Thick and Perceptual Moral Beauty

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Abstract
Which traits are beautiful? And is their beauty perceptual? It is argued that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain emotion— ecstasy—and that compassion tends to be more beautiful than fair-mindedness because it tends to give rise to this emotion to a greater extent. It is then argued, on the basis that emotions are best thought of as a special, evaluative, kind of perception, that this argument suggests that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain kind of evaluative perceptual experience.
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2022
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DORTAP-5
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First archival date: 2021-12-21
Latest version: 3 (2022-04-01)
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2021-12-21

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