Explaining our Moral Reliability

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):71-86 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DOGEOM-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-06-04
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:76-101.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-04-26

Total downloads
120 ( #19,022 of 37,187 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #20,058 of 37,187 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.