Explaining our Moral Reliability

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):71-86 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning.

Author's Profile

Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-26

Downloads
597 (#14,003)

6 months
93 (#9,260)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?