Thick and Perceptual Moral Beauty
Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18 (2022)
Abstract
Which traits are beautiful? And is their beauty perceptual? It is argued that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain emotion— ecstasy—and that compassion tends to be more beautiful than fair-mindedness because it tends to give rise to this emotion to a greater extent. It is then argued, on the basis that emotions are best thought of as a special, evaluative, kind of perception, that this argument suggests that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain kind of evaluative perceptual experience.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2022
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DORTAP-5
Upload history
Added to PP index
2021-12-21
Total views
97 ( #50,738 of 69,040 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
97 ( #7,211 of 69,040 )
2021-12-21
Total views
97 ( #50,738 of 69,040 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
97 ( #7,211 of 69,040 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.