Categorical versus graded beliefs

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Abstract
This essay discusses the difficulty to reconcile two paradigms about beliefs: the binary or categorical paradigm of yes/no beliefs and the probabilistic paradigm of degrees of belief. The possibility for someone to hold both types of belief simultaneously is challenged by the lottery paradox, and more recently by a general impossibility theorem by Dietrich and List (2018, 2021). The nature, relevance, and implications of the tension are explained and assessed.
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2022
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DIECVG
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First archival date: 2021-11-11
Latest version: 3 (2022-03-21)
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2021-11-11

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