Speaks's Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):275-284 (2016)
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Abstract
Speaks defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2-adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore and King, against the view that propositions are n-tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman against King's view that propositions are facts of a special sort. We offer our argument as an objection to the view that propositions are unsaturated relations.
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Archival date: 2016-09-21
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