Diamonds Are Forever

Noûs (forthcoming)
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Abstract
We defend the thesis that every necessarily true proposition is always true. Since not every proposition that is always true is necessarily true, our thesis is at odds with theories of modality and time, such as those of Kit Fine and David Kaplan, which posit a fundamental symmetry between modal and tense operators. According to such theories, just as it is a contingent matter what is true at a given time, it is likewise a temporary matter what is true at a given possible world; so a proposition that is now true at all worlds, and thus necessarily true, may yet at some past or future time be false in the actual world, and thus not always true. We reconstruct and criticize several lines of argument in favor of this picture, and then argue against the picture on the grounds that it is inconsistent with certain sorts of contingency in the structure of time.
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First archival date: 2018-08-17
Latest version: 3 (2018-12-05)
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References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Naturalness.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
Frege's Puzzle.Forbes, Graeme & Salmon, Nathan
Everything.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Modal Science.Williamson, Timothy
Temporary Safety Hazards.Russell, Jeffrey Sanford
Operator Arguments Revisited.Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani; Hawthorne, John & Fritz, Peter

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