A direction effect on taste predicates

Philosophers' Imprint 20 (27):1-22 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of use. We show in a range of experiments that neither prediction is correct. People have no clear preferences either way and which taste standard they choose in evaluating a previous taste claim crucially depends on whether they start out with a favorable attitude towards the object in question and then come to have an unfavorable attitude or vice versa. We suggest an account of the data in terms of what we call hybrid relativism.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DINADE
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-11-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-11-01

Total views
90 ( #46,378 of 2,448,874 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #23,679 of 2,448,874 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.