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  1. Empathy and Anastomosis: On the Empathetic interpretation of Universal archetypes.Jeffery Childers - manuscript
    This work deconstructs the subjective experience, and identifies the role of empathy in experience as being capable of reconciling the mob mindedness that accompanies ideologies. The essence of the paper is to discuss and elucidate the societal impact of empathetic being, and the correlation with such states of being as an avenue for learning which identifies and interprets reality rather than realizing it. The idea is that by empathetically interpreting our experience and empathetically informing our modes of expression, one becomes (...)
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  2. Against the diversity objection to group worldview description.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper defends the practice of attributing a worldview to a group against the objection that this practice overlooks different views within the group and wrongly portrays the group as homogeneous.
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  3. “Everyone knows X”: analytic philosophy, medicine, and Lacanian psychoanalysis.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This is a one page handout presenting different attempts to understand claims of the form "Everyone knows X.".
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  4. Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none).Richard Pettigrew -
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is (...)
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  5. Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.
    A group is lying when it makes a statement that it believes to be untrue but wants the addressee(s) to believe. But how can we distinguish statements that the group believes to be untrue from honest group statements based on mistaken beliefs or confusion within the group? I will suggest a narrative constraint for honest group statements, made up of two components. Narrative coherence requires that a new group statement should not conflict with group knowledge on the matter, or beliefs (...)
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  6. Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts.Lukas Schwengerer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework. I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge. Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations. I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework that can explain these desiderata. I (...)
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  7. Pluralistic Summativism about Group Belief.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In what sense do groups have beliefs? This paper provides a novel answer to this question by combining pluralism and summativism about group belief. The resulting view is called pluralistic summativism. The paper starts by critically assessing the three main debates in the literature—the disputes between monism and pluralism, summativism and non-summativism, and believism and rejectionism—and draws a general methodological lesson for the summativism/non-summativism debate—namely, that intuitions about cases alone are not enough to adjudicate between views of group belief, and (...)
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  8. Questioning the Body. Certainties between Epistemology and Psychopathologies.Claudio Fabbroni - 2023 - In Ines Skelac & Ante Belić (eds.), What Cannot Be Shown Cannot Be Said: Proceedings of the International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Zagreb, Croatia, 2021. Lit Verlag. pp. 161-174.
    Having a body is one of those unquestionable certainties of which we could not really understand the negation: the latter would not be a legitimate doubt in our linguistic, and therefore the epistemic game. In facts, according to Wittgenstein, contravening certain cornerstones of our language game implies that the used combination of words is being excluded from the game, withdrawn from circulation. The idea of this paper is that the external labelling of a behaviour as a mental illness, prima facie, (...)
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  9. Permissive Divergence.Simon Graf - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):240-255.
    Within collective epistemology, there is a class of theories that understand the epistemic status of collective attitude ascriptions, such as ‘the college union knows that the industrial action is going to plan’, or ‘the jury justifiedly believes that the suspect is guilty’, as saying that a sufficient subset of group member attitudes have the relevant epistemic status. In this paper, I will demonstrate that these summativist approaches to collective epistemology are incompatible with epistemic permissivism, the doctrine that a single body (...)
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  10. On group lies and lying to oneself: comment on Jennifer Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups.Megan Hyska - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-8.
    In The Epistemology of Groups, Jennifer Lackey investigates the conditions for the possibility of groups telling lies. Central to this project is the goal of holding groups, and individuals within groups, accountable for their actions. I show that Lackey’s total account of group phenomena, however, may open up a means by which groups can evade accusations of having lied, thus allowing them to evade responsibility in precisely the way Lackey set out to avoid. Along the way, I also take note (...)
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  11. An anchored joint acceptance account of group justification.Lukas Schwengerer - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):432-450.
    When does a group justifiedly believe that p? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunately, Jennifer Lackey developed a powerful argument against joint acceptance (...)
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  12. Collective vice and collective self-knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2023 - Synthese 201 (19):1-18.
    Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based (...)
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  13. Group Belief: Summativism in Non-summativist Cases.Youssef Aguisoul - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (3):231-243.
    The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary (...)
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  14. Scientific Progress: By-Whom or For-Whom?Finnur Dellsén - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 97 (C):20-28.
    When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather (...)
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  15. Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Group Belief against the Challenge from Group Lies.Lukas Schwengerer - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (4):421-428.
    Joint acceptance accounts of group belief hold that groups can form a belief in virtue of the group members jointly accepting a proposition. Recently, Jennifer Lackey (2020, 2021) proposed a challenge to these accounts. If group beliefs can be based on joint acceptance, then it seems difficult to account for all instances of a group telling a lie. Given that groups can and do lie, our accounts of group belief better not result in us misidentifying some group lies as normal (...)
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  16. Would we lie to you?: Jennifer Lackey: The epistemology of groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, 224 pp, $70 HB. [REVIEW]Kenneth Boyd - 2021 - Metascience 30 (3):397-400.
    A review of Jennifer Lackey's "The Epistemology of Groups".
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  17. Can a Wise Society be Free? Gilbert, Group Knowledge and Democratic Theory.Joshua Anderson - 2020 - Ethics, Politics and Society 3:28-48.
    Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize (...)
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  18. AS SOMBRAS CEGAS DE NARCISO (um estudo psicossocial sobre o imaginário coletivo).Roberto Thomas Arruda (ed.) - 2020 - Terra à Vista.
    No presente trabalho, vamos abordar algumas das questões essenciais sobre o imaginário coletivo e suas relações com a realidade e a verdade. Devemos encarar esse assunto em uma estrutura conceptual, seguida pela análise factual correspondente às realidades comportamentais demonstráveis. Adotaremos não apenas a metodologia, mas principalmente os princípios e proposições da filosofia analítica, que com certeza serão evidentes ao longo do estudo e podem ser identificados pelos recursos descritos por Perez[1] : Rabossi (1975) defende a ideia de que a filosofia (...)
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  19. Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History 16 (1):125-178.
    In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This (...)
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  20. Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
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  21. Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.
    I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...)
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  22. Introduction to the special issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision.Franz Dietrich & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):1-4.
    This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contribution. The beliefs occur in groups, which is ambiguous between beliefs of (...)
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  23. The Solution to Poor Opinions is More Opinions: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the Epistemic Long Game.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, Tina Besley & Mats Hyvonen (eds.), Post-Truth, Fake News: Viral Modernity & Higher Education. Springer. pp. 43-58.
    Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent tour (...)
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  24. Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
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  25. Trump, Propaganda, and the Politics of Ressentiment.Cory Wimberly - 2018 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 32 (1):179-199.
    This article frames Trump's politics through a genealogy of propaganda, going back to P.T. Barnum in the 19th century and moving through the crowd psychologist Gustave Le Bon and the public relations counsel Edward Bernays in the 20th. This genealogy shows how propaganda was developed as a tool by eager professionals who would hire themselves to the elite to control the masses. Trump’s propaganda presents a break in that he has not only removed professionals from control over his propaganda, he (...)
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  26. Do corporations have minds of their own?Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):265-297.
    Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in (...)
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  27. Крим як Храмова гора.Ruslana Demchuk - 2016 - NaUKMA Research Papers. History and Theory of Culture 179:10-17.
    «Крим як Храмова гора» – новітній дискурс, артикульований російським президентом Путіним як ідеологічне прикриття анексії Криму 2014 р., що виступає пролонгацією «кримського міфу». Зазначений міф представлений дискурсами «Легендарний Севастополь» у радянський та «Крим наш» у пострадянський періоди. Компенсаторні дискурси започатковано трагічними подіями Кримської війни (1853–1856 рр.) як сублімація посттравматичної ментальності, обумовлена низкою військових та політичних поразок Росії на території Кримського півострова. Експресивні репрезентації образу Севастополя через пісенний інтертекст, передусім, стосуються російської «сакральної географії». Таким чином, тривалий «севастопольський» дискурс структурувався як антиукраїнський, (...)
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  28. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
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  29. Collective Intentionality.Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - In Lee C. McIntyre & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 214-227.
    In this chapter, we focus on collective action and intention, and their relation to conventions, status functions, norms, institutions, and shared attitudes more generally. Collective action and shared intention play a foundational role in our understanding of the social. -/- The three central questions in the study of collective intentionality are: -/- (1) What is the ontology of collective intentionality? In particular, are groups per se intentional agents, as opposed to just their individual members? (2) What is the psychology of (...)
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  30. What is a mode account of collective intentionality?Michael Schmitz - 2016 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses. Cham: Springer. pp. 37-70.
    This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and thus (...)
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  31. Developing Community Epistemic Capacities.Ian Werkheiser - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (2):97-101.
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  32. Disagreement and Authority: comparing ecclesial and scientific practices.Louis Caruana - 2015 - In A. J. Carroll, M. Kerkwijk, M. Kirwan & J. Sweeney (eds.), Towards a Kenotic Vision of Authority in the Catholic Church. The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 91-102.
    In recent years, disagreement as a philosophical topic has started to attract considerable attention, giving rise to rich debates not only on the logical nature of disagreement but also on specifically political and religious forms of it. Moreover, in some recent documents of the Catholic Church, we see corresponding attempts at understanding religious pluralism, dialogue among religions, and doctrinal tensions that sometimes arise within various parts of the Church itself. In such debates, many assume that the realm of the humanities (...)
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  33. Friends with benefits! Distributed cognition hooks up cognitive and social conceptions of science.P. D. Magnus & Ron McClamrock - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1114-1127.
    One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, (...)
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  34. Human thinking, shared intentionality, and egocentric biases.Uwe Peters - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):1-16.
    The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper focusses on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases in communication.
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  35. Joint Commitment and Collective Belief.Leo Townsend - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9 (9):46-53.
    According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing (...)
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  36. Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds.Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):17-31.
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...)
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  37. Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
    This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes—e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes—but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation.
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  38. When to defer to supermajority testimony — and when not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” (...)
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  39. Against Group Cognitive States.Robert D. Rupert - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 97-111.
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  40. Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):1-24.
    According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosophical debate has often remained at some distance from relevant empirical research, while empirical memory research, in particular, has been somewhat slow to incorporate distributed/extended ideas. This situation, however, appears to be changing, as we witness an increasing level (...)
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  41. Subject, Mode and Content in We-Intentions.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and Mind 2.
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  42. O afrykańskim stanie rzeczy. Analiza teorii systemu autorstwa Paulina J. Hountondji'ego.Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2011 - In A. Żukowski (ed.), Problem bogactwa i biedy we współczesnej Afryce. pp. 393-413.
    Beniński filozof Paulin J. Hountondji jest autorem teorii systemu, która aspiruje do przynajmniej częściowego wytłumaczenia przyczyn złej kondycji afrykańskich społeczeństw i państw. Afrykański społeczno-polityczny stan rzeczy charakteryzuje, zdaniem Hountondjiego, przede wszystkim wadliwa organizacja struktur instytucjonalnych państw oraz codziennego życia Afrykanów. Hountondji krytykuje liczne wady afrykańskiej rzeczywistości - w tym inercję instytucji, działania pełne absurdów, marnowanie czasu, energii i zdrowia - i zarazem poszukuje ich ukrytych, „systemowych” podstaw. W rozumieniu Hountondjiego, system to zbiór wzajemnie ze sobą powiązanych elementów organizacji afrykańskich społeczeństw. (...)
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  43. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  44. Bayesianism, convergence and social epistemology.Michael J. Shaffer - 2008 - Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219.
    Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian (...)
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  45. Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective.Christian List - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
    In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group’s aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group (...)
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  46. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and the (...)
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  47. Externalism.Robert A. Wilson - 2003 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: pp. 92-97.
    Introduction to externalism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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  48. On the Rational Basis of Revelation in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption.Abraham Mounitz - manuscript
    On the Rational Basis of Revelation in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption -/- Abraham Mounitz Zefat Academic College Israel -/- Abstract The present study focuses on ‘revelation,’ one of the three constitutive concepts, and possibly the most central such concept, in Rosenzweig’s philosophy. As opposed to its ostensibly religious meaning, the article offers a view of the rational element enfolded within this concept in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. By employing a textual exegesis based on a close reading of Rosenzweig’s language, the (...)
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