From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory

Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap. The paper is organized around a baseline impossibility theorem, which we use to map out the space of possible solutions to the belief-binarization problem. Our theorem shows that, except in limiting cases, there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying four initially plausible desiderata. Surprisingly, this result is a direct corollary of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem in social choice theory.
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DIEFDO
Revision history
First archival date: 2020-04-19
Latest version: 2 (2020-04-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.Fitelson, Branden & Easwaran, Kenny

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-08-31

Total views
182 ( #23,254 of 50,265 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #29,555 of 50,265 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.