Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this paper I give a novel argument for the view that epistemic normative reasons (or evidence) need not be facts. I first argue that the nature of normative reasons is uniform, such that our positions about the factivity of reasons should agree across normative realms –– whether epistemic, moral, practical, or otherwise. With that in mind, I proceed in a somewhat indirect way. I argue that if practical motivating reasons are not factive, then practical normative reasons are not factive. If it is possible to act rationally in the light of a falsehood, as I will say, then some good reasons must be falsehoods. The implication of this argument is perhaps surprising: for one to firmly establish the view that epistemic normative reasons are factive, one must discredit the view that practical motivating reasons are not factive.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-07-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
.Williamson, Timothy

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
201 ( #21,422 of 49,996 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #16,186 of 49,996 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.