of prioritarianism, the informational requirements of variable-population ethics, the impossibility theorems of Arrow and others, and the metaphysics of value. (shrink)

Poverty, understood as basic capability deprivation, can only be solved through a process of expanding the freedoms that people value and have reason to value. This process can only begin if the capability to imagine and aspire for an altenative lifestyle worthy of human dignity is cultivated by an education program that develops both the capability to reason and to value. These two facets play a major role in the creative exercise of human agency. This program of humane education can (...) only come from an adequate description of the human agent as a persona that seeks to actualize itself based on his/her understanding of the good. Education must therefore seek to cultivate the capability to have an adequate conception of the good (normative) as well as the capability to constantly re-evaluate one’s conception of the good (evaluative) in order to freely and reasonably choose a life that one values and has reason to value. Education must therefore entail not merely the development of skills nor specialization in a particular field but must concentrate on the integration of the human person as a whole which leads to self-creative praxis. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer (...) an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal. (shrink)

El concepto de desarrollo humano del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) surge en 1990 como una crítica a la consideración de la economía como el fin último de los esfuerzos del desarrollo. En la visión del PNUD, la economía es considerada un fin relativo, es decir, un fin y un medio para el desarrollo humano. Al considerar, por su parte, el fin del desarrollo humano, este es identificado con el ensanchamiento de las opciones y libertades de (...) que gozan los individuos. En este sentido, este concepto de desarrollo humano hace alusión a una práctica política más que a un entendimiento ético-ontológico del ser humano, evitando referirse a desarrollo humano entendido como un desarrollo del ser humano. Este artículo explora los antecedentes del concepto del desarrollo humano del PNUD y los fines que consideran estos enfoques previos. Se observa que la consideración subjetivista del PNUD proviene de la teoría de Amartya Sen, quien queda sujeto a la crítica objetivista de Martha Nussbaum al no considera un fin objetivo para los asuntos humanos, crítica que puede de igual manera aplicarse al concepto de desarrollo humano del PNUD. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est double. D’une part, il vise à identifier une interprétation éthique de la neutralité axiologique, et non de réduire ce critère à des considérations épistémologiques comme la distinction entre faits et valeurs. On peut, en effet, interpréter le critère de neutralité axiologique comme un mécanisme visant à défendre l’autonomie des différents membres de la communauté universitaire. D’autre part, cet article entend utiliser cette interprétation éthique pour répondre aux critiques contemporaines de la neutralité axiologique. Amartya Sen (...) et Hilary Putnam ont proposé des critiques pertinentes de la neutralité axiologique, en réfléchissant sur les conditions d’objectivité du discours éthique et politique. Au terme de cette analyse, nous proposerons une conception publique de la science, qui répond à l’impératif éthique de neutralité en sciences sociales, ainsi qu’au programme de recherche amorcé par Sen et Putnam. L’examen critique et public de la science est ce qui permet de respecter tant l’exigence de neutralité chez Weber que la demande d’une science renouvelée chez Sen et Putnam. (shrink)

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being, Jon Elster and John E. Roemer The Quality of Life, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.

The capability approach, which is closely connected to the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, is one possible theoretical framework that could be used to answer the question as to why poverty is a problem from a moral point of view. In this paper we will focus on the normative philosophical capability approach rather than the social scientific and descriptive perspective. We will show that the approach characterizes poverty mainly as a limitation of freedom and that it is (...) precisely this aspect, from its point of view, that makes poverty morally significant. This insight shifts the discussion away from questions regarding specific capabilities or lists of them-questions treated extensively in the literature-to the more general level of what constitutes the normative core of the capability approach. But as we will also discuss and argue, the role of freedom alone does not give us a complete picture of poverty but only presents us with one aspect relevant to evaluating it. A further aspect which we consider has not been adequately recognized and taken into account by most capability theorists is the experience of disrespect and humiliation, or to put it differently, a lack of recognition. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are often said to have held opposed views concerning the way “the value” of different pleasures should be estimated. Mill is accused of being an inconsistent utilitarian because he thought that, when comparing the value of two pleasures, we should not forget to take their “quality” into account. Bentham, on the other hand, is said to have believed that we should take “only quantity” into consideration. By verifying what they actually wrote, and reflecting on (...) what they meant by words like “value”, “quantity”, and “quality”, we find that these allegations are largely imaginary and that the difference between Mill and Bentham on this question has (at least) been exaggerated. Bentham, for example, did not write that "quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry", as is so often reported. In his Principles of Morals and Legislation he clearly tells us why he rejects the inaccurate word “quantity”, when speaking of “the value of (a lot of) pain or pleasure”, and he explicitly introduces “quality” – both the word and the concept – in his analysis of rewards and punishments. These clarifications allow us to sort-out a few other confusions concerning utilitarianism. We explain, for example, why authors like Amartya Sen and Michael Sandel are mistaken in believing that rights and freedoms have “no intrinsic value” (only instrumental value) in utilitarian ethics. (shrink)

International development theorists and practitioners agree that human empowerment is a necessary part of good development. This agreement is encouraging because attention and resources are being directed towards the important goal of empowering the oppressed. It is problematic because the agreement is relatively superficial and masks some deep and important disagreements about the goals and means of development theory, policy, and practice. Chapters One and Two compare the dominant economic growth approach to development with the capability approach, a relatively new (...) alternative. I determine that the capability approach offers a more complete and therefore, superior concept of empowerment. Chapter Three considers Thomas Pogge’s argument for the conclusion that the praise and attention the capability approach receives cannot be justified. I explain that Pogge’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of the capability approach, including the important role of empowerment. Chapters Four and Five provide detailed consideration of the role of empowerment within both Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s versions of the capability approach. I conclude that although neither scholar consistently uses the term empowerment, the concept of empowerment – both as agency and as capability-set expansion – plays a robust role on both versions of the approach. Moreover, I make the controversial suggestion that many of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are more a matter of style than substance. Chapter Six considers the concern that Sen does not do enough to engage the role of institutionalized power in generating inequalities that prevent individuals from being empowered. I conclude that despite valuable contributions, Sen fails to provide a complete account of empowerment issues. However, this is not a fatal flaw. Considering both Sen’s contributions, and the fact that the approach is well suited to accommodate a more complete understanding of institutionalized power and of empowerment for development (for example, Naila Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach), it is clear that Sen and the capability approach have offered valuable steps towards a complete concept of empowerment. (shrink)

Adaptive preferences are preferences formed in response to circumstances and opportunities – paradigmatically, they occur when we scale back our desires so they accord with what is probable or at least possible. While few commentators are willing to wholly reject the normative significance of such preferences, adaptive preferences have nevertheless attracted substantial criticism in recent political theory. The groundbreaking analysis of Jon Elster charged that such preferences are not autonomous, and several other commentators have since followed Elster’s lead. On a (...) second front, Capacity Theorists Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have objected that adaptive preferences lead people away from objective goods and constitute an impediment to progressive change in developing countries. In this paper I argue that the criticisms of Elster, Sen and Nussbaum fail on the one hand to take into account what may be positively said in favour of this type of preference formation, and fail on the other hand to distinguish between different types of psychological changes – with the result that many of the critiques offered have a narrower purview than is currently allowed. My analysis of adaptive preferences, even in their most ideal form, is however not entirely positive; I adduce reasons why we can be cautious about allowing adaptive preferences to play certain types of roles in political processes, even as we accept those very preferences as normative and autonomous for the agent holding them. [International scholars without access to the AJPAE are invited to email [email protected] for a pdf copy of this article.]. (shrink)