Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge

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Abstract
In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of this conclusion, especially for the issue of whether imagination can help us to learn something from fictions.
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DORKBI-2
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Archival date: 2016-05-13
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.Williamson, Timothy
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John

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2016-05-13

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