Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):413-427 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival of each stranger for its own sake. Secondly, you are rationally required to achieve as many of these ends as possible, if you have these ends
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-12-08
View other versions
Added to PP

526 (#14,794)

6 months
34 (#25,050)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?