The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement
Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408 (2020)
Abstract
Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who arecommittedto religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1017/s0034412518000847
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2018-12-03
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