Role of the Frame Problem in Fodor's Modularity Thesis

In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited (1996)
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It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.
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The Modularity of Mind.Cummins, Robert & Fodor, Jerry
Brainstorms.Dennett, Daniel
Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of Endel Tulving.Roediger, Henry L. I. & Craik, Fergus I. M. (eds.)
The Robot's Dilemma.Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (ed.)

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