Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective

In Manuel Dr Knoll, Stephen Snyder & Nurdane Şimşek (eds.), New Perspectives on Distributive Justice. Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 23-51 (2019)
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This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on distributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should – instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements. The next two sections are analytical. The first sketches five possible reasons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. The second discusses the meta-ethical relevance of the lack of consensus on justice and rejects ethical realism and cognitivism based on the argument from deep disagreements.
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Archival date: 2020-03-27
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