10 found
Order:
See also
Jeremy Goodman
University of Southern California
  1. Diamonds Are Forever.Cian Dorr & Jeremy Goodman - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):632-665.
    We defend the thesis that every necessarily true proposition is always true. Since not every proposition that is always true is necessarily true, our thesis is at odds with theories of modality and time, such as those of Kit Fine and David Kaplan, which posit a fundamental symmetry between modal and tense operators. According to such theories, just as it is a contingent matter what is true at a given time, it is likewise a temporary matter what is true at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  2. Thinking and Being Sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-27.
    How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by "believe". On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon -- it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Classical Opacity.Michael Caie, Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):524-566.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  4. Counting Incompossibles.Peter Fritz & Jeremy Goodman - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1063–1108.
    We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  5. Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 1: Closure and Generation.Peter Fritz & Jeremy Goodman - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (6):645-695.
    This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism – the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, according to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  6. Perspectivism.Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):623-648.
    Consider the sentence “Lois knows that Superman flies, but she doesn’t know that Clark flies”. In this paper we defend a Millian contextualist semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions, according to which ordinary uses of this sentence are true but involve a mid-sentence shift in context. Absent any constraints on the relevant parameters of context sensitivity, such a semantics would be untenable: it would undermine the good standing of systematic theorizing about the propositional attitudes, trivializing many of the central questions of (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  7. Knowing Against the Odds.Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.
    We present and discuss a counterexample to the following plausible principle: if you know that a coin is fair, and for all you know it is going to be flipped, then for all you know it will land tails.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  8. Sense, Reference and Substitution.Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):947-952.
    We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Frege’s distinction between sense and reference does not reconcile a classical logic of identity with apparent counterexamples to it involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. Agglomerative Algebras.Jeremy Goodman - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (4):631-648.
    This paper investigates a generalization of Boolean algebras which I call agglomerative algebras. It also outlines two conceptions of propositions according to which they form an agglomerative algebra but not a Boolean algebra with respect to conjunction and negation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10. Consequences of Conditional Excluded Middle.Jeremy Goodman - manuscript
    Conditional excluded middle (CEM) is the following principe of counterfactual logic: either, if it were the case that φ, it would be the case that ψ, or, if it were the case that φ, it would be the case that not-ψ. I will first show that CEM entails the identity of indiscernibles, the falsity of physicalism, and the failure of the modal to supervene on the categorical and of the vague to supervene on the precise. I will then argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations