Resolving Religious Disagreements

Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83 (2018)
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Abstract
Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of religion and advocate one of them as the best for promoting the resolution of religious disagreements.
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ISBN(s)
0739-7046
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DORRRD
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Archival date: 2017-12-11
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2017-12-11

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