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  1. Risk-Limited Indulgent Permissivism.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    This paper argues for a view described as risk-limited indulgent permissivism. This term may be new to the epistemology of disagreement literature, but the general position denoted has many examples. The paper argues for the need for an epistemology for domains of controversial views (morals, philosophy, politics, and religion), and for the advantages of endorsing a risk-limited indulgent permissivism across these domains. It takes a double-edge approach in articulating for the advantages of interpersonal belief permissivism that is yet risk-limited: Advantages (...)
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  2. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 1: Kinds of Religious Luck: A Working Taxonomy.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    Although there has been little written to date that speaks directly to problems of religious luck, described in other terms these problems have a long history. Contemporary contributors to the literature have referred to “soteriological luck” (Anderson 2011) “salvific luck” (Davidson 1999) and “religious luck” (Zagzebski 1994). Using “religious” as the unifying term, Part I of this monograph begins with the need a more comprehensive taxonomy. Serious philosophic interest in moral and epistemic luck took hold only after comprehensive taxonomies for (...)
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  3. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 2: The New Problem of Religious Luck.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    One main kind of etiological challenge to the well-foundedness of someone’s belief is the consideration that if you had a different education/upbringing, you would very likely accept different beliefs than you actually do. Although a person’s religious identity and attendant religious beliefs are usually the ones singled out as targets of such “contingency” or “epistemic location” arguments, it is clear that a person’s place and time has a conditioning effect in all domains of controversial views, and over all of what (...)
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  4. Gods Revisited.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Inspired by Paul Moser's recent work, this paper presents a new parable on the topic of belief and unbelief in the tradition of Wisdom, Flew and Mitchell. -/- This paper was read at the annual POH Symposium at Lake Wenatchee, WA in May, 2010. An edited version of this paper has appeared in the second issue of the Seattle Critical Review (online).
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  5. Theism and Christianity.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this essay, I investigate the implications for the discussion of theism in philosophy of religion for the beliefs of ordinary Christians and conclude that, in light of its historical development, those implications are minimal.
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  6. The Burning Bush.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I present some ruminations on Hume's argument from miracles and the distorted view of rationality that it reflects (along with religious skepticism generally) contrasting it with what I take to be a better account of rationality, one more sympathetic - at least less hostile - to religious claims.
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  7. What's Love Got to Do with It?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    I examine the notion of the authoritative command of divine love developed by Paul Moser in his book The Elusive God. Using a Calvinist objection to Moser's contention that God must love every one, including His enemies, I conclude that the notion of an authoritative command of divine love is paradoxical. I then offer a resolution of this paradox on terms that I judge to be in line with Moser's intentions.
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  8. Can a Christian Be a Mycologist?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    I agree with about 95% of what Paul Moser has written in his book The Elusive God. However, I have three main points of disagreement with Moser, two of which I ventilate in this paper. The third I discuss in my paper "What's Love Got to Do with It?" also on this website.
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  9. Knowing in the Teeth of the Diallelus - How Rightly Not to Be Sceptical.Jude Arnout Durieux -
    What can we know if we take sceptical worries such as the Münchhausen trilemma seriously? Quite a lot, actually - if the world is a certain way, namely if transcendent mediocrity is the case.
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  10. Alcune riflessioni storico-critiche di epistemologia teologica.Giuseppe Iurato - manuscript
    In questa nota storico-critica, anche contestualmente alla nozione di cambio concettuale toulmiano, si vuol riflettere sull'opportunità metodologica di un ritorno, in senso heideggeriano, all'autenticità dell'originario pensiero filosoco greco sia per meglio chiarire i termini dei rapporti fra pensiero scientifico e teologia sistematica sia per inquadrare, in maniera più coerente e maggiormente comprensiva, le principali concezioni della dottrina eucaristica della teologia cattolica che, ripensate entro l'impianto ontoteologico heideggeriano, avvaloreranno e giusticheranno le teorie transustanziali rispetto a quelle consustanziali.
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  11. Alcune riflessioni storico-critiche di epistemologia teologica.Giuseppe Iurato - manuscript
    In questa nota storico-critica, anche contestualmente alla nozione di cambio concettuale toulmiano, si vuol riflettere sull'opportunità metodologica di un ritorno, in senso heideggeriano, all'autenticità dell'originario pensiero filosoco greco sia per meglio chiarire i termini dei rapporti fra pensiero scientico e teologia sistematica sia per inquadrare, in maniera più coerente e maggiormente comprensiva, le principali concezioni della dottrina eucaristica della teologia cattolica che, ripensate entro l'impianto ontoteologico heideggeriano, avvaloreranno e giusticheranno le teorie transustanziali rispetto a quelle consustanziali.
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  12. Rational Epistemics of Divine Reality Leading to Monism.Domenic Marbaniang - manuscript
    Rational epistemics is the line of reasoning inclined to reason separated from reliance on experience that ultimately leads to monism or non-dualism.
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  13. God, Logic and Evolution.Jan-A. Riemersma - manuscript
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  14. A Probabilistic Defense of Proper De Jure Objections to Theism.Brian C. Barnett - 2019
    A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a “proper” de jure objection—a de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced a general argument against all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically fallacious (it makes subtle probabilistic fallacies (...)
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  15. The Problem of The Self-Ascription of Sainthood.Gorazd Andrejč - forthcoming - In Tyler McNabb & Victoria S. Harrison (eds.), Philosophy and the Spiritual Life. Oxford, UK:
    The main idea of this essay stems from a grammatical peculiarity of ‘being a saint’ in the Christian context, which can be described as follows: the term ‘saint’ seems to be ascribable only to others but not to oneself. This is because claiming for oneself that one is a saint is considered morally and spiritually inappropriate, indeed self-defeating. Does this mean that sainthood is not a real property? Not all Christians are convinced that the problem with the self-ascriptions of sainthood (...)
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  16. Problems of Religious Luck, Ch. 5: "Scaling the ‘Brick Wall’: Measuring and Censuring Strongly Fideistic Religious Orientation".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    This chapter sharpens the book’s criticism of exclusivist responsible to religious multiplicity, firstly through close critical attention to arguments which religious exclusivists provide, and secondly through the introduction of several new, formal arguments / dilemmas. Self-described ‘post-liberals’ like Paul Griffiths bid philosophers to accept exclusivist attitudes and beliefs as just one among other aspects of religious identity. They bid us to normalize the discourse Griffiths refers to as “polemical apologetics,” and to view its acceptance as the only viable form of (...)
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  17. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    This book has argued that problems of religious luck, especially when operationalized into concerns about doxastic risk and responsibility, can be of shared interest to theologians, philosophers, and psychologists. We have pointed out counter-inductive thinking as a key feature of fideistic models of faith, and examined the implications of this point both for the social scientific study of fundamentalism, and for philosophers’ and theologians’ normative concerns with the reasonableness of a) exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, and b) theologically-cast but bias-mirroring (...)
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  18. Wittgenstein and Contemporary Belief-Credence Dualism.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Wittgenstein and the Epistemology of Religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This paper examines religious epistemics in relationship to recent defenses of belief-credence dualism among analytic Christian philosophers, connecting what is most plausible and appealing in this proposal to Wittgenstein’s thought on the nature of religious praxis and affectively-engaged language-use. How close or far is Wittgenstein’s thought about faith to the analytic Christian philosophers’ thesis that “beliefs and credences are two epistemic tools used for different purposes”? While I find B-C dualism appealing for multiple reasons, the paper goes on to raise (...)
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  19. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 3: "Enemy in the Mirror: The Need for Comparative Fundamentalism".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    Measures of inductive risk and of safety-principle violation help us to operationalize concerns about theological assertions or a sort which, as we saw in Part I, aggravate or intensify problems of religious luck. Our overall focus in Part II will remain on a) responses to religious multiplicity, and b) sharply asymmetrical religious trait-ascriptions to religious insiders and outsiders. But in Part II formal markers of inductive norm violation will supply an empirically-based manner of distinguishing strong from moderate fideism. As we (...)
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  20. Problems of Religious Luck, Ch. 4: "We Are All of the Common Herd: Montaigne and the Psychology of Our 'Importunate Presumptions'".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies and (...)
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  21. Freud's Critique of Religion.Ian M. Church - forthcoming - In R. Douglas Geivett & Robert B. Stewart (eds.), Dictionary of Christian Apologists and Their Critics. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  22. If We Can’T Tell What Theism Predicts, We Can’T Tell Whether God Exists: Skeptical Theism and Bayesian Arguments From Evil.Nevin Climenhaga - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    According to a simple Bayesian argument from evil, the evil we observe is less likely given theism than given atheism, and therefore lowers the probability of theism. I consider the most common skeptical theist response to this argument, according to which our cognitive limitations make the probability of evil given theism inscrutable. I argue that if skeptical theists are right about this, then the probability of theism given evil is itself largely inscrutable, and that if this is so, we ought (...)
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  23. The Epistemic Benefits of Religious Disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
    Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who are committed to religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them (...)
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  24. Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Paul Allen (ed.), The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology. New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury.
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge. This entry covers epistemology in two parts: one historical, one contemporary. The former provides a brief theological history of epistemology. The latter outlines three categories of contemporary epistemology: traditional epistemology, social epistemology, and formal epistemology, along with corresponding theological questions that arise in each.
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  25. N, N-DIMETHYLTRYPTAMINE AND BIOLOGICAL REDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS FOR RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCES.Shaun Smith - forthcoming - Liberty University Digital Commons.
    There is unquestionably a plethora of details and mysteries regarding the mind and the body. However, with the advent of psychopharmacology (the study of how psychedelics inform or alter brain states) there are more issues at hand. Do psychedelics allow us to access deeper areas of our consciousness? Are we having a spiritual experience under the influence of psychedelics? Dr. Rick Strassman does not want to continue asking these rather conspiratorial-like questions. Instead, Dr. Strassman believes that there is one special, (...)
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  26. How is Analytical Thinking Related to Religious Belief? A Test of Three Theoretical Models.Adam Baimel, Cindel J. M. White, Hagop Sarkissian & Ara Norenzayan - 2021 - Religion, Brain and Behavior 11 (3):239-260.
    The replicability and importance of the correlation between cognitive style and religious belief have been debated. Moreover, the literature has not examined distinct psychological accounts of this relationship. We tested the replicability of the correlation (N = 5284; students and broader samples of Canadians, Americans, and Indians); while testing three accounts of how cognitive style comes to be related to belief in God, karma, witchcraft, and to the belief that religion is necessary for morality. The first, the dual process model, (...)
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  27. The Clash Between Scientific and Religious Worldviews: A Re‐Evaluation.Louis Caruana - 2021 - Heythrop Journal 63 (1):19-26.
    Many assume that science and religion represent two worldviews in mutual conflict. These last decades however, the improved study of the social, psychological and historical dimensions of both science and religion has revealed that the two worldviews may not be as mutually antagonistic as previously assumed. It is important therefore to review carefully the very idea of a clash of worldviews. This paper seeks to make a contribution in this area by exploring the deeper, hidden attitudes and dispositions that are (...)
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  28. Supernatural Resurrection and its Incompatibility with the Standard Model of Particle Physics.Robert Greg Cavin & Carlos A. Colombetti - 2021 - Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry 3 (2):253-277.
    In response to Stephen Davis’s criticism of our previous essay, we revisit and defend our arguments that the Resurrection hypothesis is logically incompatible with the Standard Model of particle physics—and thus is maximally implausible—and that it cannot explain the sensory experiences of the Risen Jesus attributed to various witnesses in the New Testament—and thus has low explanatory power. We also review Davis’s reply, noting that he evades our arguments, misstates their conclusions, and distracts the reader with irrelevancies regarding, e.g., what (...)
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  29. Evidence Through a Glass, Darkly.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):56-61.
    ABSTRACT Dormandy’s ‘True Faith’ presents two views on the proper epistemological stance towards faith: doxastic-partialism and evidentialism. Here, I argue for a third option that cuts across the evidentialism/partialism distinction. I first analyze the Pascalian conception of faith, arguing that Pascal begins with the cognitive attitude of acceptance rather than belief. Next, I discuss Dormandy’s case for evidentialism, and contend that some evidence—the kind gained through transformative experiences—presents a difficulty for her argument. Finally, I offer my proposed view—Partialist Evidentialism—and argue (...)
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  30. Does "Think" Mean the Same Thing as "Believe"? Linguistic Insights Into Religious Cognition.Larisa Heiphetz, Casey Landers & Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 13 (3):287-297.
    When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in conjunction (...)
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  31. Interactive Religious Imagination.Malm Lindberg Ingrid - 2021 - The Junkyard.
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  32. MISTERO E ANALOGIA NELLA TEOLOGIA RAZIONALE E IN ETICA. IN DIALOGO CON ALCUNE TESI DI MARIO MICHELETTI.Damiano Migliorini - 2021 - Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia Della Religione 1:107-129.
    In the essay I analyse Micheletti’s three theses concerning: (a) the notion of mystery in relation to the “evidentialistic claim”; (b) analogical metaphysics in relation to “univocist immanentism” and to the importance of developing an analogical theism; (c) the fallibilistic conception of reason in relation to natural law, universalistic ethics and the so-called “essentialism” applied to individual human nature. I will try to show how deep is the intertwining and mutual implication of mystery and analogy – in metaphysics and theology, (...)
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  33. Philosophy of Modeling in the 1870s: A Tribute to Hans Vaihinger.Karlis Podnieks - 2021 - Baltic Journal of Modern Computing 9 (1):67-110.
    This paper contains a detailed exposition and analysis of The Philosophy of “As If“ proposed by Hans Vaihinger in his book published in 1911. However, the principal chapters of the book (Part I) reproduce Vaihinger’s Habilitationsschrift, which was written during the autumn and winter of 1876. Part I is extended by Part II based on texts written during 1877–1878, when Vaihinger began preparing the book. The project was interrupted, resuming only in the 1900s. My conclusion is based exclusively on the (...)
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  34. La racionalidad pragmática de la creencia religiosa.Angel Rivera-Novoa - 2021 - Cauriensia 16:531-556.
    En este artículo, defiendo que las creencias religiosas pueden ser pragmáticamente racionales. Una creencia religiosa es pragmáticamente racional si es consistente con una ética de las virtudes, como la de Martha Nussbaum, al margen de si tal creencia tiene evidencia o justificación como soporte epistémico. Para lograr tal objetivo, primero, analizaré algunas tesis pragmatistas y anti-evidencialistas de William James y Richard Rorty. En segundo lugar, analizaré el evidencialismo de William Clifford y Susan Haack. Luego, argumentaré que, aunque los argumentos evidencialistas (...)
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  35. Ecclesial Belonging in a World of Pure Experience: William James, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Religious Rationality in Crisis.Walter Scott Stepanenko - 2021 - Open Theology 7 (1):111-128.
    The global COVID-19 pandemic has spotlighted several instances of churches violating state issued and scientifically recommended guidelines designed to keep populations healthy and to prevent the further spread of the disease. While these instances are minority responses to these orders, they nonetheless raise questions about the rationality of ecclesial belonging in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, I draw on the work of William James and W. E. B. Du Bois to articulate a conception of ecclesial belonging as (...)
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  36. The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion.Walter Scott Stepanenko - 2021 - Religions 12 (7):466.
    Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that (...)
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  37. Religious Disagreement Is Not Unique.Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-106.
    In discussions of religious disagreement, some epistemologists have suggested that religious disagreement is distinctive. More specifically, they have argued that religious disagreement has certain features which make it possible for theists to resist conciliatory arguments that they must adjust their religious beliefs in response to finding that peers disagree with them. I consider what I take to be the two most prominent features which are claimed to make religious disagreement distinct: religious evidence and evaluative standards in religious contexts. I argue (...)
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  38. On the Epistemic Role of Our Passional Nature.Frederick D. Aquino & Logan Paul Gage - 2020 - Newman Studies Journal 17 (2):41-58.
    In this article, we argue that John Henry Newman was right to think that our passional nature can play a legitimate epistemic role. First, we unpack the standard objection to Newman’s understanding of the relationship between our passional nature and the evidential basis of faith. Second, we argue that the standard objection to Newman operates with a narrow definition of evidence. After challenging this notion, we then offer a broader and more humane understanding of evidence. Third, we survey recent scholarship (...)
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  39. The Vagueness of Religious Beliefs.Daniele Bertini - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (2):181-210.
    My paper characterizes religious beliefs in terms of vagueness. I introduce my topic by providing a general overview of my main claims. In the subsequent section, I develop basic distinctions and terminology for handling the notion of religious tradition and capturing vagueness. In the following sections, I make the case for my claim that religious beliefs are vague by developing a general argument from the interconnection between the referential opacity of religious belief content and the long-term communitarian history of the (...)
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  40. Ansia epistemica e diversità religiosa.Daniele Bertini - 2020 - Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia Della Religione 14:2-10.
    Persistent disagreements may induce parties in the disagreement to experience a strong state of anxiety. Such anxiety has a psychological nature in ordinary cases of disagreement (i.e., cases which do not impact on the doxastic identity of the opposing epistemic agents). On the contrary, the more the content of a disagreement concerns basic issues related to the non-negotiable views for the parties involved, the more anxiety turns out to be of an epistemic kind, and, accordingly, suggests a set of normative (...)
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  41. "Can Faith Be Empirical?".Mark J. Boone - 2020 - Science and Christian Belief 32 (1):63-82.
    THIS IS A PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION OF THE PAPER and does not have the same pagination as the published version. -/- It is sometimes said that religious belief and empiricism are different or even incompatible ways of believing. However, William James and notable twentieth-century philosophers representing Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity have argued that there is a high degree of compatibility between religious faith and empiricism. Their analyses suggest that there are three characteristics of empiricism—that an empiricist bases his beliefs (...)
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  42. Как верить преданно и твердо? (How to Believe Faithfully and Firmly?).Pavel Butakov - 2020 - Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics 4 (4):167-184.
    Religious people are expected to believe in their religious creeds faithfully and firmly. How can one acquire such belief? In order to answer that question, I propose a model for all belief-like propositional attitudes. The model differentiates, firstly, between voluntary and involuntary, and, secondly, between categorical and quantitative belief-like attitudes. The whole variety of belief-like attitudes is then reduced into two main groups. The first group combines all voluntary and categorical attitudes, and the second group combines all involuntary and quantitative (...)
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  43. The Implausibility and Low Explanatory Power of the Resurrection Hypothesis—With a Rejoinder to Stephen T. Davis.Robert Greg Cavin & Carlos A. Colombetti - 2020 - Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry 2 (1):37-94.
    We respond to Stephen T. Davis’ criticism of our earlier essay, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis.” We argue that the Standard Model of physics is relevant and decisive in establishing the implausibility and low explanatory power of the Resurrection hypothesis. We also argue that the laws of physics have entailments regarding God and the supernatural and, against Alvin Plantinga, that these same laws lack the proviso “no agent supernaturally interferes.” Finally, we offer Bayesian arguments for the Legend hypothesis and against the (...)
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  44. What It Takes to Live Philosophically: Or, How to Progress in the Art of Living.Caleb M. Cohoe & Stephen R. Grimm - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (2-3):391-410.
    This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are (...)
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  45. TEMPO DA DECISÃO E CHAMADO À DECISÃO NA PREGAÇÃO ÉTICO-ESCATOLÓGICA DE JESUS CRISTO: DA PROCLAMAÇÃO DO REINO DE DEUS NA TEOLOGIA ESCATOLÓGICO-EXISTENCIAL DE BULTMANN.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2020 - Revista Último Andar, Cadernos de Pesquisa Em Ciência da Religião, PUC/SP - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo [São Paulo, Brasil] 23 (36): 160 - 189.
    Se a pregação de Jesus consiste no pressuposto da teologia neotestamentária, segundo o pensamento de Bultmann, a análise do seu conteúdo emerge como fundamental para a compreensão do querigma cristão e da construção literário-teológica da comunidade primitiva. Dessa forma, o artigo se detém na pregação ético-escatológica de Jesus, que anuncia o reino de Deus e o tempo da decisão e o chamado à decisão, que converge para a radicalidade e exige a obediência escatológica enquanto realização da vontade de Deus. Assim, (...)
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  46. Languages of Ineffability. The Rediscovery of Apophaticism in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion.Sebastian Gäb - 2020 - In Sebastian Hüsch (ed.), Negative Knowledge. Tübingen: Narr Francke. pp. 191-206.
    I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?
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  47. Is the God Hypothesis Improbable? A Response to Dawkins.Logan Paul Gage - 2020 - In Kevin Vallier & Joshua Rasmussen (eds.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-76.
    In this chapter, Logan Paul Gage examines the only real attempt to disprove God’s existence by a New Atheist: Richard Dawkins’s “Ultimate 747 Gambit.” Central to Dawkins’s argument is the claim that God is more complex than what he is invoked to explain. Gage evaluates this claim using the main extant notions of simplicity in the literature. Gage concludes that on no reading does this claim survive scrutiny. Along the way, Dawkins claims that there are no good positive arguments for (...)
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  48. A Saint for Our Times: Newman on Faith, Fallibility, and Certitude.Logan Paul Gage - 2020 - Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 23 (2):60-76.
    This essay shows how John Henry Newman reconciled the certitude of faith with a fallibilist epistemology. While Newman holds that many of our beliefs are held with certitude, he does not conceive of all certitude as Cartesian, apodictic certitude. In this way, he walks a middle road between rationalism and fideism.
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  49. The Phenomenal Conservative Approach to Religious Epistemology.Logan Paul Gage & Blake McAllister - 2020 - In John M. DePoe & Tyler McNabb (eds.), Debating Christian Religious Epistemology: An Introduction to Five Views on the Knowledge of God. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 61-81.
    In this chapter, we argue for a phenomenal conservative perspective on religious epistemology and attempt to answer some common criticisms of this perspective.
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  50. The Coevolution of Sacred Value and Religion.Toby Handfield - 2020 - Religion, Brain and Behavior 10 (3):252-271.
    Sacred value attitudes involve a distinctive profile of norm psychology: an absolutist prohibition on transgressing the value, combined with outrage at even hypothetical transgressions. This article considers three mechanisms by which such attitudes may be adaptive, and relates them to central theories regarding the evolution of religion. The first, “deterrence” mechanism functions to dissuade coercive expropriation of valuable resources. This mechanism explains the existence of sacred value attitudes prior to the development of religion and also explains analogues of sacred value (...)
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