The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggregation rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation.
Reprint years
2008, 2010
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-08-29
Latest version: 3 (2020-04-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
On Social Facts.Gilbert, Margaret
The Society Of Mind.Minsky, Marvin L.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
285 ( #15,423 of 49,098 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #18,860 of 49,098 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.