Responsibility for Collective Inaction and the Knowledge Condition

Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):532-554 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into groups capable of so doing. In this paper I argue that several questionable assumptions have shaped the character and scope of inquiry to this point, precluding us from grappling with a range of important questions concerning the epistemic dimensions of collective inaction. I offer an overview of recent conversation concerning collective inaction, advance a critique of the picture of responsibility that has emerged from this conversation, and propose an alternative approach to th...
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DOARFC-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-05-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-05-02

Total views
235 ( #15,326 of 43,872 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #18,255 of 43,872 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.