The Qua-Problem and Meaning Scepticism

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17:71–78 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.

Author's Profile

Samuel Douglas
University of Newcastle, Australia

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-01

Downloads
2,270 (#3,303)

6 months
159 (#16,047)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?