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  1. Teleología y funcionalidad en el diseño de artefactos técnicos: una exploración metafísica.G. Flórez-Vega - 2024 - Revista de Filosofía UIS 23 (2):195–214.
    Este artículo presenta una interpretación alternativa de la funcionalidad en el diseño de artefactos técnicos, integrando el concepto de teleología en el ámbito de la filosofía de la tecnología. A través de un análisis detallado y apoyándose en la literatura especializada, se examina cómo la teleología puede enriquecer la comprensión de la esencia de los artefactos técnicos. Las conclusiones proponen una fusión entre los dilemas de la filosofía de la tecnología y la metafísica, expandiendo el marco teórico que aborda la (...)
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  2. Muhammad Iqbal, Philip Pettit and the Explanation of Social Ontology.Saad Malook - 2023 - Epistemology 12 (1):83-96.
    This article explicates the nature of social ontology. There are three social holist theses relevant to the problem: First, the individual and society are not independent of each other. Second, the development of the individual’s human potential depends upon the nature of society. Third, a good society cultivates rather than undermines human potential. To explore the problem, this paper juxtaposes Muhammad Iqbal and Philip Pettit, two social holist philosophers, who belong to the Islamic and Western traditions, respectively. Drawing on the (...)
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  3. Explanationism about Freedom and Orthonomy.David Heering - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    According to a popular idea, freedom is grounded in orthonomy – the ability to be responsive to normative demands. But how exactly must an agent’s action relate to their reasons in order for this orthonomous relationship to hold? In this paper, I propose a novel explanationist answer to this question. I argue that extant answers – causalism and modalism about orthonomy – fail because they fail to account for the fact that intuitions about freedom and orthonomy track facts about explanation. (...)
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  4. Conversations with Chatbots.P. J. Connolly - forthcoming - In Patrick Connolly, Sandy Goldberg & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Conversations Online. Oxford University Press.
    The problem considered in this chapter emerges from the tension we find when looking at the design and architecture of chatbots on the one hand and their conversational aptitude on the other. In the way that LLM chatbots are designed and built, we have good reason to suppose they don't possess second-order capacities such as intention, belief or knowledge. Yet theories of conversation make great use of second-order capacities of speakers and their audiences to explain how aspects of interaction succeed. (...)
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  5. Modeling Action: Recasting the Causal Theory.Megan Fritts & Frank Cabrera - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Contemporary action theory is generally concerned with giving theories of action ontology. In this paper, we make the novel proposal that the standard view in action theory—the Causal Theory of Action—should be recast as a “model”, akin to the models constructed and investigated by scientists. Such models often consist in fictional, hypothetical, or idealized structures, which are used to represent a target system indirectly via some resemblance relation. We argue that recasting the Causal Theory as a model can not only (...)
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  6. Processing adjunct control: Evidence on the use of structural information and prediction in reference resolution.Jeffrey J. Green, Michael McCourt, Ellen Lau & Alexander Williams - 2020 - Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics 5 (1):1-33.
    The comprehension of anaphoric relations may be guided not only by discourse, but also syntactic information. In the literature on online processing, however, the focus has been on audible pronouns and descriptions whose reference is resolved mainly on the former. This paper examines one relation that both lacks overt exponence, and relies almost exclusively on syntax for its resolution: adjunct control, or the dependency between the null subject of a non-finite adjunct and its antecedent in sentences such as Mickey talked (...)
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  7. Virtues, Rights, or Consequences? Mapping the Way for Conceptual Ethics.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Studia Philosophica.
    Are there virtues that constitutively involve using certain concepts? Does it make sense to speak of rights or duties to use certain concepts? And do consequentialist approaches to concepts necessarily have to reproduce the difficulties that plague utilitarianism? These are fundamental orientating questions for the emerging field of conceptual ethics, which invites us to reflect critically about which concepts to use. In this article, I map out and explore the ways in which conceptual ethics might take its cue from virtue-ethical, (...)
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  8. Doing History Philosophically and Philosophy Historically.Marcel van Ackeren & Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In Marcel van Ackeren & Matthieu Queloz (eds.), Bernard Williams on Philosophy and History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Bernard Williams argued that historical and philosophical inquiry were importantly linked in a number of ways. This introductory chapter distinguishes four different connections he identified between philosophy and history. (1) He believed that philosophy could not ignore its own history in the way that science can. (2) He thought that when engaging with philosophy’s history primarily to produce history, one still had to draw on philosophy. (3) Even doing history of philosophy philosophically, i.e. primarily to produce philosophy, required a keen (...)
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  9. Combinatoriality and Compositionality in Everyday Primate Skills.Nathalie Gontier - forthcoming - International Journal of Primatology.
    Human language, hominin tool production modes, and multimodal communications systems of primates and other animals are currently well-studied for how they display compositionality or combinatoriality. In all cases, the former is defined as a kind of hierarchical nesting and the latter as a lack thereof. In this article, I extend research on combinatoriality and compositionality further to investigations of everyday primate skills. Daily locomotion modes as well as behaviors associated with subsistence practices, hygiene, or body modification rely on the hierarchical (...)
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  10. Philosophy is the unborn child of science: looking for a universal common language.Yuriy Rotenfeld - manuscript
    The article "Philosophy is the unborn child of science: in search of a universal commonly used language" explores the problem of creating a universal philosophical language that includes not only the language of classification concepts of natural language that define people's reasoning thinking, but also the language of comparative concepts, which is the basis their mind and wisdom. At the same time, the author divides comparative concepts into two parts, the first of which is determined by particular concepts – concepts (...)
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  11. (1 other version)Agentially Controlled Action: Causal, not Counterfactual.Malte Hendrickx - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):3121-3139.
    Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this (...)
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  12. On the immediate mental antecedent of action.Michael Omoge - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):276-292.
    What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal (...)
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  13. An Algebra for Tracing Categories of Social Processes: From a Surprising Fact to Middle-Range Theory using Categorical-Generative Analysis.Bruno da Rocha Braga - manuscript
    This paper describes a method for the analysis of the evolutionary path of a complex, dynamic, and contingent social phenomenon in an empirical setting. Given empirical evidence of a surprising or anomalous fact, which contradicts the prediction of the wide-acknowledged theory, the goal is to formulate a plausible explanation based on the context of occurrence, taking a holistic and historical point of view. The procedure begins by translating theoretical propositions into grammar rules to describe patterns of either individual action or (...)
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  14. (39 other versions)كيف تشكل اللغة أفكارنا.Salah Osman - manuscript
    تعمل الكلمات كروابط لإدراكات متباينة، ما يسمح لنا بتجميع التجارب الحسية المختلفة تحت مُسمى واحدًا. ينطبق هذا بشكل خاص على المفاهيم التي تُشير إلى أشياء يمكننا رؤيتها أو لمسها، لكننا ما زلنا لا نفهم حقًا كيف تعمل اللغة في تشكيل معنى المفاهيم الأكثر تجريدًا، أو كيف تسمح لنا بتجميع الخبرات معًا تحت مظلة مصطلح واحد يشير إلى شيء لا يمكننا الإشارة إليه أو رؤيته أو لمسه. هذا ما تناقشه «ماريانا مارسيلا بولونيسي» (الأستاذ المشارك بقسم اللغات والآداب والثقافات الحديثة بجامعة بولونيا) (...)
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  15. A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action.Xingfei Zheng - 2021 - Journal of Human Cognition 5 (1):58-74.
    Ordinary action explanation formulated as "I am doing A because I am doing B" is explanation of an action in terms of another action-in-progress. According to Michael Thompson, the explained action is a teleological part of the explaining complex action, which is composed of different parts. Thompson's analysis focuses on the part-whole relation between the explained action and the explaining action, thus ignores a possibility: these two actions can be two different parts of a complex action. I shall argue that (...)
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  16. Introduction.Samuel Murray & Paul Henne - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury. pp. 1 - 12.
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  17. Supreme Mathematics: The Five Percenter Model of Divine Self-Realization and Its Commonalities to Interpretations of the Pythagorean Tetractys in Western Esotericism.Martin A. M. Gansinger - 2023 - Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society 1 (1):1-22.
    This contribution aims to explore the historical predecessors of the Five Percenter model of self-realization, as popularized by Hip Hop artists such as Supreme Team, Rakim Allah, Brand Nubian, Wu-Tang Clan, or Sunz of Man. As compared to frequent considerations of the phenomenon as a creative mythological background for a socio-political struggle, Five Percenter teachings shall be discussed as contemporary interpretations of historical models of self-realization in various philosophical, religious, and esoteric systems. By putting the coded system of the tenfold (...)
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  18. Handling og rasjonalitet.Edmund Henden - 2020 - In Dag Jenssen, Monica Kjørstad, Sissel Seim & Per Arne Tufte (eds.), Vitenskapsteori for sosial-og helsefag. Gyldendal Forlag AS. pp. 78-100.
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  19. Meanings Without Species.Josh Armstrong - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, I critically assess Mark Richard’s interesting and important development of the claim that linguistic meanings can be fruitfully analogized with biological species. I argue that linguistic meanings qua cluster of interpretative presuppositions need not and often do not display the population-level independence and reproductive isolation that is characteristic of the biological species concept. After developing these problems in some detail, I close with a discussion of their implications for the picture that Richard paints concerning the dangers of (...)
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  20. Pragmatic Particularism.Ray Buchanan & Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):62-78.
    For the Intentionalist, utterance content is wholly determined by a speaker’s meaning-intentions; the sentence uttered serves merely to facilitate the audience’s recovering these intentions. We argue that Intentionalists ought to be Particularists, holding that the only “principles” of meaning recovery needed are those governing inferences to the best explanation; “principles” that are both defeasible and, in a sense to be elaborated, variable. We discuss some ways in which some theorists have erred in trying to tame the “wild west” of pragmatics (...)
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  21. What does it mean to inhibit an Action? A Critical Discussion of Benjamin Libet’s Veto in a Recent Study.Robert Reimer - 2022 - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2021 Collocated Workshops. SEFM 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol 13230.
    In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of ex-periments to test whether the will is free. Whilst he originally assumed that the will functions like an immaterial initiator of cerebral processes culminating in actions, he later began to think that it rather works like an immaterial veto inhib-iting unwanted actions by preventing unconsciously initiated cerebral processes from unfolding. Libet’s veto was widely criticized for its Cartesian dualist and interactionist implications. However, in 2016, Schultze-Kraft et al. adopted Libet’s idea (...)
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  22. Against the Illusory Will Hypothesis. A Reinterpretation of the Test Results in Danial Wegner and Thalia Wheatley’s I Spy Experiment.Robert Reimer - 2021 - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2020 Collocated Workshops. SEFM 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
    Since Benjamin Libet’s famous experiments in 1979, the study of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like Libet the scien-tists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt that the will is causally efficacious. In their influential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experi-mental setup to show that agents erroneously experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions are caused by unconscious neural pro-cesses; the agent’s ‘causal experience of will’ (...)
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  23. Words on Kripke’s Puzzle.Maciej Tarnowski & Maciej Głowacki - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.
    In this paper we present a solution to Saul Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief Meaning and use, Dordrecht, 1979) based on Kaplan’s metaphysical picture of words. Although it is widely accepted that providing such a solution was one of the main incentives for the development of Kaplan’s theory, it was never presented by Kaplan in a systematic manner and was regarded by many as unsatisfactory. We agree with these critiques, and develop an extension of Kaplan’s theory by introducing the notion of (...)
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  24. (1 other version)Individuant accions.Adrián Solís - 2021 - Filosofia, Ara! Revista Per a Pensar 2 (7):26-28.
    Com podem fer per individuar accions? Com determinem quines accions són diferents d'unes altres? El present treball discutirà dues teories sobre la individuaci´ó d'accions: la de Davidson i la de Goldman. Atenent a un clàssic escenari filosòfic sobre la individuació d'accions veurem les virtuds i defectes d'aquestes dues propostes.
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  25. Nonsense: a user's guide.Manish Oza - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense (...)
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  26. Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away.Nevin Climenhaga & Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):459-485.
    Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both (...)
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  27. Apulian Qualitative Binominal Noun Phrases.Angelapia Massaro - 2023 - Italian Journal of Linguistics 35.
    We investigate the morphosyntax of qualitative binominal constructions (QBCs) in a Southern Italo-Romance language from the Apulian town of San Marco in Lamis. QBCs are complex noun phrases like ‘a jewelN1 of a villageN2’, appearing here prepositionally (with the preposition də, ‘of’, allowing definites, indefinites, and demonstratives) and non-prepositionally (only allowing definites with definite articles and not proper names). We propose that in the latter, a categorial match in the determiner layer, which we call ‘match D’, relates N1 and N2. (...)
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  28. Agency in the Space of Reasons. A Comment on The Castle.Josep E. Corbi - 2021 - In Petr Kotátko & Tomas Koblízek (eds.), Lessons From Kafka. Praha: Filosofia. pp. 113-140.
    The received view about rationalizing explanations divides our psychological status into two kinds: beliefs and desires. In *The Retrieval of Ethics*, Talbot Brewer makes a case against this view. In this paper, I examine our experience as readers of *The Castle* by Franz Kafka to support Brewer's critical program, that is, his challenge to the received view. I will argue, however, that a proper analysis of this experience poses a serious problem to Brewer's alternative approach, that is, to his attempt (...)
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  29. An Existing Sculps Human Modelling- The Deviations in Dialect of Indian Standard English from the British Colonial Period to Present Times. [REVIEW]Syeda Tasfia Imam, Md Majidul Haque Bhuiyan & Kamrunnahar Rakhi - manuscript
    English is spoken all around the world as it is chosen as the second language to speak within most of the countries. However, from the ancient history of the British to come into this South Asian region, the entrance of English as a speaking language happened. Though, after some centuries, the British went out of the mainland of India, it remains the second-largest spoken language there. Here comes another fact; many words in Standard English changed its form. So, this made (...)
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  30. Somatic Semantics: anorexia and the nature of meaning.Louis Caruana - 2010 - In Antonio Mancini, Silvia Daini & Louis Caruana (eds.), Anorexia Nervosa, a multi-disciplinary approach: from biology to philosophy. Nova Science Publishers. pp. 173-186.
    This paper explores some ways how perceptual-cognitive accounts of anorexia can benefit from philosophy. The first section focuses on the three dimensions of anorexia most open to a contribution from philosophy: the dimensions of language, perception and cognition. In the second section, I offer a brief overview of what philosophy has to say regarding these dimensions, especially as they relate to two crucial issues: introspection and meaning. I draw from current philosophy of language, especially from the arguments against using internal (...)
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  31. Bayes, predictive processing, and the cognitive architecture of motor control.Daniel C. Burnston - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96 (C):103218.
    Despite their popularity, relatively scant attention has been paid to the upshot of Bayesian and predictive processing models of cognition for views of overall cognitive architecture. Many of these models are hierarchical ; they posit generative models at multiple distinct "levels," whose job is to predict the consequences of sensory input at lower levels. I articulate one possible position that could be implied by these models, namely, that there is a continuous hierarchy of perception, cognition, and action control comprising levels (...)
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  32. The leopard does not change its spots: naturalism and the argument against methodological pluralism in the sciences.Jonas Ahlskog & Giuseppina D'Oro - 2022 - In Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), The history of understanding in analytic philosophy: around logical empiricism. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 185-208.
    This paper sets out to undermine the view that a commitment to the early modern conception of the mind as immortalized in Ryle’s metaphor of the (Cartesian) ghost in the machine and in Quine’s metaphor of the (Lockean) myth of the museum is required to articulate a defence of the sui generis character of humanistic explanations. These powerful metaphors have not only contributed to undermining the claim for methodological pluralism by caricaturizing the arguments for disunity in the sciences; they have (...)
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  33. Limited Conventions about Morals.Marinus Ferreira - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Auckland
    n this thesis I describe how conventions specify how to put normative principles into practice. I identify a class of recurring situations where there are some given normative principles in effect, but they underdetermine what each individual should do, and what is best for an individual depends on what others do. I demonstrate that in such cases, whenever the community develops a response that repeatedly brings them to as good an outcome as is available according to their principles, that response (...)
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  34. Communication before communicative intentions.Josh Armstrong - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):26-50.
    This paper explores the significance of intelligent social behavior among non-human animals for philosophical theories of communication. Using the alarm call system of vervet monkeys as a case study, I argue that interpersonal communication (or what I call “minded communication”) can and does take place in the absence of the production and recognition of communicative intentions. More generally, I argue that evolutionary theory provides good reasons for maintaining that minded communication is both temporally and explanatorily prior to the use of (...)
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  35. Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):103-121.
    In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid de re attitude ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of view of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, unlike (...)
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  36. Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12683-12704.
    Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to what (...)
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  37. Revisiting the Six Stages of Skill Acquisition.B. Scot Rousse & Stuart E. Dreyfus - 2021 - In B. Scot Rousse & Stuart E. Dreyfus (eds.), Teaching and Learning for Adult Skill Acquisition: Applying the Dreyfus & Dreyfus Model in Different Fields. Charlotte, NC, USA: pp. 3-28.
    The acquisition of a new skill usually proceeds through five stages, from novice to expert, with a sixth stage of mastery available for highly motivated performers. In this chapter, we re-state the six stages of the Dreyfus Skill Model, paying new attention to the transitions and interrelations between them. While discussing the fifth stage, expertise, we unpack the claim that, “when things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, (...)
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  38. From Habits to Compulsions: Losing Control?Juliette Vazard - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 28 (2):163-171.
    In recent years, there has been a trend in psychiatry to try and explain disorders of action in terms of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of action. In particular, it has been hypothesized that compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder are driven by maladaptive habits. In this paper, I argue that this view of obsessive-compulsive disorder does not fit the phenomenology of the disorder in many patients and that a more refined conceptualization of habit is likely to be helpful in clarifying (...)
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  39. From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.
    ABSTRACT A number of authors have recently advanced a ‘disjunctivist’ view of the rationalising explanation of action, on which rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because p’ are explanations of a fundamentally different kind from rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because she believed that p’. Less attempt has been made to explicitly articulate the case against this view. This paper seeks to remedy that situation. I develop a detailed version of what I take to be the basic argument against (...)
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  40. How Socratic Is Swift's Irony?Chris A. Kramer - 2016 - In Janelle Pötzsch (ed.), Jonathan Swift and Philosophy. Lexington Books. pp. 13-25.
    Was Swift correct that “reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion, which by reasoning he never acquired” (Letter to a Young Gentleman)? If so, what recourse is there to change attitudes especially among those who continue to fervently believe unjustified claims and act upon them in a way that affects other people? I will answer the first question with a qualified yes, and the second I will follow Swift’s implicit proposal to rely upon humor, satire, playful ridicule, (...)
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  41. Explaining Away Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):991-1011.
    The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content (...)
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  42. Simulating Grice: Emergent Pragmatics in Spatialized Game Theory.Patrick Grim - 2011 - In Anton Benz, Christian Ebert & Robert van Rooij (eds.), Language, Games, and Evolution. Springer-Verlag.
    How do conventions of communication emerge? How do sounds or gestures take on a semantic meaning, and how do pragmatic conventions emerge regarding the passing of adequate, reliable, and relevant information? My colleagues and I have attempted in earlier work to extend spatialized game theory to questions of semantics. Agent-based simulations indicate that simple signaling systems emerge fairly naturally on the basis of individual information maximization in environments of wandering food sources and predators. Simple signaling emerges by means of any (...)
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  43. (1 other version)The Skill of Translating Thought into Action: Framing The Problem.Wayne Christensen - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (3):547-573.
    The nature of the cognition-motor interface has been brought to prominence by Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2014), who argue that the representations employed by the cognitive and motor systems should not be able to interact with each other. Here I argue that recent empirical evidence concerning the interface contradicts several of the assumptions incorporated in Butterfill & Sinigaglia’s account, and I seek to develop a theoretical picture that will allow us to explain the structure of the interface presented by this evidence. (...)
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  44. Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.
    This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variety of real-life cases where a person acts habitually but contrary to her beliefs are discussed. The cases serve as dissociations showing that intentional agency is possible without doxastic guidance. The upshot is a model for thinking about the rationality of habitual action and the rationalizing role that habits can play in it. The model highlights the role that our history and institutions play in (...)
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  45. Is Synchronic Self-Control Possible?Julia Haas - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):397-424.
    An agent exercises instrumental rationality to the degree that she adopts appropriate means to achieving her ends. Adopting appropriate means to achieving one’s ends can, in turn, involve overcoming one’s strongest desires, that is, it can involve exercising synchronic self-control. However, contra prominent approaches, I deny that synchronic self-control is possible. Specifically, I draw on computational models and empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience to describe a naturalistic, multi-system model of the mind. On this model, synchronic self-control is impossible. Must we, (...)
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  46. Slurs and register: A case study in meaning pluralism.Justina Diaz-Legaspe, Chang Liu & Robert J. Stainton - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):156-182.
    Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always (...)
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  47. Motor imagery and action execution.Bence Nanay - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    What triggers the execution of actions? What happens in that moment when an action is triggered? What mental state is there at the moment of action-execution that was not there a second before? My aim is to highlight the importance of a thus far largely ignored kind of mental state in the discussion of these old and much-debated questions: motor imagery. While there have been a fair amount of research in psychology and neuroscience on motor imagery in the last 30 (...)
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  48. Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
    In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view (...)
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  49. Reasoning First.Pamela Hieronymi - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 349–365.
    Many think of reasons as facts, propositions, or considerations that stand in some relation (or relations) to attitudes, actions, states of affairs. The relation may be an explanatory one or a “normative” one—though some are uncomfortable with irreducibly “normative” relations. I will suggest that we should, instead, see reasons as items in pieces of reasoning. They relate, in the first instance, not to psychological states or events or states of affairs, but to questions. That relation is neither explanatory nor “normative.” (...)
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  50. The Aristotelian conception of habit and its contribution to human neuroscience.José Ignacio Murillo & Javier Bernacer - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:1-10.
    The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, (...)
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